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ABSTRACT 
In this current hyperconnected era, many could argue that multifaced daily news 
events, arranged into univocal storylines, generate effects well beyond the media 
environment. Empirically speaking, most explorations of media and cyberspace focus 
discretely on one or the other, parochially missing their potential interaction. More 
specifically, could negative media events, laced with dueling narratives, aimed at the 
United States and its interests by other countries on a given day, impact the level of cyber 
intrusions on U.S. networks the next day? The purpose of this study is to relate today’s 
recorded cyber intrusions on a U.S. network to yesterday’s media events using statistical 
regression models as the method of testing for the relationship’s existence. The analysis 
begins with a broad investigation of all regimes, and then proceeds through specific 
regime types, before narrowing down to case studies of specific countries. The evidence 
provided from these models bears out that negative media narratives projected by other 
countries toward the U.S. generate measurable impacts on the level of ensuing intrusions 
on U.S. networks. Furthermore, these effects vary in important ways across 
countries and regime types contingent upon their unique culture, political context, 
and evolutionary setting. 
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A. RESEARCH SETTING 
Media reporting of cyber attacks seems to increase daily, as do the associated 
tangible or intangible costs of such attacks on individuals or organizations.1  Examples 
span from the cyber intrusions on the Sony Corporation in 2011 and 2014, to the data 
breach at the Office of Personnel Management in 2014, to the more recent WannaCry 
ransomware attacks, and Equifax intrusion of 2017, to the most recent Solar Winds hack 
of 2021 (Andriotis & Minaya, 2017; BBC, 2017; Kroft, 2015; Goodman, 2015; Kantchev 
& Strobel, 2021; Paletta & Yadron, 2015; Paletta, 2015; Richwine, 2014).2  The pervasive 
nature of the internet creates a perverse expectation in many individuals, leading them to 
believe they must remain connected 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (Goodman, 2015).3  As 
this societal dependence on ubiquitous access to the internet continues to grow, so do the 
opportunities for nefarious actors to exploit an internet replete with vulnerabilities 
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993; Denning & Denning, 2010; FireEye, M-Trends, 2016; 
FireEye, M-Trends, 2017; Gandhi, et al., 2011; Goodman, 2015; Hoffman, 2011; Manion 
& Goodrum, 2000; Mims, 2017; Stavridis, 2015). 
Over the last two decades, cyber intrusions have continued to rise in frequency and 
magnitude. Much has been written identifying the problem at hand, but little research has 
been done to identify where to begin to gain an understanding of what drives this behavior 
(CSIS, 2008; Curran, 2010; Denning, 2001; Donohue, 2013; Goodman, 2015; Hoffman, 
 
1 Definitions herein use language that is combined, synthesized, or taken verbatim from the cited 
source(s). See Appendix A for more information and a comprehensive glossary  
Cyber-attack – a cyber-operation, whether offensive or defensive in nature, that is reasonably expected 
to cause injury or death to human beings or damage or destruction to objects (Schmitt, 2013, p. 106). 
2 Cyber – interactions through the use of computer or digital information systems or networks 
(Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 40; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, p. 22). 
3 Internet – the single, interconnected, worldwide system of commercial, governmental, educational, 
and other computer or digital information systems or networks that share (a) the protocol suite specified by 
the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and (b) the name and address spaces managed by the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, 
p. 70; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, pp. 9-17). Used throughout this paper as synonymous with the World 
Wide Web (WWW), cyberspace, or cyber domain. 
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2011; Lukasik, 2011; Lynn III, 2010; Paletta D., 2015; Paletta & Yadron, 2015). Although 
some fundamental research has explored the cyber intrusion phenomenon by using 
predictive algorithms, graphic data presentations, simulation models, and case study 
analysis, researchers continue to pursue a common understanding of what drives cyber-
intrusions  (Bass, 2000; Choo, 2011; Czosseck, Ottis, & Taliharm, 2013; Gandhi et al., 
2011; Qin & Lee, 2004; Valeur, Vegna, Kruegel, & Kemmerer, 2004; Valeriano & Maness, 
2014; Vatis, 2001; Yang, Holsopple, & Sudit, 2006; Yang, Stotz, Holsopple, Sudit, & 
Kuhl, 2009).4  Yet, to date, no research has gathered real-world cyber intrusion data to test 
a conjectured relationship between exogenous catalyst(s) and cyber intrusion activity using 
statistical methods. For example, could diplomatic tension between the United States (US) 
and Iran be driving the number of intrusions on U.S. servers?5  Some evidence exists that 
cyber intrusion activity may be motivated by the level of political cooperation or conflict 
between sovereign nations (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993; Denning, 2001a; Fitri, 2011; 
Gandhi et al., 2011; Jordan & Taylor, 2004; Manion & Goodrum, 2000; Samuel, 2004a; 
Vegh, 2002). Furthermore, some adversarial state or non-state actors, operating from 
within or outside of a given sovereign state’s borders, could be responsible for cyber 
intrusion activity. Direct attribution to that state or non-state actor remains an unrealized 
goal. Yet, someone is performing these intrusions. They do exist and most information 
technology organizations record information about these intrusions every second of every 
minute, of every hour, of every day.  
 
 
4Cyber Intrusion – a. an event or combination of multiple events, that constitutes a cyber-incident in 
which a hacker or an intruder gains, or attempts to gain, access to information residing on an information 
system (IT) or networks, without having authorization, in violation of security policies, security procedures, 
or acceptable use policies (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 61; Maness & Valeriano, 
2016, p. 310; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Vatis, 2001, pp. 11-12); b. any set of methods used to 
surreptitiously gain access to IT systems or networks that result in actual or potential compromise to the 
availability, integrity, or confidentiality of the information, residing on those systems (Committee on 
National Security Systems, 2015, p. 61; Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Vatis, 
2001). For example, when an IT system or network is remotely accessed for the purposes of stealing, 
gathering, exfiltrating or manipulating information. 
5 Server – a computer in a network that provides services (such as access to files or shared peripherals 
or the routing of e-mail) to other computers in the network (Webster, 2017, sec. “server”). 
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Hence, one could envision a scenario where two countries, country X and country 
Y, are engaged in the exchange of competing narratives over some matter that could 
potentially benefit or harm one or both. In the midst of this exchange of narratives, internal 
actors within country X may become activated by the reported dueling narratives, obtained 
from media outlets, causing these actors to seek access or hack into country Y’s networks, 
initially flagged as cyber intrusion activity.6  Thus at the outset of initial cyber intrusion 
activity, an actor or hacker within Country X desires, for myriad reasons, to intrude into a 
server within country Y, provoked by the media narrative describing the nature of the 
dialogue between the two countries.7  Conversely, this internal actor in country X activated 
by the competing narratives played out in open source media, could seek to enlist the 
assistance of the hacktivist diaspora around the world to draw attention to country X’s 





6 Hack – a. to gain unauthorized access to computers or to computerized, information systems or 
networks, (Floridi, 2008, p. 8; Himma, 2008, pp. 191-192; Webster, 2017, sec. “hack”); b. related form – 
Hacker, noun; c. related form – Hacking, transitive verb.  
Hacking – refers to acts in which a person or groups of people gain unauthorized entry to computers, 
information systems or networks (Floridi, 2008, p. 8; Himma, 2008, pp. 191-192; Webster, 2017). 
Network(s) – Information system(s) implemented with a collection of interconnected components. 
Such components may include routers, hubs, cabling, telecommunications controllers, key distribution 
centers, and technical control devices (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 86). 
7 Hacker – an expert at programming and solving problems with a computer; a person who gains 
unauthorized access to and sometimes tampers with information in computers, information systems or 
networks (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 56; Floridi, 2008, pp. 3-24; Himma, 2008, pp. 
191-192; Webster, 2017). 
8 Hacktivism – a. refers to the marriage of hacking and activism. It covers operations that use hacking 
techniques against a targets Internet site with the intent of disrupting normal operations but not causing 
serious damage. Examples are Web sit-ins and virtual blockades, automated e-mail bombs, Web hacks, 
computer break-ins, and computer viruses and worms (Denning D. E., 2001a, pp. 70-75); b. the 
commission of an unauthorized digital intrusion for the purpose of expressing a political or moral position 
(Himma, 2008, pp. 200-201); c. the (sometimes) clandestine use of computer hacking to help advance 
political causes (Manion & Goodrum, 2000, pp. 14-19); d. the nonviolent use of illegal or legally 
ambiguous digital tools in pursuit of political ends, combining the transgressive civil disobedience with the 
technology and techniques of computer hackers (Samuel A. , 2004a, p. 2); e. related form – Hacktivist, 
noun or adjective. 
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Figure 1.  Research Question 
Several theories exist that may assist us in our explanation.9  The section that 
follows will explore the two-level model of diplomatic and domestic politics, the two-step 
flow model of communication, the digital panopticon concept, and the sharp power model, 
each of which may contribute to the theoretical basis needed to explore the cyber intrusion 
phenomenon that this research seeks to explain (Bentham, 2012; Galič, Timan, & Koops, 
2017; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; Loadenthal, 2018; Putnam, 1988; Strong, 
2017; Walker & Ludwig, 2017; Walker, Kalathil, & Ludwig, 2020). 
B. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
This section intends to explore how two theories, the two-level theory of diplomatic 
and domestic politics and two-step flow of communication, may operate together to explain 
how certain hacktivist’s or cyber intruder’s behavior is heavily influenced by the regime 
type of their home country. Next, a description is provided of where the requisite data 
resides, which will be used to develop dependent and independent variables to test the 
hypotheses defined at the end of the literature review. Further, an exploration of how 
modern era social scientists have resurrected the panopticon effect, originally posited by 
Jeremy Bentham in the late 1700s, describes how certain regime types execute and possess 
 
9 Explanatory inference, as used within this paper, means to derive and compare hypotheses about the 
hidden frameworks that may be responsible for the data (i.e., cyber-intrusions), then use an epistemic 
branch of science, in this case statistical correlations, to test the strength of the hypothesized relationships 
between the dependent variable and independent or explanatory variables (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, pp. 190-
201). 
Motivation for Inquiry: How do competing narratives, reported by news media 
sources, between the United States (U.S.) and other sovereign states, relate to the level 
of future cyber-intrusion activity targeting U.S.-based information technology? 
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different levels of social or societal control.10  First, a review of the two-level theory of 
diplomatic and domestic politics is in order. 
1. Putnam’s Two-Level Theory 
The two-level theory posits that a country’s leadership simultaneously engages in 
negotiations with another country at two levels  (Putnam, 1988; Trumbore, Boyer, Gibson, 
Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000; Walton & McKersie, 1965). At level-one, country X’s 
leadership engages in international negotiations or dialog with country Y, preferably to 
achieve some outcome beneficial to X. Yet, the leadership of country X must manage the 
narrative as they engage with country Y to achieve a desired outcome or win-set, while 
simultaneously managing the domestic narrative at level-two  (Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 
2017; Putnam, 1988; Trumbore, Boyer, Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000; Walton & 
McKersie, 1965). This theory describes how a nation’s ruling class wields the information 
instrument of national power, not only externally as in level-one discussions with other 
nations, but also internally in level-two to manage or control the ongoing domestic 
narrative.11  Thus, this theory provides a foundation from which to build an explanation of 
the cyber intrusion phenomenon. 
In this case, two countries duel each other with their narratives, each trying to gain 
some competitive advantage over the other (Porter, 1991).12  These two narratives remain 
verbal as the negotiation over an issue continues; however, as the negotiation verbally 
 
10 Digital Panopticon – an internet enabled, digital version of a structural design and theoretical 
concept that allows a single individual to monitor an entire institution without the observed subject’s 
awareness of their observation. This presumes that if individuals – such as prisoners, students, workers, or 
citizens – understand that they may be under observation at any time; these individuals will act as though 
they are under examination; thus, they will self- police (Foucault, 1977, p. 216; Loadenthal, 2018, pp. 1-3; 
Manokha, 2018, pp. 219-237; Pinkaew, 2016, pp. 195-214). 
Social Control – the rules and standards of society that circumscribe individual action and civil 
discourse through the inculcation of conventional sanctions and the imposition of formalized mechanisms 
(Webster, 2017, sec. “social control”). Used in and throughout this text as synonymous with Societal 
Control. 
11 Instruments of National Power include Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) 
(Farlin, 2014, pp. 9-38; Mattis, 2018, p. 4). 
12 Competitive advantage ‒ the unique ability of a state to utilize its resources effectively, managing to 
improve its value and position itself ahead of its economic or military rival (Choucri, 2012; Diehl & 
Goertz, 2001; Porter, 1991; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018; Vasquez & Leskiw, 2001). 
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culminates, the results become real or material to each of these audiences. At face value, 
it seems as though autocracies and anocracies, because of their higher levels of societal 
control, may be more capable than democracies at controlling their level-two domestic 
narratives during these level-one interactions.. Ceteris paribus, democracies possess less 
societal control, more transparency, and less censorship over media and internet modalities, 
then autocracies and anocracies (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012; Sinpeng, 
2013). So then, how does a theory based on a two-step flow of communication add to this 
explanation? 
2. Lazarsfeld’s Two-Step Theory 
The two-step flow theory falls within the minimal effects branch of media effects 
theory (Katz, 2001; Postelnicu, 2008; Werder, 2009). At its heart, this two-step flow rests 
on the notion that people talking with or communicating with other people carry greater 
currency than the consumption of mass media products (Habermas, 1987, p. 437; Katz, 
2001; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944). First (i.e., step one), opinion leaders or elites 
digest the latest narratives covering topical issues of the day as presented in the media, and 
subsequently decide upon their given position on the issue.13  Next (i.e., step two), opinion 
leaders articulate this position to the populous leading to the adoption of certain aspects of 
their narrative by the general public (Klapper, 1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; 
Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011; Postelnicu, 2008). In this modern era, these opinion leaders 
communicate their views about these narratives almost instantaneously, via Twitter, 
Facebook, Snapchat, and other forms of social media.  
The conjecture here is that the two-step flow operates and reinforces within 
Putnam’s level-two (i.e., domestic) communications between a country’s leaders and the 
population, as depicted in the logic map found in Appendix C. While the level-two media 
signal may flow through the two-step process, the hackers may be part of diverse groups 
ranging from citizen hackers triggered by the event, to hackers affiliated with some social 
 
13 Elites – individuals and small, cohesive groups who wield a disproportionate level of power or 
influence affecting national and supranational political outcomes in a substantial way on a continuing basis 
(Best & Higley, 2018, p. 3; Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 14). Throughout this text, elite is synonymous with 
opinion or proximate leader. 
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movement, or to patriotic or government sponsored hackers (Anderson & Sadjadpour, 
2018; Best & Higley, 2018; Biçakci, Doruk, & Mitat, 2015; Calamur, 2017; Deibert & 
Rohozinski, 2010; Denning D. E., 2011; Goodman, 2015; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Kello, 
2013; Lindsay J., 2014; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1999; MacKinnon, 2012; Nye, 2011; 
Pinkaew, 2016; Singer & Friedman, 2013; Sinpeng, 2013; Snegovaya, 2015; Thorton & 
Miron, 2019; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). Certainly, 
each of these could receive the information via the two-step flow from elites across this 
spectrum; whereas, the hacktivist executing the cyber intrusion may be aligned with or part 
of either unassociated or associated groups—as described in the scholarly literature cited 
here (Best & Higley, 2018; Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Higley & Burton, 2006; 
Higley, 2018; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017). 
Nevertheless, parsing out specifically which grouping or movement these intrusive hackers 
are a part of remains beyond the scope of this research.  
Thus, national leaders communicate via various media platforms to opinion leaders 
or elites, who in turn consume the narrative, form their opinions, and transmit them to the 
population. Their actions effectively alert the population, including its hacktivist elements 
(e.g., average citizens, members of a social movement, or government sponsored groups), 
to the narrative and the behavior expected. This leads to the final step in this theoretical 
account, whereby the hacktivists, motivated by the freshly adopted elite narrative, ply their 
trade and begin to conduct cyber intrusions.  
Data collected by prior work in events coding nests well with media effects theory 
and provides volumes of data collected daily to use in formulating models to explore the 
above research question. Events coding began as a manual process in the early 1990s, 
developing over the intervening years into an electronic textual content scraping 
procedure.14  Each scraped media event describes the tone of the narrative or discourse 
between two states (i.e., dyad) and receives a score on the Goldstein scale (Goldstein,  
 
14  Scraping refers to a discrete form of machine learning or [electronic] statistical learning techniques, 
whereby, digital text on a given website or set of websites is scanned for a predefined set of words or 
phrases; once discovered the information is extracted from the sources website and placed into a database 
for various uses such as, in this case, political discourse analysis (Monroe & Schrodt, 2008, p. 353; 
Monroe, Pan, Roberts, Sen, & et al., 2015, p. 71; Schrenk, 2012, pp. 227-237).  
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1992).15   Essentially, the Goldstein scale ordinally places each article narrative in a 
directional dyad between two states spanning a cooperative (+10) narrative to a conflictual 
(‒10) narrative. This ordinal scale allows researchers to gauge the tone or tenor of the media 
narrative directionally between states. Subsequently, events scholars break these narratives 
into quadrant counts depicting verbal cooperation, material cooperation, verbal conflict, 
and material conflict. These two variables, the Goldstein score and the material or verbal 
counts, provide measures of the level of discourse between states, which will be used to 
formulate independent or explanatory variables. This methodological process has 
improved considerably with the advent of scraping technology, enhanced by advances in 
computational capability, which allows for the scraping of hundreds of thousands of 
articles daily, amassing a huge resource of scaled media events data (Goldstein, 1992; 
Howell, 1983; Schrodt, 2012; Schrodt, 2017). This data will be used to gauge the impact 
of tone (e.g., negative or positive), variation in tone, and type of narrative (e.g., material or 
verbal) on cyber intrusions as a manifestation of the two-step flow operating and 
reinforcing at level-two of the domestic level, as depicted in Appendix C.  
Now, depending on the regime type this effect may range from clearly to obscurely 
observable. For example, democracies may reside on the obscure end, because they 
exercise modest societal control, whereas, anocracies and autocracies may manifest clear 
results, due to their elaborate use of mechanisms for societal control (Freedom House, 
2017; Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). Instead of viewing the internet as a liberating 
technology, most anocracies and autocracies view and use it as a repressive technology 
uniquely suited for surveillance, censorship, and propaganda (Gunitsky, 2015; 
MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Rød & Weidmann, 2015). Some scholars refer to the 
internet and all of its associated technologies as the digital panopticon operating in these 
countries (Bentham, 2012; Galič, Timan, & Koops, 2017; Loadenthal, 2018; MacKinnon, 
2012, pp. 75–86; Manokha, 2018). 
 
15 Dyad – an interaction between two elements or parts, in this case two states or countries  (Oxford 
Dictionary, 2015, sec. “dyad”).  
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3. Digital Panopticon Theory 
The panopticon effect, so named by Jeremy Bentham, an English social theorist of 
the late 1700s, described a physical prison structure in which all inmates could find 
themselves under surveillance by unseen guards at any time (Bentham, 2012). As a result, 
this had the effect of causing the inmates to self-police their behavior to conform to the 
disciplinary norms of the prison. Foucault (1977) extended this theory by describing how 
government could control society as a whole (Loadenthal, 2018), while Chesterman (2011) 
extended the theory to describe the digital panopticon that is emerging across all regime 
types (MacKinnon, 2012; Manokha, 2018). However, the digital panopticon effect seems 
particularly evident in autocracies and anocracies that exploit it as a means of societal 
control. 
The exercise of societal control in anocracies and autocracies springs from their 
regime type’s need to intensely regulate their population and the narratives. The internet 
provides a uniquely designed environment that facilitates traceability and, depending on 
the regime type (a.k.a., level of democracy or polity score), a panoptic surveillance of who 
is talking about what to whom. Thus, this digital panopticon enables anocracies and 
autocracies to squelch certain narratives, while promoting others, further fortifying their 
societal control (Gunitsky, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012; Manokha, 2018; Pinkaew, 2016). 
Figure 2 provides a world map where each country’s level of democracy is coded and color 
from autocracy (‒10 / red) through democracy (+10 / green), which corresponds to the 
polity scores in Appendix G (Marshall & Cole, 2014; Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017; 
Polity IV, 2018).  
In this case, this pervasive means of societal control appears to be the method by 
which anocratic and autocratic state leaders control their civil society through the elites to 
expand their negotiation and compromise space during level-one (international level) 
discussions with the US.16  To lay this out plainly, first, the regime leadership 
 
16 Civil Society – the self-generating and self-supporting communities of people who share a 
normative order and volunteer to organize political, economic, or cultural activities that are independent 
from the state or state functions (Diamond, 1994, p. 5; Hussain M. M., 2016, p. 7). 
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communicates the level-two (domestic level) narrative to their elites via media outlets. 
Second, the regime leverages the digital panopticon to cement their control of that 
narrative. Third, following the two-step information flow, elites and opinion leaders digest 
the narrative and signal a wait and see position on the given issue being discussed at level-
one. 
 
Figure 2.  World Map Depicting Levels of Democracy by Color.  
This activity provides the anocratic or autocratic leader with wide rhetorical space 
in which to operate, while verbally scuffling with the U.S. As the elites’ signal to the 
population to decrease their activities, the level-one discussion remains verbal, leading to 
a conjectured decrease in intrusion activity. However, once this verbal tussling comes to 
an end and the material outcome becomes a reality, elites telegraph to the populace that 
they may resume or increase their activities to include network intrusions. Both causal 
inferences are the focus of this research. This is not to suggest that these are the only effects. 
Nor does the posited process necessarily proceed in the discrete order in which it is 
described here, beyond the verbal or material signaling leading to decreased or increased 
intrusion activity, respectively. 
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The transition from verbal rhetoric to material action may occur in several different 
ways, particularly when the narrative remains negative because the opposing side of the 
dyad, dispensing the conflictual rhetoric, did not achieve the change of U.S. policy 
originally sought. This leads to the media reporting physically real material events, either 
by the verbal bantering devolving into a negative material result or by simply escalating 
from verbal to material interactions between these states and the U.S. Alternatively, the 
media reported narratives could flow from material to verbal, as well. 
Democracies on the other hand, may manifest the opposite effect, perhaps because 
they exercise very little societal control over the digital medium beyond the illegal 
(Goodman, 2015). Control of the media and internet modalities within democracies resides 
mostly in the private sector (Goodman, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011). Beyond 
the threshold of clearly unlawful acts as defined by a democracy’s laws, control of the 
media and internet is largely driven by a profit motive (Chesterman, 2011; Freedom House, 
2017; Goodman, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012; McHugh & Ramirez, 2018; Morozov, 2011; 
Shahin & Zheng, 2020). Further, the elites within a democratic civil society span many 
different points of view on a given subject (Best & Higley, 2018; Higley & Burton, 2006). 
In democracies, while the two-level process may exist, it is far from consistent, controlled, 
or discrete (Putnam, 1988). Contrary to other regime types, democracies produce a 
multiplicity of level-two narratives that their leadership can only manage at best and may, 
on rare occasion, appear to control (Best & Higley, 2018; Bjola & Manor, 2018, 
Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Higley & Burton, 2006; Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017; 
Trumbore, Boyer, Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000). As such, in democracies as the 
dyadic tone becomes increasingly negative for both material and verbal narratives, it would 
be expected that intrusion attempts will increase. 
C.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
The final hypotheses, offered at the end of the literature review, will be tested using 
data derived from a representative U.S. Government server that provided cyber intrusion 
information in two date ranges. The first spans from 02 January 2015 to 06 May 2015 (~ 
124 days) and the second from 12 September 2016 to 18 March 2017 (~ 178 days). The 
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data sources will remain anonymous per their request. Data derived from intrusion 
detection software provided the means to assess the hacktivist or intrusion activity on a 
given network. The SNORT intrusion detection software (IDS) will be used to gather the 
intrusion activity data from servers running within these anonymous sources (Beale, Foster, 
Posluns, & Caswell, 2003; Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2005; Rehman, 2003). 
First, the researcher created an intrusion activity response variable by aggregating the 
intrusion data to derive a per country, per day or country-day variable. Per country-day will 
be the unit of analysis used throughout this research. Second, this data does not possess the 
level of fidelity necessary to discern specifically what trigger or catalyst (i.e., elite, social 
movement, or state-sponsored organization) led the hacktivist or group to intrude. Nor does 
it provide the capability to distinguish between hacktivists mobilized by elites, social 
movements, or government-sponsored groups. 
Next, dyadic events data will be utilized to create a set of independent variables in 
the same unit of analysis, drawn from the Phoenix Data Project. The Phoenix Data Project 
establishes a set of nominal and ordinal codes from 386 worldwide, English language, 
international, local, and wire media news sources generating news articles on a daily basis. 
These scraped articles are coded and stored in electronically queryable databases 
(Goldstein, 1992; Howell, 1983; Schrodt P. A., 2012). Each line in the events coding data 
provides nominal dyad information between two countries and an ordinal score, the 
Goldstein score, ranging from cooperation +10 to conflict ‒10. This media events data is 
an electronic record of the dyadic narratives between international actors as reported by 
open media sources and electronically scraped from the given news outlet (Caerus, 2015; 
Schrodt P. A., 2012). As the use of [media] events data has become increasingly reliable, 
researchers have begun to use it to measure the level of cooperation or conflict between 
states (Bi, 2015; Colaresi, 2004; Goldstein, 1992; Goldstein & Pevehouse, 1997; Monroe 
& Schrodt, 2008; Monroe, Pan, Roberts, Sen & et al., 2015; Schrodt & Gerner, 1997). 
Further, the Goldstein score within the media events data closely estimates the level of tone 
of on-going narratives, as reported by open source media, describing the tenor of discourse 
or dialogue between sovereign states.  
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In addition to gauging the tone of narratives, the event coders delineate the 
narratives as either verbal or material, cooperative or conflictual in content.17  Verbal 
narratives might include political rhetoric, verbal posturing, or political dialog. Essentially, 
a country’s leadership may use these verbal narratives to telegraph potential threats, coerce, 
or cajole their opponents in the dyadic dialogue to come around to a position favorable to 
their country. Whereas, material narratives describe events characterized by physical acts 
(massing forces on another nation’s borders, providing aid, conducting armed attacks, etc.). 
Human event coders established rules to parse these verbal and material / 
cooperative and conflictual narratives into typological quadrants that will be useful in 
creating per country day count independent variables. Thus, the research uses the Conflict 
and Mediation Events Observations (CAMEO), two-digit, media event root codes, as 
shown in Table 1, as an indication of the characterization of the types of narratives about 
the U.S. used by other countries. There are 20 ordinal codes in the CAMEO construct using 
the terminology of the scraped article to categorize each narrative into actor-action-actor 
characterizations, within the bounded range from cooperative to conflictual (Caerus, 2015, 
pp. 3–4; Schrodt P. A., 2017). For example, the code for engage in diplomatic cooperation 
is 05 while reduce relations is 16, as depicted in the first and second columns of Table 1 
(Schrodt P. A., 2012, pp. 131–138). The CAMEO defined actor-action-actor construct sorts 
the content of the media articles into cooperative-coded events 01–05 for verbal events and 
06–09 for material events shown in black (i.e., cooperative or positive) in Table 1, with the 
conflictual or negative event codes depicted below them in red 10–14 describing verbal 
events while 15–20 define material events (Schrodt P. A., 2012, p. 3). Since each scraped 
 
17 Verbal Cooperative (Positive) – narratives describing dialog-based meeting, such as negotiations or 
peace talks or statements that express a desire to cooperate or appeal for assistance (other than material aid) 
for other states (Schrodt P. A., 2017, p. 20).  
Verbal Conflictual (Negative) – a spoken criticism, threat, or accusation, innately rhetorical and 
normally related to past or future potential acts of conflict (Schrodt P. A., 2017, p. 20). 
Material Cooperative (Positive) – physical acts of collaboration or assistance, including receiving or 
sending aid, reduce bans, reduce sanctions, etc (Schrodt P. A., 2017, p. 20). 
Material Conflictual (Negative) – physical acts of a conflictual nature, including armed attacks, 
destruction of property, assassination, embargos, naval blockades, etc (Schrodt P. A., 2017, p. 20). 
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media narrative fits into one of the four quadrants of the typology, per country-day count 
variables will be easy to derive.  
Finally, the daily tone variation (i.e., standard deviation) can be derived from these 
scraped narratives to determine the level of media polarization on a given day. Thus, a 
calculated media polarization variable could discern how increasing or decreasing 
divergence in daily media narratives impacts intrusions.  
The focus of this research will cover the extent to which negative material and 
verbal narratives, tone and variation today affect intrusions on U.S. networks tomorrow; 
however, the development of the statistical model will require applying it to all-narratives 
(i.e., positive or negative / cooperative or conflictual) first. This application of the model 
to all-narratives will assist in testing the validity and reliability before proceeding to the 
negative narratives research. Further, the initial model will need to be exposed to multiple 
theoretical distribution types (i.e., Gaussian ~ normal, Poisson, negative binomial, and 
geometric) to discern which distributions best fit the observed data. Thus, the macro model 
will assist us in deciding which theoretical distribution fits best and provides the most 











01 Make a Public Statement 
02 Appeal 
03  Express Intent to Cooperate 
04 Consult (with dyad partner) 
05 Engage in Diplomatic Cooperation 
06 Engage in Material Cooperation 








15 Exhibit Force Posture 




20 Use of Unconventional Mass Violence 
 
Once chosen, this initial model and statistical distribution structure, will be used to 
focus the model on the effects of negative narratives across all regime-types. This model 
will form the basis for the negative narratives research used throughout the remainder of 
this dissertation. Next, the analysis will examine the model to differentiate between the 
effects on regime-types (e.g., democracies, anocracies, and autocracies) before turning to 
focus on explicit countries falling within their type designations..18  The research will 
 
18  Anocracy is defined as a form of government that is neither a full democracy nor an autocracy; 
often times referred to as a mixed democracy or hybrid regime (Marshall & Cole, 2014, p. 21). 
Autocracy is a form of government where a citizens’ participation is severely curtailed, restricted, or 
suppressed; chief executives are selected according to clearly defined (usually hereditary) rules of 
succession from within the established political elites; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power 
over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, most of civil society  (Marshall & 
Cole, 2014, pp. 20-21). 
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proceed as discussed here, as described in Table 2 and as described in detail in Chapter III, 
Model Design: Media Effects in Cyberspace. 
Table 2.   Research Design Steps 
Research Step Short Description 
1 
Develop a macro statistical model to test the effects of all-narrative types on 
subsequent levels of intrusions. 
2 
Test the macro model across multiple theoretical distribution types to discern 
which best fits the data and provides the most illustrative output describing 
the relationship between the media narrative ‒ yesterday generated by other 
countries about the U.S. and intrusions on U.S. networks—today. 
3 
Focus the model chosen on negative narratives, about the U.S., originating 
from first all democracies, then anocracies, and then autocracies to test the 
hypotheses. 
4 
Focus the model on negative narratives, about the U.S., originating from 
these regime types and compare the results to a set of autocratic, anocratic, 
and democratic countries, using a case study format, to test if proffered 
hypotheses hold for the examined countries within each type. 
 
D. DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION 
This introduction began with a description of the cyber intrusion phenomenon, 
delved into the theoretical underpinnings of what may drive this behavior, and concluded 
with the intent to incorporate the various data and its sources into the research design to 
test the hypotheses that will be offered at the end of the literature review chapter. 
Subsequently, the following chapter will introduce the design of the quantitative (i.e., 
statistical regression) model in much greater detail and discuss the results derived from the 
macro regression model. Then, the chapter will present the All-Regime narratives 
regression model, followed by the different regime types and explore how stories, 
originating from other sovereign states, about the U.S. published today effect cyber 
intrusions on U.S. networks tomorrow. Next, in the case study chapters will aim to explore 
how the model responds to the shifting contexts of different regime types, and then down 
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to particular countries. Across these levels of analysis, the evidence consistently shows that 
media narratives originating from other states about the U.S. generate substantial impacts 
on the succeeding levels of cyber intrusions observed on U.S. networks. Ultimately, the 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This review will begin by surveying the literature to provide context for, assist in 
refining the explanation of, and focus this research covering the implied relationship 
between media events and cyber intrusions. First, a brief discussion of the cyber intrusion 
phenomenon provides clarification of why this is an important area of study, describes a 
cyber narrative, and defines the layers of the internet. Second, the review seeks to explore 
the theories underpinning international conflict and rivalry, including the development of 
a typology to describe cyber-intrusion behavior and its motivations. Third, the review will 
survey the two-level theory of international relations covering its linkages to state elites 
and media outlets and how it functions across different regime types. Fourth, the author 
will describe the theoretical placement of the two-step flow theory of communication inside 
of the two-level model and the applicability of this integrated construct across multiple 
regime types, which will assist in explaining the theoretical relationship between media 
events and cyber intrusions. This review will then address the media events data 
community and how these scraped, scored, and categorized media narratives provide a rich 
data set for use in developing a quantitative model to describe how media narratives on a 
given day may affect cyber intrusions on the following day. Next, the review will cover 
aspects of digital panopticon, narrative, and sharp power, teasing out certain elements that 
will buttress the explanation of the research. Finally, this chapter will discuss how the 
research intends to derive observable implications from the available data, ending with the 
proffering of hypotheses to test through the use of the developed model. 
B. CYBER INTRUSION PHENOMENON 
Media reports describing cyber intrusions—most often referred to in the ongoing 
media narrative as Cyber Attacks—seem to proliferate daily (Andriotis & Minaya, 2017; 
BBC, 2017; Kroft, 2015; Gandhi, et al., 2011; Koh, 2012; Kugler, 2009; Mims, 2017; 
Owens, Dam, & Lin, 2009; Paletta & Yadron, 2015; Stavridis, 2015). Over the past decade, 
the number of notable attacks, breaches, or intrusions seem to have increased exponentially 
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from the Sony Online Entertainment in 2011 and the Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014 
to Equifax and WannaCry in 2017, to the Solar Winds hack of 2021. Cyber Attacks, or 
more precisely intrusions, appear to be growing in frequency and cost.19  Further, as each 
individuals’ connection to the internet becomes a perceived human necessity, the term 
cyber-attack takes on a meaning that both misleads the public and creates a fear of some 
exogenous menace, which seems too often be misplaced (Deibert R. J., 2013; Goodman, 
2015; Lindsay, 2013; MacKinnon, 2012; Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Morozov, 2011; Rid, 
2012; Valeriano & Maness, 2015).  
Further, the ongoing narrative does not help. The media’s use of the term cyber-
attack, however ill-defined, has been adopted as the term of reference to describe any type 
of cyber event. The media comes by this naturally, they are simply trying to tell a story that 
 
19 The spear phishing intrusion at Sony Online Entertainment in 2011 compromised over 77 million 
consumer accounts in the company’s PlayStation network, which constituted the largest data breach at the 
time and cost Sony over $171 million (M) to contain the breach (Hoffman, 2011; Richwine, 2014). 
Subsequently, Sony Pictures Entertainment was hacked again in 2014. U.S. Cyber Officials attributed the 
hack to North Korea, although they emphatically denied responsibility (Carter, 2015). To contain the 2014 
intrusion, Sony had to completely disconnect from the internet, forcing their over 6000 employees to 
communicate the old-fashion way via land line telephone or hand delivered message, until the magnitude of 
the cyber-attack was contained (Kroft, 2015; Paletta D. , 2015). Sony lost over 3,000 computers and 800 
servers, and all of the intellectual capital that was ex-filtrated out of their network before their hardware 
was damaged or destroyed – as described in the media narrative (Carter, 2015; Kroft, 2015). 
A group, known as “Guardians of Peace,” orchestrated the 2014 cyber intrusion (Whyte, 2016). 
Subsequently, an investigative team from Sony in cooperation with the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) discovered the “Guardians” operated out of North Korea. Apparently, the intrusion was 
an attempt by North Korea to coerce Sony Pictures into halting the release of the The Interview a movie 
that depicted the assassination of Kim Jong-Un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea by a trio of popular 
comedians (Sharp, 2017; Whyte, 2016).     
The initial estimated cost of the 2014 Sony Pictures intrusion was close to $100M, later revised to 
$35M (Hornyak, 2015; Kroft, 2015; Richwine, 2014). This figure is less than the 2011 breach because this 
hack was focused on their internal employees and not the records of their customers – the former, as 
discussed earlier, was much more expensive (Paletta D. , 2015; Richwine, 2014). Interesting how the $100 
million in lost content and in destroyed IT equipment received wide media exposure; however, when Sony 
Picture revised the estimated loss to $35M and described the loss as immaterial – the media did not seem 
interested providing only meagre coverage (Hornyak, 2015). Nevertheless, from that point, the state of 
North Korea began to refine its tactics. 
The Equifax data breach, hackers exfiltrated over 143 million records containing Americans’ personal 
and financial information (i.e., name, address, Social Security number, and date of birth) (Andriotis, 
Rapoport, & McMillian, 2017). 
In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware virus spread throughout the world (Harris, 2017; Rivero, 
2017). The ransomware infected information systems by initially locking users out of their computers and 
then demanding a payment in BitCoin, an electronic digital currency, to unlock the computer.19  
WannaCry operated in two stages one to infect, the other to spread the infection across other information 
systems, hitting Russia and China the hardest with 24,000+ and 15,000+ respectively (Rivero, 2017).  
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adds a bit of flair to the bland zeros and ones of cyberspace. These would be cyber reporters 
cast their stories (i.e., narratives) as possessing verisimilitude or the appearance of truth, 
whereas, the authors of these tales may only possess a modest degree of understanding on 
the subject.  
The media attempts to create a narrative around the experience of others, in what 
narrative theorists call a descriptive structure to make sense of a cyber event (Barbatsis, 
2004). But, Barbatsis (2004) offers a caution, by quoting narrative theory scholars, that 
narrative’s descriptive structure merely reflects real-world events and does not record 
them.20  In their defense, these media outlets using cyber narratives are attempting to 
describe incredibly complex cyber incidents, reducing them to narratives that allow the 
average person to make sense of and understand the story. If these narrators follow the 
time-honored media refrain, if it bleeds, it leads, they label these cyber events as attacks, 
which implies someone is bound to bleed as a result (Arango-Kure, Garz, & Rott, 2014; 
Miller & Albert 2015; Sherry, 2004; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996;). These cyber narratives 
create fascinating stories around what are frequently banal cyber incidents, structurally 
transforming them into the far more compelling and dramatic cyber-attack.  
1. Cyber Attacks: The Narrative 
Thus, the term cyber-attack feeds into this already electric atmosphere, conflating 
the meaning of it with all lesser cyber intrusions or incidents (BBC, 2017; Kroft, 2015; 
Czosseck, Ottis, & Taliharm, 2013; FireEye, M-Trends, 2016; Gandhi, et al., 2011; Harris, 
2017; Stavridis, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). Some scholars liken cyberspace to the 
land, sea, air, and space (i.e., physical) domains, which are, at best, imprecise analogies for 
this man-made, synthetic domain (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993; Clarke & Knake, 2010; 
Clarke & Knake, 2019; Lynn III, 2010; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & 
 
20Narrative Theory – a. the institutionalized use of semiotic structures or codes to allow narrators (i.e., 
authors), and readers to communicate through texts; thereby, allowing the reader to understand and make 
sense of a given situation described in the story (Barbatsis, 2004; Kearns, 2005). b. information that 
actively engages the senses using language to create structure that draws in the reader or listener, 
intentionally, leaving out pieces of information, or the other side of the story, in an effort to engage the 
reader or listener by inviting them to us their imagination to fill in the missing information and discern 
what really happened (Wake, 2009, p. 674). 
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Maness, 2018). The media narrative and the scholarly conjectures meld together to create 
the impression that Cyber Attacks and their effects parallel those seen in the terrestrial 
world.  
By the definition herein, Cyber Attacks must cause physical harm to persons or 
destroy systems, see page 1 or Appendix A (Schmitt, 2013, p. 106). While these incidents 
may have caused financial harm to the targets causing physical damage to objects of these 
media labeled attacks, none to date cross the threshold meeting all aspects (i.e., injury or 
death to a person) of the cyber-attack definition used in this research. Thus, the number of 
actual documented Cyber Attacks causing physical harm to human beings has not occurred 
as of yet, despite the relentless media and scholarly hyperbole predicting its imminent 
occurrence (BBC, 2017; Goodman, 2015; Lindsay, 2013; Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Rid, 
2012; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2015).21  For instance, while 
 
21 Four of the foremost, documented, examples of cyber-attacks on the physical layer via the syntactic 
substrate by a state or non-state actor include Bronze Soldier (Estonia 2007), Stuxnet (Iran 2009-2010), 
Shamoon-Saudi Aramco Corporation (Saudi Arabia 2012), and Sony Pictures Entertainment (US 2014). 
While surveying each of these cyber-attacks lies well beyond the scope of this research, we need to clarity to 
the level of damage or destruction caused by these attacks.  
First, none of these cyber-attacks, as we have defined them, caused physical injury or death to any 
human beings, as stated earlier (Goodman, 2015; Lindsay, 2013; Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Rid, 2012; 
Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). In only one case, Stuxnet, some do suggest, at 
least anecdotally, that physical damage and/or destruction of objects did occur (i.e., computers, servers, 
routers, IT Systems, centrifuges) may have occurred (Goodman, 2015; Lindsay, 2013; McGraw, 2013; 
Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Rid, 2012; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). However, 
in this Stuxnet case, recent evidence points to damage, but destruction of the centrifuges remains a 
conjecture (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015; Lindsay, 2013; Rid, 2012; Sanger, 2012; Valeriano & Maness, 
2015). 
Second, two of the four, Bronze Soldier and Stuxnet, were state on state cyber incidents, with the other 
two, Shamoon and Sony Pictures, being state on non-state (Carter, 2015; Choo, 2011; Goodman, 2015; 
Lindsay, 2013; Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Paletta D. , 2015; Rid, 2012; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). Thus, 
these cyber incidents can and do transcend territorial and geographic boundaries with little regard for state 
sovereignty, borders, or governance (Choucri, 2012; Clarke & Knake, Cyberwar, 2010; Gartzke & Lindsay, 
Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace, 2015; Lindsay J. , Stuxnet and 
the Limits of Cyber Warfare, 2013; Nye J. S., 2011; Rid, 2012; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Whyte, 2016). 
Further, these incidences can come from state or non-state actors (Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Nye J. S., 
2011; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Whyte, 2016).  
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Maness and Valeriano (2016) provide empirical evidence that cyber incidents have 
occurred, they carefully avoid referring to them as Cyber Attacks.22  The type of research 
done by these and other authors tend to refute much of the apocryphal cyber-attack 
theoretic terminology proffered by some scholars and media sources (Gartzke & Lindsay, 
2015; Lindsay, 2013; Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Rid, 2012; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; 
Valeriano & Maness, 2015). Therefore, at this point in time, only the damage to objects 
portion of our cyber-attack definitions holds up to the scrutiny of empirical research. 
2. Cyber Attacks: The Narrative’s Effect  
Certainly, the wanton fear of the unknown in cyberspace appears to infect the 
public, the elites, the politicians, and the media with a quasi-phobic viewpoint-colonizing 
each individual’s lifeworld, driven by the imprecise terminology consistent in today’s 
 
Finally, in all cases, the target of the cyber-attack incurred financial costs due to loss of reputation or 
due to the damage and subsequent repair of infected systems. Thus, when cyber-attacks occur, and they do, 
targeted state or non-state actors have incurred in the past and will incur in the future economic costs 
associated with the incident (Goodman, 2015; Gartzke & Lindsay, Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, 
Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace, 2015; Kroft, 2015; Lindsay J. , Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber 
Warfare, 2013; Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Nye J. S., 2011; Rid, 2012; Singer & Friedman, 2013; 
Valeriano & Maness, 2015). Still, to reiterate – no quantifiable evidence exists that a cyber-attack caused 
physical harm, death, or injury to human being nor evidence of actual destruction of an object, computer, 
server, router, or IT system. Certainly, cyber-attacks have caused economic harm to individuals or their 
organizations and damage to IT systems. 
Yet, while the initial media reports described these cyber incidents as massive or colossal in scope, the 
long-term observable results do not. Estonia remains one of the most cyber-connected countries in the 
world, hosts the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO), Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of 
Excellence in Tallinn, and hosts the annual International Cyber Conflict Conference (CyCon) (Clarke & 
Knake, 2010; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). Iran continues to develop its nuclear capability; in fact, the 
Stuxnet incident may have strengthened their resolve (Valeriano & Maness, 2015). Saudi Aramco remains 
the world’s largest energy producer, generating daily revenues of over $1B per day and an estimated net 
worth of $2T (Gregory, 2017; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). Sony Pictures continues to churn out new 
movies, with an estimated net worth of $30B in 2017, equivalent to 857 times greater than the 2014 
estimated loss of $35M (Hornyak, 2015; Lee, 2017).21  A loss described by Sony Pictures as not material 
to its overall financial results for the year ending March 2015 (Hornyak, 2015). However, since no 
incidence of injury or death to a person or destruction of an object has transpired to date, points to a deep 
flaw in the scholarship surrounding the qualitative cyber-attack inference. 
22 Cyber Incident – a. an occurrence or set of occurrences that result in an actual or potentially adverse 
effect on an information system, network, and/or the information residing therein (Committee on National 
Security Systems, 2015, p. 40). b. an individual action or cyber-operation launched against a state, by 
another state or non-state actor as part of an ongoing cyber dispute or conflict (Valeriano & Maness, 2014, 
p. 349; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). 
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cyber narrative.23  A quick Google News query of the word, cyber-attack, returns over 
11M results in a little under half a second. So, regardless of whether an individual 
appreciates the media’s use of imprecise language to describe these cyberspace events, 
better described as intrusions or even incidents, this lexicon has crept into society’s 
collective cyber reality creating an uninformed fear of some exogenous threat. 
This palpable fear, across civil society, leads many policy makers to rely on the 
advice of private sector cybersecurity companies to attain, gain, or maintain their 
cyberspace capabilities in defense of their national interests (Valeriano & Maness, 2015).24  
Thus, the general lack of cyber fluency, the imprecise use of cyber terms—particularly in 
media narratives, the scholarly comparison of cyberspace to other conflictual domains, and 
the growing commercial interests in cybersecurity fuse together to create a distorted, 
apocryphal representation of cyberspace threats (Clarke & Knake, 2010; Singer & 
Friedman, 2013; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). The basis of this fear comes from the lack of 
cyber fluency within civil society in general. 
More precisely, civil society lacks a deep knowledge of the internet and how it 
works. Coupled with the daily media cyber-attack narrative, colonizing what Jürgen 
Habermas (1987) would describe as an individual’s lifeworld, this causes many to 
internalize their fears of what might happen to them, their family, or their country due to 
these seemingly relentless Cyber Attacks (Valeriano & Maness, 2015). Yet, existing 
research has only unearthed implied damage or destruction of objects. Cyber-attack as 
defined in this volume falls well short of the deadly or destructive connotations the word 
 
23 Lifeworld – best describes a human’s socially constructed reality, where the individual hears from 
and speaks to the world around them, interacting with their day-to-day world system. Habermas (1987) 
clarifies that a person’s communications (i.e., speaking and hearing) in the modern world system is 
semantically laced with propositional, illocutionary, and expressive components that in effect can do harm 
or “violence” to a person’s lifeworld; thereby, constraining clear communication and hampering the ability 
to achieve societal consensus on given issues. This harm or violence to the lifeworld of individuals causes 
pathologies and crises that lead to serious social problems (Habermas, 1987; Ryan, 2005).  
24 The private sector can provide us with evidence of the magnitude of this growing societal trend, 
according to Steve Morgan – a well-known cyber expert, investors pumped $3.5B into cybersecurity start-
up companies in 2016 (Morgan, 2016; OilPrice.com, 2017). Morgan estimates that by 2020 that number 
will increase to $170B  (Morgan, 2016; OilPrice.com, 2017). A whopping 4857% percent increase over the 
next four years. Or $170B divided by $3.5B equals 48.571, which if multiplied by 100% that equals 
4857%. 
 25
attack enjoys in the non-synthetic land, sea, and air domains. Thus, the author chooses to 
defenestrate the imprecise term cyber-attack once and for all, in favor of cyber intrusion, 
which more precisely describes the topic. Next, a review of the internet’s origins, how it 
works, and an introduction to some key terms, will provide the conversant knowledge of 
cyberspace necessary for use in this ongoing discussion.  
3. Internet: The Evolution 
The internet, cyberspace, or Worldwide Web (WWW) of today began as a research 
project, in the mid-1960s, executed by a U.S. government agency known as the Advance 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) (Barabasi, 2003). Originally, the ARPA net project 
envisioned the connection of scientific researchers and academicians by interlinking their 
computers, as a means through which these intellectuals could collaborate and share 
information. Eventually, the network became more sophisticated leveraging emerging 
technology connecting computers to optical cables, servers, and routers causing 
information between these individuals to move even faster.25  From that point, the ARPA 
net began to grow at a rapid pace. Eventually growing into the internet. In 1989, the 
invention of web pages, and their incumbent commercial applications, enabled the internet 
to grow into today’s WWW. Nevertheless, even with its exponential growth, the WWW’s 
protocols and design management remained under the purview of the U.S. National 
Science Foundation (NSF) (Barabasi, 2003, pp. 143–148).  
In early 1995, NSF relinquished control of the internet, as it continued to grow 
exponentially, ultimately, expanding globally and across the private sector. Over the 
intervening years, a set of international committees coalesced around the a US‒based, 
international, non-profit corporation, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), which now sells domain names, promulgates policy standards, and 
nominally manages data routing across internet’s system of systems (Barabasi, 2003; 
ICANN, 2018; Nye, 2014; Shackelford, 2012). At best, ICANN and this coterie of 
committees provide stewardship and the collection of policies that keep the WWW 
 
25 Router – a device that mediates the transmission routes of data packets over an electronic 
communications network (i.e., the Internet) (Webster, 2017, sec. “router”). 
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functioning; however, the realization of an effective governance structure for this new 
domain remains illusive (Barabasi, 2003; ICANN, 2018; Nye, 2014; Shackelford, 2012). 
Today, cyberspace has emerged as a collective of servers owned by multinational 
corporations and governments connected together by routers and optical cables that reside 
in states across the globe and serve as a backbone for information transported across the 
internet (Barabasi, 2003). Technically, any state or non-state actor with a computer and 
access to an internet connection may use this domain for their own purposes. For example, 
a person or group could use the internet to communicate or coordinate efforts, to conduct 
business, to collect information or gain knowledge, to conduct acts of malice or subversion, 
to hack into an unwitting server, etc. (Rid, 2012; Valeriano & Manness, 2015). Essentially, 
the internet is a quasi-governed, borderless domain that spans the globe (Choucri, 2012; 
Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). Any internet user, who places any of their information on the 
WWW; ostensibly, has placed it there for all the world to see (Goodman, 2015). 
4. Internet: The Layers 
Current theory breaks the internet down into discrete layers: the physical and the 
synthetic, with the later broken down into the syntactic and the semantic substrates 
(Libicki, 2007). These substrates describe and comprise the multiple layers that operate 
together and allow the internet to function (Choucri, 2012; Clarke & Knake, 2010; Libicki, 
2007; Valeriano & Maness, 2015).26  The physical layer, the backbone of the internet, 
contains all of the manifold computers, routers, servers, technical control devices, 
telecommunications controllers, and IT systems that allow the internet to operate (Choucri, 
 
26 Clark and Knake (2010) stratified cyberspace into the physical, logical, informational, and actor 
layers. Choucri (2012) chose to follow this construct. Libicki (2007) broke the layers of the internet into the 
physical, syntactic, and semantic. Libicki’s stratification of cyberspace collapses Clarke and Knake’s 
logical and informational stratum into the synthetic using more precise language by using syntactic (i.e., 
logical) and semantic (i.e., informational) substrata. Valeriano and Maness (2015) seem to adopt Libicki’s 
construct, which will be used throughout this volume. 
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2012; Clarke & Knake, 2010; Comer, 2015; Libicki, 2007, p. 8; Valeriano & Maness, 
2015).27 
The synthetic layers consist of the syntactic and semantic substrates, as Libicki 
(2007) described. The computer language, instructions, and syntax reside within the 
syntactic substrate, which enables the internet to function, as the operator intends (Libicki, 
2007, pp. 1–14).28  The syntactic substrate provides access to the semantic layer, where 
the information and knowledge, created by humans, resides in cyberspace (Choucri, 2012; 
Clarke & Knake, 2010; Libicki, 2007; Valeriano & Maness, 2015).29  The syntactic layer 
provides the medium to access the physical layer. Cyber-intrusions come through this 
substrate. Thus, to hack or to intrude into a network entails the use of the physical layer to 
gain access to the synthetic layer through the manipulation of the syntactic to access, 
damage, or exfiltrate the information residing in the semantic substrate (Choucri, 2012; 
Clarke & Knake, 2010; Libicki, 2007; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). Any cyber intrusion 
would proceed in this manner. Yet, attribution of these intrusions remains elusive due to 
the ubiquitous use of Internet protocol (IP) anonymizers and other surreptitious methods 
not discussed here. 
 
27 Information Technology (IT) Systems – Includes all categories of ubiquitous technology used for 
the gathering, storing, transmitting, retrieving, or processing of information (e.g., microelectronics, printed 
circuit boards, computing systems, software, signal processors, mobile telephony, satellite communications, 
and networks). Synonymous with Information and Communications Technology (Committee on National 
Security Systems, 2015, p. 62). 
Further, using the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) internet 7-layer reference, in 
this context the physical layer would incorporate ISO layers 1 through 4 (i.e. 1. Physical, 2. Data Link, 3. 
Network, and 4. Transport) (Comer D. , 2015). Comer (2015) points out that modern protocols may not fit 
into this structure; yet, the use of the ISO layering terminology persists, largely for descriptive purposes. 
28 Using the ISO layering protocol this syntactic layer would encompass layer 5 and 7 (i.e., 5. Session 
(login in procedures) and 7. Application) (Comer D. , 2015). 
29 Syntactic substrate – a substratum of the synthetic layer that contains the computer language, 
instructions, and syntax, which enables the internet to function. The physical layer, of cyberspace, enables 
access to the semantic substrate, through the syntactic substrate where the hacking occurs to gain access to 
the information in the semantic (Libicki, 2007, pp. 8-10; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, pp. 22-24). 
Semantic substrate – a substratum of the synthetic layer that contains the information and knowledge 
created, manipulated, and utilized by humans in our day-to-day life. Access to this substrate comes through 
the physical through the syntactic. Information that is exfiltrated, manipulated, or stolen resides in the 
semantic substrate (Libicki, 2007, pp. 8-10; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, pp. 22-24). 
Using the ISO Layering Protocol this semantic layer would be synonymous with Layer 6 (i.e., 6. 
Presentation) (Comer D. , 2015).  
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5. Internet: The Anonymity 
IP anonymizers, such as The Onion Router (TOR), a common freeware application, 
essentially encrypt the user’s network traffic from point of origin until exiting the 
anonymizer network of servers.30  As shown in Figure 3, it is not until the last link to the 
final destination that information proceeds un-encrypted. This makes attribution of the 
intrusion’s origin, as in the examples below, exceedingly difficult for individuals, but 
possible by leveraging government or state-level resources. 
 




30 Internet Protocol (IP) – Standard protocol for transmission of data from source to destinations in 
packet-switched communications networks and interconnected systems of such networks (Committee on 
National Security Systems, 2015, p. 70). 
Freeware – (a.k.a. Public Domain Software) Software not protected by copyright laws of any nation 
that may be freely used without permission of or payment to the creator, and that carries no warranties from 
or liabilities to the creator (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 99). 
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Thus, using an IP anonymizer, like TOR, an internet user or would-be hacker gains 
a certain amount of anonymity when using the internet. Indeed, intrusions and hacks have 
become an instrument of statecraft to use in conflict or rivalry situations between states or 
non-state actors (i.e., Sony Pictures) (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993; Choo, 2011; Denning, 
2007; Gandhi et al., 2011; Harris, 2008; Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Murphy, 2014; 
Shackelford, 2012). In reality, most of this cyber activity seems to fall into the realm of a 
low-level cyber incidence at best or more appropriately as cyber intrusions. In this way, 
cyberspace is both similar and different from the other conflictual domains, where crime, 
coercion, espionage, and sabotage (i.e., with the intent to damage only) do occur, 
frequently. As such, it is prudent to explore the existing literature surveying the extent to 
which conflict and rivalry between any manifold combination of state or non-state actors 
unfolds in the internet domain. So, what does conflict and rivalry look like in cyberspace? 
C. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND RIVALRY  
Since humans began to make historical records, the state has acted as a system 
around which groups of people organized. Granted the state concept was nascent at first 
but grew in its importance over time. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which ended the 
Thirty Years’ War in Europe, set the foundational cornerstone establishing the territorial 
sovereignty of the state as the premier form of organization in the international system and 
its concomitant elite underpinnings (Bull, 2012, p. 39; Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 24; Nye 
J. S., 2007, p. 3). People throughout the world have and continue to organize around the 
state paradigm.31   
The state construct has led to much conflict and rivalry over the centuries in the 
various domains expanding from the land and sea to air and space in the most recent era. 
The rivalry normally revolves around competition for resources, frequently territorial with 
pre-existent cultural, ethnic, or religious overtones contributing to the contentious 
atmosphere (Diehl & Goertz, 2001; Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006; Thompson, 2001; 
 
31 Presently, there are approximately 196 sovereign states in the World (Polity IV, 2018).  
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Vasquez & Leskiw, 2001).32  In some cases, over time, these rivalries lead to conflicts 
ranging from simple disagreements with cyber overtones, to arms races, to armed 
skirmishes, and even to all-out war (Diehl & Goertz, 2001; Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006; 
Maoz & San-Akca, 2012; Toft, 2014; Thompson, 2001; Valeriano & Maness, 2014).33  
What Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1994) described as the Third Wave or the information age 
engulfed modern society—cyberspace became the next contentious domain.34  
1. Conflict in Cyberspace 
Early on, as the information age began to take its form and supplant the industrial 
age, many conflict and rivalry scholars conjectured that the Third Wave would similarly 
impact inter-state affairs and tactics of warfare, just as the Second Wave had so utterly 
transformed First Wave’s feudal, agrarian-based society. (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993; 
Clarke & Knake, 2010; De Tocqueville, 1955; Lynn III, 2010; Toffler, 1980; Toffler & 
Toffler, 1993; Valeriano & Maness, 2015).35  Various aspiring cyber-intellectuals and 
 
32 Rivalry – is a relationship between two states whereby through a series of connected disputes both 
sides use, with some regularity, their instruments of national power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, 
military, or economic [DIME]) to telegraph threats, to employ coercion or intimidation tactics in order to 
gain some competitive advantage over the other (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016; Diehl & 
Goertz, 2001; Farlin, 2014; Porter, 1991; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018; Vasquez & Leskiw, 2001). 
Rivalries take on psychological manifestations of their enmity towards each other, which include suspicion, 
mistrust, hatred, and demonization (Maoz & Mor, 2002). This psychosis seems to permeate all level of civil 
societies (i.e., masses to elites) engaged in a rivalrous behavior (Maoz & Mor, 2002). Further, opponents 
view accommodations, made by their rival, in actions, deeds, or statements with bias suspicion, whereas, 
hostility consistently defines the true essence of a rival’s intentions or attitudes (Jervis, 1976; Heradstveit, 
1979; Maoz, 1990; Maoz & Mor, 2002, p. 7). 
33 Conflict ‒ is a disagreement on preferred outcomes (Valeriano & Maness, 2015, p. 32). 
34 Toffler uses “social wave-front analysis” as a theoretical construct or metaphor to explain the often 
turbulent, unpredictable, and often destructive fluctuations in societal patterns that emerge as a result of 
changes in technology, brought about by necessity or cycles of innovation (i.e., First Wave – Agricultural 
Revolution, Second Wave – Industrial Revolution, Third Wave – Information Revolution) (Nye J. S., 2011; 
Toffler, 1980; Toffler & Toffler, 1993). 
35 The First Wave – Agricultural Revolution (i.e., age); the age of the three estates, 1st Estate or the 
Clergy, 2d Estate or the Nobility, 3d Estate or the Serfs, Peasants, or Commoners. Social and Political 
power resides with the owners of the land, usually nobility. Society revolved around the cultivation of 
arable land and the security of it. Hence, conflict generally revolved around the protection or acquisition of 
land or territory (Connolly, 1979; De Tocqueville, 1955; Toffler, 1980; Toffler & Toffler, 1993). 
Information circulated from person to person by word of mouth. Agrarian Age spanned from 8000–9000 
BC or BCE (Saharan Africans begin to farm and raise cattle for subsistence) to 1770s (Toffler, 1980). 
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cyber-luminaries surmised that cyberspace would become the next contested domain, 
comparable to the land, sea, air, and space domains (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993; Clarke & 
Knake, 2010; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). As a matter of their own national security, states 
seek to master, if not dominate, each domain in an effort to minimize threats from other 
states (Choucri, 2012, p. 38; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, p. 37). Yet, due to the internet’s 
complexity, most policy makers and state leaders rely on cyber security professionals and 
scholars to gain insights and assist them in clarifying their policies and initiatives in this 
realm (Clarke & Knake, 2010; Clarke & Knake, 2019). 
Certainly, many cyber professionals and scholars using qualitative research 
methods, and its requisite inductive reasoning, have done their best to inform the ongoing 
cyber debate amongst policy makers and elites. Indeed, qualitative research remains the 
time-honored, central pillar of comparative politics and the basis for most research in the 
cyber arena. The growth of the internet and the veritable explosion of available data creates 
an estimated 2.5 quintillion bytes per day and the computational means to analyze them. 
 
Second Wave – Industrial Age (i.e., Revolution), the age of mechanization of textiles, transportation, 
communications, warfare, etc., which created the requisite mass production, mass merchandising, mass 
distribution of goods and services, and mass media  (Toffler, 1980; Toffler & Toffler, 1993) a. social and 
political power resides with those leading, managing, or investing in major industries (i.e., gas, oil, steel, 
automobile, etc.). Society became dependent on industrial production and the security of materials and 
means of production. Information begins to accelerate beyond person-to-person communication to print 
media and transmission via telegraph, telephone, and/or wireless radio. Agriculture still necessary to 
sustain the population became increasingly industrialized and more efficient (i.e., Eli Whitney’s Cotton 
Gin, steam engine, steam locomotive). Conflict between the industrial and agrarian age societies 
culminated in the U.S. Civil War (1861‒1864), with the industrial society firmly supplanting the agrarian 
(Toffler, 1980). The Industrial Age spanned from approximately 1800 to 1960.  
Third Wave – Information Revolution (current age), the age of digitization and computerization of 
information through use of interconnected networks spanning the globe (i.e., the internet, World Wide 
Web, Cyberspace), enabling the nearly instantaneous transfer of information and knowledge, leading to the 
demassification of society (Nye J. , 2014; Toffler, 1980; Toffler & Toffler, 1993). Social and political 
power resides with those creating, innovating, controlling, managing, harnessing information to improve or 
innovate the use of existing legacy or newly developed systems (Nye J. , 2014; Toffler, 1980; Toffler & 
Toffler, 1993). By using information, agriculture and industrial products have become commodities  
(Toffler, 1980; Toffler & Toffler, 1993). The Information Revolution began in the 1960s and continues in 
the present era.  
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Thus, human understanding of the internet, in its entirety, remains elusive.36  Nevertheless, 
this increase in data availability and computational power has combined to enable political 
and social scientist to leverage statistical tools and to quantitatively test these conjectured 
qualitative cyber mechanisms (Baum & Zhukov, 2015; IBM, 2018; Maness & Valeriano, 
2016; Rid, 2012; Toft, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; 
Warren, 2015). These political scientists have uncovered some interesting results as they 
pertain to conflict and rivalry in cyberspace.  
To begin with, inside cyberspace empirically, a lot of rivalry and some conflict 
exists, but very few cyber disputes or conflicts ever spill over into the terrestrial realm or 
cause any real world destruction (Schmitt, 2013; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & 
Maness, 2015).37  In fact, Valeriano and Maness (2015) demonstrated in their research that 
roughly 16% (i.e., 20) of rival dyads actually devolved into cyber conflict between 2001 
and 2011.38  Thus, relatively few cyber rivalries have blossomed into cyber conflicts 
(Lindsay, 2013; Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & 
Maness, 2015). Further, evidence exists that these conflicts initially resulted in financial 
loss due to damage of IT systems, exfiltration of intellectual property, destruction of 
information, etc., leading to the loss of reputation of the target state or non-state actor. In 
 
36 In 2017, it was estimated that daily humans create 2.5 quintillion bytes of data, the equivalent to 
approximately of 47 million Blu-Ray ©, high capacity, storage discs (IBM, 2018). Each Blu-Ray © disc 
holds 50 gigabytes of data. If one placed each of the 47 million discs atop the other starting at sea level, the 
stack of discs would tower to the height 56 kilometers or approximately ~ 35 miles – just beyond the 
Earth’s stratosphere (Layers of Earth's Atmosphere, 2018). That figure is calculated by equating 2.5 
quintillion bytes to 2.33 billion gigabytes. One Blu-Ray disc holds 50 gigabytes. By dividing the 2.33 
billion gigabytes by 50 equals 46.6 million discs. A single Blu-Ray disc has a width of 1.2 millimeters or 
0.00394 of a foot. By multiplying 46.6 million by the width of the disk, one derives the height in feet 
spanned by stacking each disk atop or 183,604 feet, which equates to 56 kilometers or 35 miles once 
converted. It is estimated that only about 0.5% of this data is used or analyzed by humankind per day 
(Regalado, 2013).  
37 Cyber dispute – specific campaigns between two states using cyber tactics during a particular time-
period and contains one to several incidents, often including an initial engagement and responses 
(Valeriano & Maness, 2014, p. 349). 
Cyber conflict – the use of computational technologies in cyberspace for malevolent and destructive 
purposes in order to impact, change, modify diplomatic, economic, and military interactions between 
entities [state or non-state] short of war and non-contiguous to a battlefield (Valeriano & Maness, 2014, pp. 
348-351; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, p. 5). 
38 20 (rival dyads with observed cyber conflicts between 2001 and 2011) divided by 126 (known rival 
dyads existing over the 2001 to 2011 period) = 0.15873 ~ 16% (Valeriano & Maness, 2015, pp. 88-96). 
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fact, Maness and Valeriano (2016) provided empirical evidence that cyber incidents have 
little or no impact on foreign policy relationships between states involved in cyber conflicts 
with one exception—Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) incidents.39   
Further, it appears that full-scale cyber conflict in observable numbers, falls 
astonishingly short of what one might expect. This surprisingly low number appears to 
indicate that Valeriano and Maness’ (2015) theory of cyber restraint may be in operation.  
State or non-state antagonists may constrain their tactics in cyberspace to avoid 
miscalculation or misinterpretation of intentions, thereby, intentionally preventing a 
conflict (Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Valeriano & Maness, 2014). Indeed, most of the cyber 
activities observed fall well short of conflicts; instead, fall into the realm of a low-level 
cyber incidence or intrusions at best. Since rivalries seem to exist as precursors to conflicts, 
as discussed above, an exploration of the literature describing international rivalry in 
cyberspace would logically follow. So, what does rivalry look like in cyberspace? 
2. Rivalry in Cyberspace 
First, most enduring rivalries stem from some longstanding territorial disputes and 
the resources that exist within the territory in question, usually amplified by cultural, 
ethnic, or religious issues and are largely regional (Diehl & Goertz, 2001; Klein, Goertz, 
& Diehl, 2006; Thompson, 2001; Toft, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & 
Maness, 2015; Vasquez & Leskiw, 2001; Weidmann, 2015). Rivalries encompass the 
ongoing process of interaction and the psychological baggage surrounding the issue under 
dispute, leading to low-level cyber intrusions (Maoz & Mor, 2002; Valeriano & Maness, 
2015). Cyber antagonists conduct intrusions, as discussed in the previous section, through 
 
39 Cyber Incident – a. an occurrence or set of occurrences that result in an actual or potentially adverse 
effect on an information system, network, and/or the information residing therein (Committee on National 
Security Systems, 2015, p. 40). b. an individual action or cyber-operation launched against a state, by 
another state or non-state actor as part of an ongoing cyber dispute or conflict (Valeriano & Maness, 2014, 
p. 349; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) – a tactic in which multiple compromised computer systems 
target a server [s], website [s], or other network resource [s], and cause a denial of service for users of the 
targeted resource. The flood of incoming messages, connection requests or malformed packets to the target 
system forces it to slow down or even crash and shut down, thereby, denying service to legitimate users or 
systems (Beaver, 2018, sec.”DDOS”). 
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the syntactic substrate of cyberspace’s synthetic layer (Choucri, 2012; Clarke & Knake, 
2010; Libicki, 2007; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). These intruding actors intend to gain 
access to and through the synthetic layer to execute any number of various cyber tactics 
driven by malice, subversion, or simply seeking information. The semantic and syntactic 
substrata, within the synthetic layer, will remain the focus of the rest of this volume, 
because this is where manifest, low-level rivalrous behavior or intrusions regularly occur 
(Valeriano & Maness, 2015).40 
Since most internet users do not have the technical skills necessary nor the time to 
attempt an intrusion, the next probable suspects are botnets.41  Botnets (i.e., robot 
networks) consist of a host of networked computers forced or clandestinely compromised 
by a remote user or hacker to perform an array of functions (Clarke & Knake, 2010; 
Gandhi, et al., 2011; Kello, 2013; Rid, 2012; Shackelford, 2012; Singer & Friedman, 2013; 
Valeriano & Maness, 2015, p. 34).42  The hackers often execute the common DDOS cyber 
 
40 In the ISO layering construct, the syntactic layer encompasses layers 5 (i.e., session or login 
procedures) and 7 (i.e., applications) (Comer, 2015). Whereas, the semantic layer, as defined in the ISO 
construct, would consist of layer 6 or the data presentation layer (Comer, 2015). 
41 As of 2016, an estimated 75 million servers globally undergird internet operations (Jones, 2016). 
Types of servers include cloud, database, file, print, web, game, and applications servers  (Comer & 
Stevens, 1993, p. 11). In our initial cyber intrusion data set collected intrusions made on a single 
application server for approximately 124 days in early 2015. Over that time, this physical server accounted 
for over 1.048M cyber intrusions. These cyber intrusions are monitored by the information resources 
branch of the organization and measured in the level of intrusion severity from 1 (high risk) to 5 (low risk). 
If we were to use this total number of intrusions as a benchmark to calculate the level of cyber intrusion 
activity across all of the servers plugged into the internet the number would be approximately 634 billion 
intrusions per day (Internet Users by Country, 2017; Jones, 2016). [1,048,000 (Intrusions) / 124 (days) = 
8,452 (intrusions per day) | 8,452 X 75,000,000 (estimated # of servers on the internet) = 633,870,967,742 
~ 634 billion cyber intrusions per day across all internet servers  (Internet Users by Country, 2017; Jones, 
2016).]  Meaning that every human connected to the internet would need to execute 188 cyber intrusion 
attempts per day. [633,870,967,742 (per day intrusions) / 3,366,542,060 (# of internet users in 2016) = 188 
(intrusions per internet user, per day) (Internet Users by Country, 2017).] 
42 Botnet(s) – host of networked computers forced or clandestinely compromised and controlled by a 
remote user or hacker to perform an array of functions. Botnets constitute free (stolen) computational or 
network resources leveraged to conduct malicious activity on the internet, such as denial of service, defraud 
internet advertisers, etc., while masking the identity of the remote operator (Singer & Friedman, 2013, p. 
44). Hackers use tailored malware to clandestinely take over and exploit a computer or networks resources 
for their own purposes (Singer & Friedman, 2013). Hackers use various methods to propagate their 
customized malware via automated or non-automated means (Shin, Lin, & Guofei, 2011).  
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tactic by leveraging their botnets (Clarke & Knake, 2010; Gandhi, et al., 2011; Kello, 2013; 
Rid, 2012; Shackelford, 2012; Singer & Friedman, 2013; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, p. 
34). Further, the vast number of internet users who own these compromised computers 
never realize their system is part of a botnet (Kello, 2013; Singer & Friedman, 2013; 
Valeriano & Maness, 2015).  
Regardless of whether these intrusions originate with a group of hackers with or 
without botnets, the global level of activity estimated at 634 billion intrusions per day (see 
footnote 42), even if it is off by a factor of ten, seems worthy of investigation. Certainly, a 
lot more activity in cyberspace is happening around the lower end of the spectrum where 
cyber intrusions reside and well within the realm of rivalry behavior, especially when one 
considers the small number of cyber incidents or conflicts, previously discussed. Further, 
this back of the envelope analysis of these state or non-state cyber interactions provides 
some evidence of the operation of cyber restraint theory at the synthetic level (Valeriano 
& Maness, 2015).  
While qualitative and, more recently, quantitative scholars have exhaustively 
analyzed the conflictual end of cyber interactions, qualitative academics have generated 
many insightful conjectures and theories. A few quantitative scholars have provided 
empirical evidence equating to 111 incidents and 45 disputes between 20 rivals over an 
11‒year period (Valeriano & Maness, 2015, p. 89). This research begets cyber restraint 
theory backed up by empirical evidence that only 20 of those 126 rivalries (~ 16%) 
escalated into cyber conflict (Valeriano & Maness, 2015, p. 89). Nevertheless, while this 
research is quite valuable, it relies on a relatively small number of documented cyber 
conflicts, disputes, or incidents that occurred in the real world.  
 
 
Malware – software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process that will have adverse 
impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system. A virus, worm, Trojan 
horse, or other code-based entity that infects a host. Spyware and some forms of adware are also examples 
of malicious code, hardware, firmware, or software that is intentionally included or inserted in a system for 
a harmful purpose (Cichonski, Millar, Grance, & Scarfone, 2012, p. 60; Committee on National Security 
Systems, 2015, p. 79). 
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However, based on the extrapolation using real-world cyber intrusion data to derive 
an albeit rough approximation of 634B intrusion attempts per day across cyberspace (see 
footnote 42 above for the calculation), this area seems ripe for analysis because the 
preponderance of cyber activity appears to fall into the intrusion or the intrusion attempt 
realm. This cyber intrusion activity seems to be indicative of low-level rivalrous behavior, 
regardless of whether the intrusion originated from state or non-state actors. Within this 
construct, players seek to gain the attention of their rival, perhaps to modify their behavior, 
policy, or intention, but do so in a restrained manner. Presently, no research has leveraged 
real-world cyber intrusion data to explore what drives this behavior using quantitative 
statistical techniques. This volume seeks to add to the body of knowledge by next 
conjecturing a typology of what motivates cyber intrusion behavior in rivalry dyads, 
regardless of whether a state or non-state actor(s) executed the intrusions or attempts. 
D. TYPOLOGY IN CYBERSPACE 
Cyber intrusion behavior at this less harmful end of the rivalry spectrum revolves 
around two categories or intents: 1) Subversive Intent or 2) Information Seeking Intent. 
Each result in different kinds of observed behavior, pursuing often-divergent goals. On one 
end of the typology, is a malevolence driven by the desire to harm a rival, even if the 
antagonists hurt themselves in the process, they view their actions as just (Maness & 
Valeriano, 2016; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). The main thrust of this observed behavior 
appears to focus on questioning the existence or the legitimacy of a given rival’s authority 
(i.e., government, President, Congress, Parliament, etc.) (Rid, 2012).  
The opposite end encompasses actions set upon deliberately gathering information 
to satisfy some conscious or unconscious need, want, or desire (Case & Given, 2016; 
Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 
2018). This type can span from simple curiosity, to espionage, or to the nefarious—seeking 
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to harm an individual or country’s reputation. Nevertheless, regardless of type, the vector 
of these intrusions are predominately malicious.43  
The research parses this arena of cyber intrusion behaviors into these types to 
provide granularity of understanding. The intent is not to force these would-be hacktivist 
or intruders, manifesting cyber intrusion behavior, into one of these discrete bins; rather, 
the research’s aim is to use these categories in a discursive manner. Meaning that an 
intruder could begin the process by initially conducting intelligence, surveillance, or 
reconnaissance (i.e., information-seeking) of a given server to achieve the subversive goal 
by defacing the organizations website each of which begins along a malicious vector 
appearing as a cybercrime.44  The intent of this typology is to provide the spectrum and 
the boundaries of these evident intrusive behaviors to draw upon in the exploration of 
motivations driving cyber intrusion activity. The succeeding paragraphs will precisely 
define the parameters of such cyber intrusions. 
1. Subversive Intent 
The Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) (a.k.a. virtual sit-in or blockade) of a 
targeted network; the degradation or disruption of a given internet target; the spreading of 
propaganda or disinformation aspiring to deceive; or the defacement of a target’s website 
by a large group of hacktivists or a group of hacktivists wielding their subjugated botnets 
describes the cyber activities that bound subversive intent (Clarke & Knake, 2010; Gandhi, 
et al., 2011; Kello, 2013; Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Rid, 2012; Shackelford, 2012; Singer 
& Friedman, 2013; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). These cyber acts intend to challenge the 
integrity, veracity, power, and authority of established institutions or positions (i.e., 
 
43 Intrusion, infiltration, or exploitation of IT systems to steal intellectual property, a person’s identity, 
or execute a cybercrime comprise the lattice of cyber actions and goals that form the boundaries of 
malicious vector (Choo, 2011; Goodman, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). These observable actions 
seem intent on causing financial, psychological, or reputational harm to the target (i.e., individual or 
government), regardless of whether the hacktivist achieves their goal. Therefore, the desire to commit an 
unlawful act to cause financial, psychological, or reputational harm or distress to a rival defines the 
malicious vector (Goodman, 2015; Sharp, 2017; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). 
44 Cybercrime – any crime that is facilitated or committed using a computer, network, or hardware 
device (Gordon & Ford, 2006, p. 14). Examples include but are not limited to phishing, identity theft, cyber 
stalking, theft of intellectual property, exfiltration of data, etc. 
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governments, agencies, corporations, presidents, prime ministers, parliaments, etc.). 
Hacktivist use these tactics to imply that the state, entity, or organization lacks the ability 
to control their operations in cyberspace; therefore, by extension, the target cannot 
influence or control their real-world operations (Valeriano & Maness, 2015, pp. 33–34). 
Their approach is to erode each individual’s social bonds, beliefs, and trust in the state or 
non-state entity and in doing so possibly recruit or coerce followers to their cause (Rid, 
2012, pp. 22–23; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). Again, regardless of whether the 
hacktivists realize their goal; it is the execution of the cyber subversive act that counts (Rid, 
2012). Thus, the desire to undermine the constitution, the integrity, or the authority 
embodied in a rival’s ability to exercise control over their established institutions or entities 
defines subversive intent (Rid, 2012, p. 22; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, pp. 33–37). 
2. Information Seeking Intent 
The conduct of cyber espionage (i.e., intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance), 
or the theft of information specifically by gathering, exfiltrating, or stealing information on 
or about an opponent delineates the parameters of information seeking intent (Carter, 2015; 
Clarke & Knake, Cyberwar, 2010; Denning & Denning, 2010; Gandhi et al., 2011; Gartzke 
& Lindsay, 2015; Kello, 2013; Samuel, 2004b; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). This cyber 
behavior makes up right at 50% of all cyber incidents cataloged by Valeriano, Jensen, and 
Maness (2018) in their longitudinal study spanning from 2000 to 2014.  
Needs, wants, sense-making, or desires of the state or non-state actors seem to drive 
these observable deeds (Case & Given, 2016; Dervin & Naumer, 2009; Turcotte, York, 
Irving, Scholl, & Pingree, 2015). Usually wants or sense-making manifest themselves in 
an individual’s observable behavior patterns; whereas, needs or desires do not normally 
reveal themselves in actions or deeds (Case & Given, 2016; Dervin & Naumer, 2009). In 
fact, individuals often find it quite difficult to verbalize a need or desire (Case & Given, 
2016). Thus, in cyberspace, the research mainly deals with the state or non-state intruder’s 
or hacker’s want of information to discover patterns, fill gaps, or answer specific questions 
seeking information manifesting active or intentional behavior (Case & Given, 2016, p. 93; 
Dervin & Naumer, 2009). Doxing would also fall into this category. Doxing involves a 
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hacker seeking to infiltrate a target’s network to extract personal or governmental 
information that the target may find embarrassing, if or when made public (Singer & 
Friedman, 2013).45  As such, the active and intentional actions in cyberspace, set upon 
executing acts of cyber espionage (i.e., intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) to 
exfiltrate or gather information specifically from or out of a target’s IT networks defines 
information seeking intent (Case & Given, 2016; Clarke & Knake, 2010; Denning D. E., 
2011; Dervin & Naumer, 2009; Gandhi, et al., 2011; Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015; Kello, 
2013).  
Therefore, subversive intent or information seeking intent enabled by a malicious 
vector make up the typology bounding this research space. These acts define those 
behaviors and observable actions that seem to manifest themselves in the available data 
set. Analysis of real-world cyber data to provide evidence to buttress conjectured theories 
through the use of statistical models remains the focus of this research, intent on exploring 
these relationships in the third wave. 
3. Third Wave Implications 
Valeriano and Maness (2014; 2015; 2016) and many others through numerous 
scholarly contributions refined the  understanding of cyber conflicts, disputes, and 
incidences (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015; Lindsay, 2013; Rid, 2012). Their research and that 
of others enabled this research to move from a broad understanding of international conflict 
and rivalry in cyberspace to ultimately arrive at the discrete portion of rivalry that will be 
explored in the following chapters. In this last section of the typology, the researcher will 





45 Doxing – revealing personal documents publicly, as part of a protest, prank, or vigilante action. 
Often doxing requires minimal network penetration, relying more on careful research to link hidden 
personal or embarrassing data to the victim (Singer & Friedman, 2013, p. 46). 
 40
Again, leveraging much of the current scholarly material about state on state 
rivalry, these studies provide a foundation of evidence indicating how regime types have 
acted or will act in this domain in the past, present, or future. This research will survey this 
space by reviewing actions of two autocracies, two anocracies, and two democracies, 
noting their differences in the case study chapters. Given this scope, broad generalizations 
can be challenging; nevertheless, these will provide a set of indicators showing how these 
regime types compete in this space. Although this is not a direct match with the categories 
used by Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness (2018), the research will leverage the explanatory 
value of the defined typology, as shown in Table 2. In doing so, the research seeks to 
classify each regime type, to understand how they seem to leverage cyberspace in order to 
achieve some competitive advantage (Choucri, 2012; Diehl & Goertz, 2001; Porter, 1991; 
Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018; Vasquez & Leskiw, 2001).  
Table 3.   Frequency Counts for Vector and Intent of Cyber Incidents  
2000‒2014. Adapted from Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness (2018). 
Regime 
Type 




Malicious**     
(80/95 = 84%) 
#1 Information Seek (62/95 = 65%) 




Malicious    
(32/45 = 71%) 
#1 Subversive (25/45 = 56%) 




Malicious    
(44/52 = 85%) 
#1 Subversive (33/52 = 63%) 
#2 Information Seek (19/52 = 37%) 
 
52 
*Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness (2018) use the term Cyber Objective, which in this 
paper is synonymous with Cyber intent. 
** The majority of the non-malicious vector consists of DDOS attacks, which fall 
under subversive intent. 
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4. Rivalry in the Third Wave 
Thus, states of differing regime types, with the commensurate level of 
sophistication, participate in this domain. While their motivations may be different, the 
intent to gain the necessary level of capability to protect a state’s national interest in 
cyberspace seems apparent (Choucri, 2012; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). All of our 
antagonists noted in this realm employ malicious methods (i.e., intrusion, infiltration, 
exploitation) to penetrate through the syntactic layer in order to gain access to the semantic 
layer where the information they seek to find or manipulate for subversive intent exists. 
Regardless of whether the target is a state or non-state actor, this method of access remains 
consistent (Choucri, 2012; Clarke & Knake, 2010; Libicki, 2007; Valeriano & Maness, 
2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018).  
Certainly, hacktivist cyber-intrusion attempts begin the process that either leads to 
information seeking or subversive intent. Thus, studying the cyber intrusion phenomenon 
and trying to determine its causal determinants appears ripe for exploration. The research 
intends to use the quantitative methods used by scholars in this arena to empirically test 
whether the tone, variance, and types (i.e., material and verbal) of continuing media 
narratives have an impact on cyber intrusions. However, before testing that correlative 
linkage, theoretical refinement of several other theories is necessary to flesh out the 
impending explanations. 
E. TWO-LEVEL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
As discussed briefly in the Introduction, Putnam posited that two levels of 
negotiations occur simultaneously as one state engages another in formal discussions over 
some issue of mutual interest (Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Putnam, 1988; Trumbore, 
Boyer, Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Leveraging the 
descriptive value of this theory, one can envision a dyadic negotiation between two states. 
One in which both nations use the information instrument of national power seeking to 
ensure that the negotiation culminates in an outcome favorable to their state (Farlin, 2014; 
Mattis, 2018). Putnam (1988) describes this as level-one, international messaging or 
communication between the leaders or negotiators of these states, pursuing a win-set 
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satisfactory to their side of the negotiation. Parallel to these level-one negotiations resides 
the level-two domestic dialog, where bargaining and consultation with elites or opinion 
leaders occurs, seeking to influence or control the narrative conveyed to the country’s 
population to cultivate support of the chosen level-one win-set. In this process, elites set 
out to assist or inhibit their nation’s leaders efforts to either ensure the chosen win-set’s 
ratification or prevent its rejection (Bjola & Manor, 2018; Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; 
Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017; Trumbore, Boyer, Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000). 
1. Theory Linkage 
Further, although Putnam (1988) makes no distinction between regime types in 
discussion of the two-level process, he does imply that no state leader is totally immune 
from domestic pressures surrounding a given issue (Putnam, 1988; Trumbore, Boyer, 
Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000). Yet, intuitively and within the body of knowledge 
on this subject, evidence exists that democracies encounter more difficulties managing the 
domestic narrative of the issue at hand versus other regime types such as anocracies and 
autocracies (Trumbore, Boyer, Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000, p. 693).  
Further, as Trumbore et al. (2000, pp. 687–688) discovered the constellation of 
proximate leaders (i.e., elites, opinion leaders) advising a state’s decision maker on given 
conflictual issues decreases markedly across the continuum from democracies to 
anocracies to autocracies. Or simply, this research indicates that the number of elite voices 
who have access to a state’s leadership during negotiations decreases across regime types 
from democracies to autocracies. This decrease enables elites in anocracies and autocracies 
to enjoy greater influence over their country’s leaders and the chosen narrative. Therefore, 
the real power to control the domestic narrative rests in the hands of fewer elites across the 




a. Media Indexing 
Media journalists use indexing in writing their stories in an attempt to reach their 
professional standard of balanced, fair, and objective reporting. Indexing will cause the 
media to report the narratives of those elites who are perceived to have the ability to 
influence events, at a higher rate or in greater proportion than other voices (Bennett, 1990; 
Strong, 2017, pp. 293-294).46  In effect, enabling these fewer elites in autocracies, and less 
so in anocracies, to have an outsized ability to control their state’s side of the ongoing 
narrative particularly at the domestic level or level-two. The impact of this outsized 
influence may manifest itself in the amount of cyber intrusions coming from these regime 
types by magnifying the narratives of fewer indexed elites projecting an influence over 
large portions of their intrusive populations. As Bennett (1990) posited and Strong (2017) 
validated, indexing operates in the journalistic community and may become a factor in the 
conduct of this research. Finally, as implied above, Strong (2017) states that indexing can 
amplify the influence of elites. Especially, when a country has fewer elites in position to 
advise their leaders that discrete set of proximate leaders enjoy an enormous amount of 
influence. Further, each regime, depending on type, may exercise an amount of control 
over media content in cyberspace. This control of content provides regime leadership with 
the capability to cement their control of the domestic narrative and enhance their ability to 
exercise social control at level-two. 
Lastly, the indexing of foreign leaders by another states domestic media, depending 
upon the dyadic relationship between two states, can lead to reverberation (Putnam, 1988; 




46 Indexing – the way in which journalists write their narratives (i.e., stories) by reporting the voices 
or viewpoints of prominent officials who, because of their influence, may affect the outcome of the 
situation (Bennett, 1990; Strong, 2017). Journalists perform the function of indexing to ensure they adhere 
to professional standards of balanced, fair, and objective reporting, which is reinforced by normative 
editorial standards (Bennett, 1990; Strong, 2017). 
47 Reverberation – how statements and actions of foreign actors (i.e., elites) reported by media sources 
can affect the domestic politics of another state, thereby, influencing the foreign policy decisions of that 
state (Putnam R. D., 1988; Strong, 2017). 
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foreign actors statements and actions have only limited significance in the U.S. (Hayes & 
Guardino, 2013; Murray, 2014; Strong, 2017). However, Putnam did point out that weaker 
states should and do greater attention to stronger states (Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017). 
Subsequently, Strong (2017) showed how non-rivalrous states like the U.S. and the United 
Kingdom (UK), who enjoy an unusual, often harmonious relationship, may enable the 
UK’s media to index certain U.S. elites statements or actions resulting in reverberation 
within level-one of the UK’s policy arena (Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017). This 
conjecture will be explored in the Democracies case study to follow. 
b. Content Controls 
In addition, to these fewer elite voices, depending on regime type and country, 
controls placed on content in cyberspace may be vastly different. Deibert and Rohozinski 
(2010) created a typology describing the generations of cyberspace content controls. 
Deibert (2015) extended this typology from three generations to four as shown in Table 4. 
The forms of internet content controls as described exist within and are employed in 
various degrees by all countries and regime types. Further, all generations are not mutually 
exclusive and can exist simultaneously in a given country (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010, 
pp. 28-29).  
Democracies may use certain aspects of Second or Third-Generation controls to 
address child pornography, cybercrime, or terrorism, but usually follows strict legal 
parameters with incumbent checks and balances to prevent abuse by state authorities 
(Choo, 2011; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 2015; Goodman, 2015; Kriesi et al., 
2013; Mackinnon, 2011, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Stier, 2015). While autocracies tend to rely 
on the first three applying exhaustive information controls and perhaps, may dabble a bit 
in the fourth (Akgül & Kırlıdoğ, 2015; Aryan, Aryan, & Halderman, 2013; Deibert & 
Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 2015; Greitens, 2013; Mackinnon, 2011, 2012; Morozov, 2011; 
Pinkaew, 2016; Ruijgrok, 2017). Anocracies appear to have vaulted over the first in favor 
of employing the second and third in tandem (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010).  
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Anocracies, appear to enjoy the benefits of plausible deniability by accepting pro-
regime supporter’s use of extra-judicial tactics to intimidate any opposition, thereby 
squelching any alternative narrative, while simultaneously accepting no responsibility for 
these partisan actions (Calamur, 2017; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 2015; 
Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018). Finally, this typology will become 
beneficial later in this chapter’s discussion, becoming discretely helpful during analysis of 
regime types and countries in the case studies.  
But for now, this generational typology describes the unique aspects of internet 
content controls that can be used by a regime to enable them to effectively manage or 
control the domestic narrative at level-two. This level of control would be quite beneficial 
as a country’s leader attempts to gain some advantage during negotiations with the U.S. 
The ability to control the domestic narrative through both the elites and via the internet’s 
synthetic controls could be quite valuable—particularly when considering the nature and 
the positive or negative content of narratives. 
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Table 4.   Range of Cyberspace Information Content Controls 
Descriptions of the Generations of Internet Content Controls 
First-Generation (Gen):1 Covers the denial of access to specific internet resources through the use of blocking, 
filtering, or deep packet inspection (DPI) techniques, active policing of cyber cafés, and/or the creation country, state, 
language, or domain specific internet (i.e. Great Firewall of China, Halal Internet, RUNET, etc.).1  First Generation 
(Gen) controls are inherently defensive in nature and are employed domestically. 
Second-Gen:2 Encompasses the creation of legal governance frameworks buttressed by technical capabilities 
establishing a normative environment, whereby, state-enabled actors can deny access to or modify selected 
information resources in real time. Thus, the legal, normative part forms the overt aspect, which provides the 
legitimacy for the covert aspect to monitor and censor all content—as necessary. Overtly, this legal basis grants these 
state-enabled actors the authority to covertly monitor what the citizen user reads, posts, or attempts to use prohibited 
content. Thereby, this covertly gathered information can be used to support overt or coercive tactics such as arrests, 
detainment, fines or other forms of intimidation as a means to maintain control of social discourse and the dominant 
narrative. The combination of the overt and covert aspects places the citizen user in a catch-22, where meeting the 
requirements for compliance sets the conditions for prosecution and non-compliance forms the legal basis for 
punishment. Covert content controls include informal removal of information or censorship, technical shutdowns, 
computer network attack techniques. Overt illegal content infractions can be anything the state deems a threat to their 
national security, which can include anything from criticism of religious or state officials, to the use of The Onion 
Router (TOR), or to the use of social media to coordinate a civil protest. 
Third-Gen:3 Covers the set of controls that intends to compete in the information space in a sophisticated, multi-
dimensional way carrying the state’s narrative to the population, while undermining the opposition’s narrative through 
the use of an utterly devastating counterinformation campaign with the intent to demoralize, discredit, and overwhelm 
any opponent. Third Gen controls include warrantless surveillance, state-sanction cyberzones, and information 
campaigns, data mining targeted systems, and direct action.4  Surveillance and data mining of targeted computer 
systems are specifically meant to confuse, entrap, and disgrace opponents. Third-Gen controls are inherently offensive 
in nature and span from domestic controls to international campaigns attempting to expand their country’s narrative 
to influence other states. Elements of Third-Gen controls can be executed by regime recruited, crowdsourced citizens 
who may feel compelled to direct action methods to squelch opposing voices. These crowdsourced legions provide 
the regime with the ability to use plausible deniability to distance themselves, as necessary, from the more rash actions 
(i.e., extra-judicial) undertaken by their partisans. Examples include China’s fifty-centers and Russia’s Patriotic 
Hackers. 
Fourth-Gen:5 Encompasses the expansion of authoritarian controls from the tactical or operational realm into the 
strategic; whereby, autocratic states argue for greater expansive, state-led controls and democratic states advocate for 
greater openness and transparency in cyberspace. The differences between the two could not be more stark. With the 
autocracies viewing the internet residing within their borders as their sovereign, albeit synthetic, territory that must 
be controlled, policed, and secured. Further, any incursion upon that synthetic territory is regarded as an attack on 
their state’s sovereignty. While the democracies see the internet as an international domain useful to exchange ideas, 
to foster innovation, and to execute global commerce. The internet is a synthetic construct to be exploited, shared, and 
leveraged for the greater good. These bipolar debates occur in both regional and international forums where 
cyberspace policy is being crafted. This is precisely where these strategic struggles about cyberspace governance 
occur. This is also where the strategic struggle against the expansion of authoritarian controls in cyberspace occur. 
1 Deibert, 2010, 2015 
2 Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010, 2015; Ensafi, Winter, Mueen, & Crandall, 2015; MacKinnon, 2011; 
Morozov, 2011  
3 Deibert, 2015; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010  
4 A cyberzone consist of state sanction electronic spaces (i.e., state sponsored—intranet), which only can access authorized state 
provided information (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). Direct action is defined as any action that achieves its desired goal (i.e., civil 
disorder, civil strife, civil disorder, civil violence, or any state sponsor variations thereof) and spans from cyber to kinetic measures 
(Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 2015; King M. L., 1963; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; MacKinnon, 2012; McAdam, McCarthy, & 
Zald, 1999) 
5 Deibert, 2015; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2018 
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2. Theory Application 
To begin with a country’s leadership will choose a type of storyline in order to 
maneuver into a position of advantage during a negotiation, possibly selecting a negative 
narrative. To that point, as discussed in the Introduction, that leader might prefer a negative 
verbal or material narrative, believing it will optimize their negotiation space allowing 
them to achieve a win-set for their country. For example, say a given state is locked in a 
dyadic negotiation with the U.S. that state might use negative verbal narratives attempting 
to coerce, cajole, or influence the U.S. into agreeing to their chosen win-set. Depending on 
the regime type, a nation’s hackers or intruders may react differently to this negative verbal 
rhetoric. Whereas, the research expects the hacktivist or intruder’s reaction to be consistent 
across regimes, particularly when other nations create negative material narratives directed 
at the U.S. and its interests. 
In democracies, the multiplicity of elite voices produce a cacophony of media 
reported narratives, which leads to a lack of clarity. This lack of clarity may lead to different 
levels of intrusions resulting from the material or verbal narratives used by the country 
opposite the U.S. in dyadic discussions. While anocracies and autocracies possess fewer 
elite voices and higher levels of internet content controls than democracies. The 
combination of the two enables fewer proximate leaders to project their outsized opinions 
on their state’s leaders and the state’s use of generations (i.e., levels) of content controls 
can produce a decidedly focused narrative. 
Additionally, autocracies enjoy a definitive level of clarity and unanimity of 
viewpoints, and by extension a certain clarity of media messaging (i.e., narratives) when 
communicating with their domestic populations on a given issue. This progressing 
unanimity of narrative, which is not as coherent and oftentimes incomprehensible in 
democracies, becomes clearer and more precise in the progression through anocracies to 
autocracies. Thus, an increasing level of narrative clarity may imply a growing degree of 
societal control across these regime types. This posited increasing level of societal control 
may reveal itself in the level of cyber intrusions occurring the day following the media 
event and may differ across regime types as the hypotheses offered later will indicate. 
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But before departing this exploration, this research needs to close a few gaps in the 
explanation thus far. First, the research looks to a branch of communication theory to 
explain how elites interpret media events and influence civil society’s view of the media 
narrative. Second, a quick exploration of the media events coding community will follow 
leading into the final piece of this review: the digital panopticon, narrative, and sharp power 
theories and how they relate to this research. So, how does Lazarsfeld’s posited two-step 
flow of media information assist in this explanation?  
F. TWO-STEP FLOW OF COMMUNICATION THEORY 
This theory resides within the Media Effects branch of Communication Theory, 
specifically within the Minimal Effects theoretical structure (Ball-RoKeach & DeFleur, 
1976; Katz, 2001; Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011; Postelnicu, 2008; Werder, 2009).48  
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s at Columbia University, a group of scholars led by Paul 
Lazarsfeld ostensibly rejected once dominant significant effects theoretic in favor of the 
minimal effects paradigm (DeFleur & Dennis, 1981; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 
1944; Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011; Postelnicu, 2008).49  One of Lazarsfeld’s students, 
 
48 Media-Effects Theory – a. the deliberate and non-deliberate short and long-term within-person 
changes in cognitions (including beliefs), emotions, attitudes, and behavior that result from media use 
(Valkenburg, Peter, & Walther, 2016, p. 316). b. Elements of media effects include timing (immediate vs. 
long-term), duration (temporary vs. permanent), valence (negative or positive), change (difference vs. no 
difference), intention (or non-intentional), level of effect (macro vs. micro), direct (or indirect), and 
manifestation (observable vs. latent) (Potter, 2012, pp. 35-36). Media Effects falls under the larger umbrella 
of Communications Theory (Ball-RoKeach & DeFleur, 1976; Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011; Werder, 2009). 
Generally, the constituency of Media Effects Theory fit into three camps: the Significant Effects, Minimal 
Effects, and Cumulative Effects, also referred to as Interpretive Effects (Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011; 
Werder, 2009).  
49 In the early 1930s, it appeared that propagandists such as Hitler, Mussolini, or Tojo were quite adroit 
in the use media to influence their populations (Lasswell, 1935). As such, there seemed to be ample real-
world evidence that media could indeed be the magic bullet to influence large passive or homogeneous 
populations (Ball-RoKeach & DeFleur, 1976; Lasswell, 1935; Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011; Werder, 
2009). Subsequently, Claude Shannon (1948) discovered a formula that governed the amount of information 
or data broadcasted over a single channel, commonly referred to as Shannon’s Law (Aftab, Cheung, Kim, 
Thakkar, & Yeddanapudi, 2002; Shannon C. , 1948; Shannon & Weaver, 1964). Weaver goes further to 
describe how Shannon’s Mathematical Theory of Communication governs the rate at which semantic 
information aired to large audiences using a single channel can be transmitted and received; thereby, 
constraining the effect of media communication based on the audience and venue size (Shannon & Weaver, 
1964, pp. 24-28). Further, very little evidence emerged, beyond the observed, revealing that those engaged 
in the propaganda campaigns of the 1930s and 1940s actually considered the magic bullet theoretic as viable 
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Joseph Klapper wrote an influential review of the premises underpinning the minimal 
effects view of the theory (Klapper, 1960; Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011). 
Building on the research previously completed by Lazarsfeld et.al (1944), Klapper 
(1960) continued the investigation of the media’s ability to influence voters during an 
election cycle. A critical finding of his research lies in the fact that media coverage only 
swayed a small fraction of voters (Klapper, 1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; 
Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011; Postelnicu, 2008). He found that the perceptive viewpoints 
of opinion leaders (i.e., elites, politicians, and policy makers), conveyed through their 
social interactions with friends and acquaintances, had greater influence on the voting 
population. He also observed that these opinion leaders actively and shrewdly digested 
media narratives to form their opinions, which they in turn shared through their social 
interactions as described in the two-step flow model (Klapper, 1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, 
& Gaudet, 1944; Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011; Postelnicu, 2008).50 
1. Theory Linkage 
Thus, the mediated two-step flow begins with opinion leaders (i.e., elites or 
proximate leaders) collecting, interpreting, and untwining the media narrative to form their 
own positions on the subject of the day—step-one. Second, these opinion leaders pass on 
their views to the voting population via social interaction; thus, reinforcing a key 
component of minimal effects—step-two (Klapper, 1960; Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011, 
p. 172; Postelnicu, 2008; Werder, 2009). Thus, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) 
concluded that information transmitted, at the time via word of mouth, played a greater 
role in the influence of civil society then mass media narratives. Certainly, the velocity of 
that information transfer has continued to increase in the current era. But, on the cusp of 
 
(Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011). As such, social scientist studying media effects began to question the 
foundation paradigms upon which the theory rested (Werder, 2009).  
50 Coincidentally, Klapper, at the time an employee of CBS News, testified before the U.S. Congress 
regarding media effects. At the time, Congress was considering regulating the television industry because 
of its perceived supporting effect on some of the transgressive societal mores emerging at the time. This 
fact only served to add to the folklore surrounding Klapper and buttress the pre-eminence of the minimal 
effects premise at the beginning of the information age (Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011). 
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the information age, another scholar discovered step-one of Lazarsfeld’s information flow 
operating in British society.  
In the late 1990s, Kenneth Newton (1999) conducted a quantitative review of the 
impact of media, specifically television and print media, on a sample of the British 
population. In his findings, he noted that those participants who read a paper daily 
manifested a greater level of interest, working knowledge, and understanding of the current 
political issues (Newton, 1999). To a lesser degree, habitual television news viewers did as 
well. Further, Newton labeled these British daily paper readers as sophisticated consumers 
of media, particularly newsprint, and were cognitively mobilized51 (Newton, 1999). Thus, 
certain elites consume media narratives and form opinions about that news. More recently, 
other scholars have found evidence that both step one and two operate in the information 
age. 
The Turcotte et al. (2015) study found evidence of the two-step operating across 
modern social media platforms. First, their research found trust of the news media’s 
reporting guides individual behavior, with opinion leaders figuring prominently in lending 
credibility to media narratives (Ladd, 2013; Turcotte, York, Irving, Scholl, & Pingree, 
2015). Second, opinion leaders, in step-two of the process, perform the necessary function 
of informing and educating civil society in the information age and may assist in 
forestalling the news media deteriorating credibility (Turcotte, York, Irving, Scholl, & 
Pingree, 2015, pp. 530-531). Thirdly, this study validates that the interpersonal nature of 
the two-step flow still matters in relation to news credibility and to information-seeking 
behavior. As a reminder, the later makes up 50% of all cyber incidents and is mentioned in 
section D of this chapter as one of the typological intents used to explain cyber intrusion 
behavior. Thus, it appears that the two-step flow of communication is relevant, operant, 
and useful for explanation—even today. Next, these theories will be fit into the existing 
theoretical structure. 
 
51 Cognitively mobilized ‒ describes people or groups of people who manifest higher levels of 
political participation, who have deeper political discussions, who have comprehensive political 
information, who possess heightened political awareness, and have an ideologically refined set of political 
skills, as compared to the general population in western countries (Newton, 1999, pp. 581-582). 
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2. Theory Integration 
As discussed in the Introduction and described graphically in Appendix C, it 
appears that the two-step flow operates within level-two or domestic political messaging 
during a given state’s negotiations with the U.S. or other nations. This linkage rest on the 
body of knowledge associating the two theories, which can be tied closely together 
contingent on the level of domestic controls of internet content employed by a particular 
country (Bjola & Manor, 2018; Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Deibert & Rohozinski, 
2010; Deibert, 2015; Katz, 2001; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; Neuman & 
Guggenheim, 2011; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018; Putnam, 1988; 
Strong, 2017; Trumbore, Boyer, Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000; Turcotte, York, 
Irving, Scholl, & Pingree, 2015). 
First, regardless of whether elites are creating or digesting the generated narrative 
this piece of the puzzle firmly resides in or is connected to step-one of the two-step flow 
and at domestic level-two. Second, elites communicate and affirm the veracity of the 
narrative to the population, at step-two and again well within the level-two domestic 
narrative, where a country’s leadership manages the national messaging. Thus, the author 
conjectures theoretically that the two-step flow operates and reinforces the level-two 
domestic narratives in international relations between sovereign states, as depicted in 
Appendix C’s logic map. The strength of this interaction may be constrained or reinforced 
by the level of domestic content controls used within a given country. 
To varying degrees, this theoretical linkage operates within states attempting to 
manage that domestic narrative during level-one negotiations. For leaders and elites of 
democratic states, this process appears to be more of an attempt at managing the narrative 
due to the plurality of differing elite viewpoints that exist in democracies. As these 
competitive elites positionally jockey within civil society to create and sustain the dominate 
narrative seeking ratification of the current administration’s chosen win-set (Hoffman-
Lange, 2018; Putnam, 1976, pp. 115‒121). This cacophony and plurality of narratives in 
democracies may lead to increases in tomorrow’s intrusions resulting from the type of 
today’s narrative, irrespective of type (i.e., material or verbal).  
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Within anocracies and autocracies, as the hypotheses will indicate, today’s 
narrative, depending upon type (i.e., verbal or material) may manifest itself in the amount 
of intrusions tomorrow; thereby, indicating certain regimes possess a greater degree of 
societal control. This higher level of societal control rests on a traditional ruling class of 
consensual elites relying on a hierarchical structure linking elites to citizens (Hoffman-
Lange, 2018; Putnam, 1976, pp. 115‒121).  
As discussed earlier, other scholars continue to expand this arena of study, 
particularly in the international relations arena. Conceição-Heldt and Mello (2017) named 
these elites gatekeepers or central actors in international negotiations. They and other 
scholars conjectured that these actors, now enabled by technology, can manage both the 
international (i.e., level-one) and domestic narratives (i.e., level-two), where the two-step 
flow operates, simultaneously (Bjola & Manor, 2018; Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; 
Strong, 2017; Turcotte, York, Irving, Scholl, & Pingree, 2015).  
Indeed, the number of channels or linkages connecting each elite to their domestic 
or international diaspora only continue to multiply (Barabasi, 2003). Twitter, Instagram, 
Snapchat, Facebook, Telegram, text message, cell phone, etc., are all constitute channels/
linkages connecting each individual, acting as a node for more and more information. Thus, 
opinion leaders / policymakers are connecting with more and more individual nodes, 
passing their views on a given issue. Therefore, in the past what could have taken days for 
an opinion leader to opine at next Saturday’s cocktail party, is now passed in a matter of 
seconds—making the two-step flow nearly instantaneous. Indeed several scholars, using 
quantitative methods, discovered that the half-life of a given day’s news narrative,52 
indicating its ability to cognitively mobilize elites lasts for less than 24 hours or 1 day 
(Castillo, El-Haddad, Pfeffer, & Stempeck, 2014). Hence, the hypotheses posited later in 
this study seek to gauge the impact of yesterday’s narratives on today’s cyber intrusions. 
Next, the research turns to the media events coding literature for assistance in deriving 
 
52 Half-life – the time required to realize half of the value or impact of event, element or substance 
undergoing a process, usually of decay or lose of effectiveness, transitioning from a period of usefulness 
and popularity to a period of decline or obsolescence (Webster, 2017). 
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explanatory variables for use in a statistical model to measure the influence today’s 
narratives may have on tomorrow’s intrusions. 
3. Media Events Coding  
Beginning in the mid-1960s, a group of political science scholars began manually 
coding daily news reports to ascertain whether the latent linguistic patterns correlated with 
the tenor of state-to-state relations (Goldstein, 1992). Anyone who has done qualitative 
research using methods described by Glaser and Strauss (1977) can attest to the laborious 
and tedious nature of a manual coding process. Fortunately, machine coding of media 
events has significantly improved with advances in computing power. Today, machine 
coding of media events scrape a billion sentences a day from over 100,000 news articles 
across the globe (Schrodt, 2017).53  These scraped articles are machine-coded and stored 
in digital query-able databases (Goldstein, 1992; Howell, 1983; Schrodt, 2012). The data 
derived from this process, commonly referred to as [media] events data, has become 
increasingly reliable for measuring the level of cooperation or conflict between states (Bi, 
2015; Colaresi, 2004; Goldstein, 1992; Goldstein & Pevehouse, 1997; Maness & 
Valeriano, 2016; Monroe & Schrodt, 2008; Monroe, Pan, Roberts, Sen, & et al., 2015; 
Schrodt & Gerner, 1997). 
Each scraped article defines a dyad capturing its directionality, for example, an 
article describing an Iranian viewpoint (i.e., narrative) on a given issue in reference to the 
United States, or vice versa, forms a single dyad (Vincent, 1979, p. 47).54  First, these 
articles are categorized as verbal cooperative (i.e., positive), verbal conflictual (i.e., 
negative), material cooperative, or material conflictual, as defined on page 11. Separately 
within the CAMEO coding construct, each article scraped and collected daily by the given 
political events database is scored on an ordinal scale of cooperation (+10) to conflict  
 
53  Scrape or Scrapping refers to a discrete form of machine learning or [electronic] statistical learning 
techniques, whereby, electronic text on a given website or set of websites is scanned for a predefined set of 
words or phrases; once discovered the information is extracted from the sources website and placed into a 
database for various uses such as, in this case, political discourse analysis (Monroe & Schrodt, 2008, p. 
353; Monroe, Pan, Roberts, Sen, & et al., 2015, p. 71; Schrenk, 2012, pp. 227-237).  
54 Dyad – an interaction between two elements or parts, in this case two states or countries  (Oxford 
Dictionary, 2015).  
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(‒10). Essentially, the political narrative captured in each media article is measured for its 
tone,55 depicting the directional tenor of narrative from cooperative to conflictual between 
two states. This scale of cooperative or conflictual is known as the Goldstein score and is 
commonly accepted by political scientists (Bi, 2015; Brandt, Colaresi, & Freeman, 2008; 
Colaresi, 2004; Goldstein, 1992; Goldstein & Pevehouse, 1997; Schrodt & Gerner, 1997; 
Shellman, Clare Hatfield, & Mills, 2010; Yonamine, 2001).  
To date neither the number of verbal or material articles nor the Goldstein score or 
its variation have been used to develop independent variables to discern their influence on 
intrusion activity using a statistical regression model. This proposed model would use these 
explanatory variables as proxies for the gravitas or tone of media narratives generated by 
other states directed at the U.S. and its interests, on a given day, and their impact or 
influence cyber intrusion activity the following day. Thus, the model would examine the 
correlation relationship between the digitally recorded in the Goldstein score or tone, its 
derived variation or polarization, and the number of a state’s verbal and material media 
narratives about the U.S. today and their effect on intrusion activity on U.S. networks 
tomorrow. Next, the research will explore segments of several different theories that will 
complete the explanation of this cyber intrusion phenomenon. 
G. OTHER USEFUL THEORIES 
These theories add certain elements intended to buttress and expand the overall 
generality of this research. Further, parts of each will be integral to regime type 
explorations and explanations contained in the case study chapters.  
1. Digital Panopticon 
As presented in the introduction, Jeremy Bentham, a 19th century social theorist, 
developed a prison architectural design based on a hub and spoke principle placing the 
guard(s) at the hub and the prisoner’s cells on the spokes (Bentham, 2012; Loadenthal, 
 
55 Tone – a construct meant to apply a objective scale (i.e.,+10 to -10) to media narratives from 
cooperative (i.e.,, positive, +10) to conflictual (i.e.,, negative, -10) (Bi, 2015; Brandt, Colaresi, & Freeman, 
2008; Colaresi, 2004; Goldstein, 1992; Goldstein & Pevehouse, 1997; Schrodt & Gerner, 1997; Shellman, 
Clare Hatfield, & Mills, 2010; Yonamine, 2001). 
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2018). In effect, this design subsequently created the panopticon effect describing how the 
individual prisoner modified their behavior, in effect self-policing, because they were never 
certain whether they were or were not under surveillance by the guard(s) (Bentham, 2012; 
Galič, Timan, & Koops, 2017; Loadenthal, 2018; MacKinnon, 2012, pp. 75-86; Manokha, 
2018). In the recent era, scholars extended theory of the panoptic effect to apply to private 
citizens, where depending on regime type, may find themselves under varying levels (i.e., 
generations) of digital surveillance (Chesterman, 2011; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; 
Deibert, 2015; Foucault, 1977; Goodman, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012; Manokha, 2018). 
Every citizen’s digital footprint regardless of device, program, or application could be 
under surveillance by the state or some nefarious character at any time (Chesterman, 2011; 
Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 2015; Duffy, 2015; Gabdulhakov, 2020; Goodman 
2015; Mackinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Manokha, 2018; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 
2018). Even the closed-circuit television (CCTV) networks ubiquitous in most large cities 
can, as a result of facial recognition technology, place most of their citizens under 
observation (Galič, Timan, & Koops, 2017; Goodman, 2015; Morozov, 2011; Manokha, 
2018). Subsequently, scholars metaphorically named this omnipresent, latent, surveillance 
infrastructure the digital panopticon (Chesterman, 2011; Foucault, 1977; Galič, Timan, & 
Koops, 2017; MacKinnon, 2012; Manokha, 2018). 
Most of the scholarly discussion in this arena revolve around terminology in the 
search for qualitative definitions to flesh out surveillance theory attempting to move 
beyond the metaphoric panopticon (Galič, Timan, & Koops, 2017). This research intends 
to focus on the surveillance or dataveillance aspects of the digital panopticon, more 
specifically a given regime’s purpose in leveraging the digital footprints of their citizens 
as a means of control or power over them (Chesterman, 2011).56  Certainly, the narrative 
chosen by the more repressive regimes, espousing the benefits of the digital panopticon, 
 
56 Surveillance – a. to watch from above; to keep a close watch over someone, b. ‘sur’ to watch from 
above, ‘veillance’ from above (Galič, Timan, & Koops, 2017; Webster, 2017). 
Dataveillance – a. surveilling individual behavior through the intensive data trails their digital behavior 
generates. b. surveilling individuals through computational means and digital information, which has 
become easier for government entities to trace individuals or groups than was possible in the past because 
of the historical on heavier forms of architectural or institutional surveillance means (Clarke, 1988; Galič, 
Timan, & Koops, 2017, p. 29).  
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revolves around the protection, the safety and the security of the population or, of course, 
national security (Gabdulhakov, 2020; Galič, Timan, & Koops, 2017; Goodman, 2015; 
MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Wallace, 2008). However, this research seeks to focus 
on the more Orwellian side of the metaphoric digital panopticon and its use as a means of 
societal control (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Chesterman, 2011; Foucault, 1977; Galič, 
Timan, & Koops, 2017; Goodman, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Pinkaew, 
2016).  
2. Narrative Theory 
While, the hypotheses of this research hinge on directed verbal or material 
narratives, narrative theory and the exploration of it is not the focus. Yet, a brief review of 
the pertinent parts of narrative theory for use in the explanation of this phenomenon 
remains useful. Specifically, the author intends to cover these few specific aspects of this 
theory. First, what is a narrative?  Second, who and how are narratives created?  Finally, 
how can one gauge the truthfulness or veracity of a given narrative?  
Most dictionaries define narratives as stories (Webster, 2017). Stories as Hesiod 
observed, in the ancient Greek poem Theogony, by stating these narratives consist of a 
combination of elements of truth and lies that resemble truth (Herman, Jahn, & Ryan, 
2005). In effect, these specifically written narratives or stories, created by humans, as 
interpretations of events that they themselves witnessed or they themselves recorded based 
on another person’s interpretation of a given event, which in either case implies a unique 
point of view (Herman, Jahn, & Ryan, 2005; Nerone, 2015; Wake, 2009). That unique 
viewpoint indicates a certain polyvocality, a key concept of narratology, which in part 
means a given narrative is a story reduced from many different viewpoints on a given issue 
to only a few or to what fits on a page.57  Consequently, during the reduction or synthesis 
process that creates a narrative, differing points of view within the story simply go 
unobserved, untold, or unrecorded. So, the other part of polyvocality means that any given 
 
57 Polyvocality – means there is no objective truth, no single official version of a story, no preferred 
interpretation or reading of the events, rather, the story is derived from many voices and multiple differing 
points of view from which the single narrative is created (Wake, 2009, pp. 673-677). 
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narrative or storyline does not inherently embody objective truth, officiality of version, or 
preferred understanding of the event or situation described in the narrative (Wake, 2009). 
Fundamentally, narratives simultaneously reveal and conceal elements of what actually 
occurred. Certainly, this may be due to time and space constraints in writing and 
constructively creating the narrative to fit into news print or a web page (Herman, Jahn, & 
Ryan, 2005). However, some regime types may use their influence or content control 
capabilities to clandestinely manipulate the information within the story attempting to 
control the narrative on a given issue. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union began developing 
doctrine to describe this form of information warfare, naming it-reflexive control.58   
Reflexive control bears a significant resemblance to perception management, 
except that its terminology (i.e., control) and intent are acutely focused on influencing an 
opponent through information exploitation (Thomas, 2004). One of the means of 
exploitation is through use of media narratives (Inkster, 2016; Snegovaya, 2015; Valeriano, 
Jensen, & Maness, 2018). While many regimes do not embrace the doctrine or use the term 
reflexive control, their use of media manipulation and the narratives therein seems apparent 
and operant today (Bilgiç, 2018; Jaitner & Mattsson, 2015; Pinkaew, 2016; Snegovaya, 
2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). Further, several of the regime types and 
countries covered in the case studies chapters use this type of tactic to control the narrative 
domestically and to influence the narrative internationally in their discourse directed at the 
U.S. Both the narrative and reflexive control theoretics fit nicely into an emergent theory, 
which ties them together and provides a useful term to use in explanations within this 
research—Sharp Power.  
3. Sharp Power 
The term sharp power springs out of the hard power and soft power lexicon, 
originally coined by Joseph Nye (Nye, 2007; Walker & Ludwig, 2017). A state using hard 
 
58 Reflexive Control – explains the use of tailored information (i.e., media narratives) that would 
influence an opponent or rival to voluntarily make the pre-determined decision created, framed, and 
preferred by the preparer or originator (a.k.a., opposing state in a conflictual dyad) (Thomas, 2004, pp. 237-
238; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, pp. 113-114). While similar to perception management, reflexive 
control focuses on control of the subject – in this case public opinion of a state or the civil society within a 
target country (Thomas, 2004, p. 237). 
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power relies upon the military or economic instruments of national power to coerce other 
nations to act in their state’s national interest (Walker & Ludwig, 2017). Whereas, soft 
power uses attraction and persuasion to obtain the desired behavior or outcome (Nye, 2007; 
Walker, Kalathil, & Ludwig, 2020; Walker & Ludwig, 2017). Soft power leverages the 
diplomatic and informational instruments of national power. While sharp power appears to 
rely solely on the informational instrument intent on bending the narrative to tell their 
chosen story (Walker, Kalathil, & Ludwig, 2020; Walker & Ludwig, 2017).  
A nation wielding sharp power relentlessly uses their influence across multiple 
domains including academia, media, politics, think tanks, and civil society to tell their 
narrative and paint their intentions as just and true. Drawing out and highlighting the 
positive, while censoring or neutralizing the negative story.59  The country employing 
sharp power intends to pierce, penetrate, or puncture any competing narrative that does not 
align with their own and may leverage third and fourth generation internet content controls 
to ensure their storyline dominates all others (Custer, Prakash, Solis, Knight, & Lin, 2019; 
Deibert, 2015; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 
2018; Walker & Ludwig, 2017; Zittrain et al., 2017). Finally, achieving the goal of general 
acceptance of their chosen narrative, which is not time based—it takes as long as it takes 
(Walker & Ludwig, 2017). Generally, the use of sharp power falls to autocratic or 
autocratic leaning countries, who tend to prefer it as a means to prey upon and to take 
advantage of the open cyberspace, media, and political structures that epitomize 
democracies (Custer et al., 2019; Deibert, 2015; Marcellino, Marcinek, Pezard, & 
Matthews, 2020; Maréchal, 2017; Nathan, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Paul & Matthews, 2017; 
Strovsky, 2015; Walker, Kalathil, & Ludwig, 2020; Walker & Ludwig, 2017).  
 
59 For example, in October 2019 when Wikipedia, the crowdsourced and edited online encyclopedia, 
received thousands of edits from Mandarin language sources editing the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre 
webpage, changing the description to an “incident” to “quell counter-revolutionary riots.”  Similarly, the 
description of Taiwan was redefined to “a province in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Miller, 2019; 
Walker, Kalathil, & Ludwig, 2020). Or in the same month, when Daryl Morey, general manager of the 
Houston Rockets basketball team, sent out a tweet in support of the protestors in Hong Kong. Morey drew 
the ire of the PRC sponsored netizens effectively condemning his statement, eventually leading the Chinese 
basketball association, state and online media to cut sponsorship of the Houston Rockets (Cook, 2019; 
Walker, Kalathil, & Ludwig, 2020).   
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Accordingly, sharp power and its tendrils into reflexive control and narrative theory 
make it useful in the explanation of the two-level process as well as the two-step process 
nested within it. First, reflexive control and sharp power may operate at level-one by state 
X attempting to ensure the resilience of their chosen win-set narrative while engaged in 
verbal negotiations with the U.S. Second, the ability of an anocracy or autocracy to wield 
sharp power, perhaps using reflexive control, to manipulate the narrative implies that state 
X exercises enough societal control via the digital panopticon, enabled by generational 
controls, to ensure their citizen’s support the win-set narrative during the verbal phase of 
the negotiations. Finally, this indicates that state X may exercise some level of internet 
content control over the domestic storyline and that state elites have communicated the 
need to support the win-set narrative to their citizens during the verbal phase. Again, this 
suggests that the two-step process operates within level-two supported by strong content 
controls, thereby controlling the domestic narrative in state X. Thus, the digital panopticon, 
narrative theory, and sharp power may prove useful when explaining how media narratives 
may impact cyber intruders residing in different countries and ruled by different regime 
structures. 
H. DERIVING OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS 
When taking this literature review in its entirety, one might question how could this 
research be scoped to derive some observable implications to either accept or reject 
postulated hypotheses concerning how media events influence cyberspace activity?  First, 
the research must consider the data available, which consists of 302 days of cyber 
intrusions cataloged by SNORT intrusion detection software and scraped media events 
captured in the Phoenix data set. Second, by exposing this available data to a statistical 
model, the research could discern if yesterday’s media events have an observable impact 
on today’s cyber intrusion activity on U.S. servers. Finally, if a relationship did exist, this 
could provide evidence of the operation of the two-step process functioning within level-
two—domestic media narratives. Wherein, a given society’s elites monitor and digest the 
domestic narrative, derive a position on the varying issues, and communicate it to the 
population. 
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The two-step process implies that the population is cued by the elites and may adopt 
their position; however, it does not describe how the triggered hacker’s position or their 
associations within society may on one end of the spectrum mobilize them to engage in 
hacktivist behavior manifesting either subversive or information-seeking intent (Aelst, 
2017; Newton, 1999). While, on the other end of the spectrum these signals from elites, 
social movements, or state-sponsors may lead to malaise behavior amongst hacktivists 
leading to on-line disengagement (Aelst, 2017; Newton, 1999). As discussed in the 
introductory chapter based on the existing literature, these hacktivists would fall into three 
distinct bins within society, the elite triggered or non-triggered citizen, the hacktivist 
affiliated with a social movement led by an elite cabal, or the state-sponsored intruder 
(Aelst, 2017; Anderson & Sadjadpour, 2018; Best & Higley, 2018; Biçakci, Doruk, & 
Mitat, 2015; Calamur, 2017; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Denning D. E., 2011; Goodman, 
2015; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Kello, 2013; Lindsay, 2014; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 
1999; MacKinnon, 2012; Newton, 1999; Nye, 2011; Pinkaew, 2016; Singer & Friedman, 
2013; Sinpeng, 2013; Snegovaya, 2015; Thorton & Miron, 2019; Valeriano & Maness, 
2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018).60  Further, hacktivists may reside or receive 
signals within each or any combination of these bins. While the triggering elites may be 
 
60 Social Movement Theory seeks to explain how political opportunities arise, how they are framed, 
and how resources are mobilized resulting in some form of collective action to achieve the movement’s 
goal – to challenge government policies, to change civil societies behavior, attitudes, or value systems, or 
to draw attention to a social injustice. This paper utilizes a broad definition of Social Movement Theory 
based on analysis and synthesis of the extant related literature. See (McAdams, McCarthy, & Zald, 1999; 
McAdams, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001) for an overall review of Social Movement Theory and its associated 
elements of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. See (De Tocqueville, 
1856; Tarrow, 1996) for political opportunities. For political framing, see (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson 
& Meyer, 1999; McAdams, 1999). See (Carroll & Hackett, 2006; McCarthy & Zald, 1977).for resource 
mobilization. See (De Tocqueville, 1955; De Tocqueville, 2002) for challenges to government policies. See 
(Bayat, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998) for changes in civil society. See (De Tocqueville, 1955; De 
Tocqueville, 2002; Keck & Sikkink, 1998) for drawing attention to a social injustice.  
An example of a social movement would be the virtual sit-in by a group of hacktivists. In 1998 a group 
of social movement activists wanted to draw attention to the plight of the indigenous Zapatista population 
of Chiapas, Mexico. The Zapatista’s are subsistence farmers whose culture rested upon their access to their 
ancestral lands. The Mexican Government was attempting to comply with the requirements of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) began forcibly removing the Zapatista’s from their land, which 
led to an armed uprising by the Zapatistas. Approximately, 10,000 hacktivists who viewed this as a human 
rights violation by the Mexican government conducted a virtual sit-in of the websites of the President of 
Mexico, the President of the United States (US), the U.S. Pentagon, the Mexican Stock Exchange, and the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange delivering 600,000 queries per minute on each website (Denning, 2001, pp. 12 & 
73). Although, the virtual sit-in did not permanently damage the servers involved, it did garner media and 
drew global attention to the Zapatista cause. 
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affiliated or unaffiliated with these distinct groupings, their impact on hackers, residing in 
or amongst these bins, may be a product of the conjectured two-step flow operating as a 
result of the domestic narrative as depicted in Appendix C (Best & Higley, 2018; 
Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Higley & Burton, 2006; Higley, 2018; Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017). 
Therefore, the statistical model explanatory variables will specifically focus on the 
daily counts of negative material and verbal narratives, the negative narrative tone, and the 
tone variation. The research intends to gauge today’s media events in relation to the 
following day’s intrusions, which provides an excellent construct to test the proffered 
hypotheses to engender a better understanding of this phenomenon. The hypotheses offered 
in Figure 4 will be tested using statistical methods to discern if they operate in the real 
world. Finally, if the statistical evidence does not support the acceptance of a given 
hypothesis, this demonstrates a failure to reject the null hypothesis. The statistical evidence 
provided fails to rise to the level necessary to reject the null, meaning the evidence provided 




Figure 4.  Main and Conditional Hypotheses 
Further, the researcher seeks to proffer a conditional hypothesis to be tested through 
the use of a first-order interactive term. The author suspects that there is interaction 
between the negative narrative tone variable or Goldstein Mean and the Level of 
Democracy (i.e. Polity score) or H7. As such, Figure 4 above provides a listing of the 
hypotheses to be tested in this study.  
Hypothesis #1 (H1): Increases in the number of conflictual material interactions 
reported in the media narratives of other sovereign states directed at the United States 
(US) and its interests—yesterday, regardless of regime type, results in increased 
cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #2 (H2): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions 
reported in the media narratives of democratic states directed at the United States 
(US) and its interests—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. 
networks—today. 
Hypothesis #3 (H3): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions 
reported in the media narratives of anocratic states directed at the United States (US) 
and its interests—yesterday, results in no change in cyber intrusion activity on U.S. 
networks—today.  
Hypothesis #4 (H4): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions 
reported in the media narratives of autocratic states directed at the United States (US) 
and its interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. 
networks—today.  
Hypothesis #5 (H5): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating 
an increased level of media polarization, across media stories originating from 
democratic and anocratic states directed at the U.S. and its interests—yesterday, 
results in decreased in cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #6 (H6): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating 
an increased level of media polarization, across media stories originating from 
autocratic states directed at the U.S. and its interest—yesterday, results in increased 
cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #7 (H7): Increases in the accumulated conflictual or negative tone of 
interactions reported in media narratives from other countries directed towards the 
United States (US) and its interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion 
activity on U.S. networks—today, with the effect becoming stronger as the level of 
democracy of the originating country increases. 
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Therefore, the statistical model explanatory variables will specifically focus on the 
daily counts of negative material and verbal narratives, the average daily negative narrative 
(NN) tone and variation, and the interaction between average NN tone and levels of 
democracy. The research will gauge today’s media events in relation to the following day’s 
intrusions, which provides an excellent construct to test the proffered hypotheses ultimately 
to engender a better understanding of this phenomenon.  
I. CONCLUSION 
This literature review began with a discussion of the cyber intrusion phenomenon, 
discussing the efficacy of the cyber-attack narrative and its effect. Ultimately concluding 
that the media label of cyber-attack, while apocryphal and sensational intent on capturing 
the public’s attention, entirely misses the mark in its description of the actual cyber-event 
best described as an intrusion. Next, the review covered the origin of the internet, how it 
operates, and how its various layers interact, concluding with an understanding of how it 
functions. The goal here was to introduce the layering terminology for future use. Finally, 
the section concluded with how IP anonymizers and TOR make anonymity on the internet 
a reality, which makes identification of an intrusion’s origin suspect at best and something 
that should be kept in mind throughout the execution of the research. 
Next, the review covered much of the extant conflict and rivalry literature and its 
consistent causes, meaning these situations usually begin as territorial, but then progress or 
are reinforced by  significant cultural, ethnic, or religious overtones and normally persist 
as regional issues. Meanwhile, conflict observed in cyberspace remains quite restrained; 
simultaneously, a lot of rivalrous activity permeates this space where gaining the attention 
of the state opposite the cyber antagonist or rival in the dyad is the intent. Further, these 
antagonists use this rivalrous cyber jostling to coerce, compel, or pressure the target state 
into making some policy or behavioral change. Finally, these cyber antagonists appear to 
gain access to the physical or semantic layers of cyberspace via the syntactic. The syntactic 
is the layer of computer language, code, instruction, and syntax, which enables the internet 
to function properly. 
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Subsequently, a typology was created, based on the work of Valeriano, Jensen, and 
Maness (2018), to describe this rivalrous behavior in cyberspace as either subversive or 
information seeking intent via a malicious vector. This malicious vector comprises 
approximately 82% of the cyber incidents identified between 2000 and 2014; additionally, 
this vector appears to be the catalyst or gateway into the execution of information seeking 
or subversive intent. Thus, it appears appropriate to place cyber intrusion activity within 
this duo of types. 
Next, the research delved further into the theoretical realms seeking to create an 
explanation of why these cyber intrusions occur. First, the author reviewed Putnam’s Two-
level International Relations Theory covering how a state’s decision makers must manage 
both the international (i.e., Level-one) and domestic narratives (i.e., Level-two), 
simultaneously, when engaged in negotiations with another state. Second, the researcher 
discussed how the power of elites varies within these and how the influence of their voices 
varies across regime types. While democracies contain a multiplicity of elitist voices, 
autocracies accommodate far less. Thus, within autocracies those few elites have an 
inordinate amount of power and influence; while, in democracies elites’ power and 
influence is diffuse. Further, the review covered the generational level of cyberspace 
content controls, with anocracies bypassing the first preferring to focus on second and third 
generation controls, while autocracies tend to employ all three in tandem. 
Subsequently, the research surveyed the two-step flow theory of communications 
and posited its operation inside of two-level theory of international relations. The two-step 
flow surmises that elites read the daily narrative, espouse an interpretation of the veracity 
of the storyline, and ultimately, relay their view of the narrative to surrogates in the state’s 
population. This research intends to test this conjectured operation of the two-step process 
within level-two by using negative material, verbal, tone, and variation of media events 
captured on a given day to gauge their impact on cyber intrusions on the following day.  
Next, the research introduced the digital panopticon, narrative, and sharp power 
theories for possible use in explaining the nuances of the two-step process operating in 
domestic (i.e., level-two) narratives as it pertains to differing regime types and countries. 
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Some portions of each of these theories will facilitate the case study explanations based on 
the results of the statistical model, introduced in the next chapter.  
Finally, this chapter provided a set of classifications within which the hacktivist 
might reside. Specifically, establishing the categories of the elite triggered hacktivist, who 
could be an average citizen, a member of a social movement group, or a state-sponsored 
intruder. Ultimately, arriving at a set of hypotheses to be tested, using the model described 
in the next chapter. The conjectured difference between verbal rhetoric and material action 
may possesses a certain gravitas within negative narratives. Further, increases in negative 
narrative tone variance may lead to a dampening effect on the following day’s intrusions 
activity. While, the interaction between tone and regime type (i.e., level of democracy or 
polity score) may result in decreasing levels of intrusions as the set of countries becomes 
more democratic. In short, this review covered the literature germane to cyber intrusion 
phenomenon seeking to create the framework to explain and to better understand if today’s 
negative media events, directed at the U.S. by other countries, affect tomorrow’s cyber 
intrusions on U.S. networks.  
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III. MODEL DESIGN: MEDIA EFFECTS IN CYBERSPACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the design section of the introductory chapter, the first few explanatory 
variables chosen to test against the response variable of intrusions per country, per day 
were intuitive given the hypotheses proposed. Initially, this chapter shall develop the 
explanatory variables using the events coding data drawn from in the Phoenix Data set, 
which uses the CAMEO coding ontology for scraped articles. All of the variables used in 
the model will conform to a per country, per day or per country-day unit of analysis; 
however, most control variables used do not exist in this format (i.e., per capita Gross 
Domestic Product, population size, internet penetration rate), and as such will remain 
constant for each day of the year. 
First, this chapter reviews how the cyber intrusion data was captured and discuss 
the derivation of the cyber-intrusions per country-day dependent variable. Second, a brief 
summary is given of how the media events and control variables were derived and how 
they will be used to create the country-day unit of analysis for each model, when possible. 
Third, this chapter formulates the macro models encompassing all negative and positive 
tone narratives originating from countries opposite the U.S. in dyadic dialog to choose the 
best fitting probability distribution model (i.e., Gaussian, Poisson, negative binomial, etc.). 
Then, the model refocuses on negative narratives and particular regime-types and 
countries. This refocusing will include the modification of the tone variable to incorporate 
only conflictual or negative narratives and the development of an interactive variable to 
gain a better understanding of what relationships that may assist in gaining better insights 
for explanation. Next, the research applies the model to specific regime types (i.e., 
democracies, anocracies, autocracies) that project negative narratives toward the U.S. 
Finally, the chapter tests the posited hypotheses using the evidence provided by each model 
to discern whether the evidence supports or does not support each given hypothesis by 
regime type using the All-Regime’s NN model. 
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Per their request, the cyber-intrusion data source shall remain anonymous. The 
source drew the data set from a single representative, internet facing, U.S. Government 
server equipped with SNORT intrusion detection software. Properly configured, SNORT 
intrusion detection software catalogs the last IP address or IP node from which the intrusion 
originated (Beale, Foster, Posluns, & Caswell, 2003; Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 
2005; Rehman, 2003). Again, with the advent of TOR, or The ONION Router, and IP 
anonymizers the actual origin may remain suspect. 
The data set contained two unbroken date ranges. The first from 02 January 2015 
to 06 May 2015 (124 days) and the second 12 September 2016 to 18 March 2017 (178 
days); thus, providing 302 days of intrusion data in two separate sets. Explicitly, this 
research focuses on the date, the country of origin, the intrusion risk indicator, and the day 
of the week that the intrusion occurred. This SNORT data was used to derive an intrusions 
per day dependent variable using the R programming language. Though the same process 
and language, all of the independent variables were derived and lagged by a day to gauge 
their impact on the following day’s intrusion activity.  
In addition, day of the week control variables were derived from the intrusions data 
set. The researcher enumerated the days of the week (e.g. 1 = Monday, 2 = Tuesday, etc.), 
based on the date provided in the data set, and then convert these to dichotomous indicators. 
This allowed for the control of differences across days of the week. Further, a control 
variable for the month of the intrusion was created to take account of monthly fluctuations 
in intrusion attempts, as well. 
B. MEDIA-EVENTS VARIABLES 
Initially, the proxy for the average daily media narrative tone using the Goldstein 
mean (Gold_Mean) and its daily standard deviation, or level of narrative polarization, 
were computed. This enabled the derivation and measurement of the daily media tone mean 
value and variation yesterday relate to cyber intrusion attempts—today. Or to state it 
another way, to gauge the effect of today’s media events on tomorrow’s intrusions.61  
 
61 Both of these ways of describing the relationship between the response and explanatory variables 
will be used throughout this text. 
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Next, a control variable summing up the total narratives count (Total Narratives) 
was created, summing up all narratives negative or positive across all narrative categories 
in the unit of analysis, as described in the control variables section below. This control 
variable captures all the narratives, regardless of whether positive or negative, material or 
verbal. As with the other control variables, the research intends to account for the effects 
of other narratives on the dependent variable. Thus, allowing the research to focus 
specifically on the negative material and verbal narratives—yesterday to gauge their 
impact on the total intrusions—today. As many of these daily narratives and types are 
skewed toward zero with some significant statistical outliers, each will be logarithmically 
transformed as is common practice to reduce the impact on the model validity. Next the 
Gold_Mean variable was multiplied by the given country’s polity score to create the first-
order interactive term Gold_Mean x Polity.  
Thus, by using these five explanatory variables (i.e., negative material and verbal 
narrative, Gold_Mean (narrative tone), Gold_SD (narrative polarization), and Gold_Mean 
x Polity, while controlling for day and month of the intrusions and narratives, lays the 
foundational work to develop the statistical inference model required to test the hypotheses. 
C. CONTROL VARIABLES 
The remaining balance of the control variables is collected and included in the 
model, by country. These variables include total narratives, total intrusions, internet and 
media freedom, media self-censorship, regime type (i.e., polity score and polity squared), 
internet penetration rate, population, gross domestic product (GDP), day of the week and 
month of intrusions. Thus, the regression model takes shape as shown in Equation 1, with 
the explanatory variables in bold and the control variables shown in plain type. 
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𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐓𝐨𝐝𝐚𝐲 𝐋𝐞𝐚𝐝
 𝐋𝐨𝐠 𝐍𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐌𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐍𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐬 country-day NmN
𝐋𝐨𝐠 𝐍𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐕𝐞𝐫𝐛𝐚𝐥 𝐍𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐬 country-day  NVN  
𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝𝐌𝐞𝐚𝐧 country-day Narrative Tone
𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝𝐒𝐃 country-day Narrative Polarization or NNp
𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝𝐌𝐞𝐚𝐧 country-day 𝑥 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 country-year  Tone Interaction        
Log TotalNarratives 1  country-day  
Log TotalIntrusionsYesterday  1  country-day  
Polity country-year  level of democracy Polity squared
InternetNotFree country-year MediaNotFree country-year 
 MediaSelfCensor country-year   InternetPenetrationRate country-year
Log Population 1  country-year  Log GDP 1 country-year
 Day of Week Month  Constant  
Equation 1: Macro Statistical Model  
First, total narrative—yesterday, regardless of whether they were negative or 
positive, material or verbal and total intrusions, were captured to account for their impact. 
The control of these should be straight forward because the aim is to ascertain and then 
quantify the relationship between today’s narratives and tomorrow’s intrusions. Second, 
the research sought to control for a host of country specific parameters beginning with 
polity or regime type (i.e., democracy, anocracy, or autocracy) capturing both its raw score 
and its potential polynomial effect.62  Third, internet and media freedom, media self-
censorship, internet penetration rate, population, gross domestic product (GDP), and finally 
 
62 Polity – the design or constitution of a politically formed state or country; in this context it means to 
describe the form of governing institutions spanning from Democracies, to mixed governments such as 
Anocracies, through to totalitarian regimes or Autocracies (Polity IV, 2018; Webster, 2017).  
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the day of the week and month in which both the narrative and intrusion took place.63  The 
polity variable leverages the Polity IV (2018) data, which ascribes yearly scores to 
countries between +10 and +6 as democracies, +5 through ‒5 as anocracies, and ‒6 through 
‒10 as autocracies.64 
Finally, the research sought to control for each country’s level of internet and media 
freedom. These control variables were drawn from the V‒Dem database that contained 
country variables for both internet and media freedom and for media self-censorship  (V-
Dem Institute, 2019, pp. 185-188). The V‒Dem assigns a scaled variable for each, which 
was modified to derive a binary (i.e., dichotomous) variable denoting free or no self-
censorship as a zero (0) and not free or media self-censorship as a one (1). 
Next, the model will be exposed to different statistical regression model types (i.e., 
normal, Poisson, negative binomial, hurdle, and zero-inflated) to ascertain which model 
provides the best inferential value. Then, the author intends to use the model at different 
levels of analysis to test the hypotheses offered throughout the remainder of this 
dissertation. 
D. MEDIA EFFECTS MODEL 
In the previous sections, the dependent, various independent, and control variables 
necessary to test the hypotheses were described. Using R, the data was broken into the 
country-day unit of analysis deriving some 44,545 macro-level observations across the 
period of analysis. As one might imagine the data varies greatly not only between countries, 
but also across regime types with lots of country-days where zero intrusions and/or media 
 
63 The internet and media freedom, media self-censorship, population, and gross domestic product 
(GDP) were drawn from the V-Dem data set (V-Dem Institute, 2019). Further, since scholarly evidence 
exists that implies media sources in some regime types and countries – self-censor, the media self-
censorship control variable was added from the V-Dem source, as well (Asmolov, 2016; Baarda, 2017; 
Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Gabdulhakov, 2020; Galič, Timan, & Koops, 2017; Manokha, 2018; 
Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018; , V-Dem Institute, 2019, Zhukov & Baum, 2016). 
Gross domestic product is a measure the output of all labor and capital within the geographical 
boundaries of a country, regardless of the residence of that labor or owner of the capital (Anderson, 1993). 
Current dollars – in this context reflects the dollar value of GDP in the year generated. The internet 
penetration rate was drawn from the World Bank, World Development Indicators data set (The World 
Bank, 2019). 
64 Democracies range from +10 to +6, Anocracies from +5 to -5, and Autocracies from -6 to -10. 
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events were recorded in the data. It seemed best to begin the testing of this macro-level 
data set with a baseline (Gaussian) normal distribution, even though its main use is for 
modeling continuous measurements and does not necessarily fit the discrete data set. 
Subsequently, the research focused on the discrete models from basic Poisson and negative 
binomial to hurdle and zero-inflated models.65  Appendix D, provides the statistical output 
for all eleven models in tabular format for comparison purposes. Through review of the 
models arrayed, the original Poisson distribution represents the regression variables 
accurately and delivers the lowest mean average  and root mean square error score (MAE 
& RMSE) from the 20% test sample held out from the observations used to estimate the 
models.66  Taken together these statistical tests signify that the Poisson distribution model 
provides the highest out-of-sample predictive accuracy, and therefore the most useful 
information for testing the hypotheses. Further, since the observed intrusion data follows a 
discrete (count) unit of measurement, it made sense to use the best fitting discrete model. 
 
65 Hurdle models fit the count variables into a Poisson, negative binomial, or geometric distribution, 
while fitting the zero counts into a binomial or censored count distribution (Zeileis, Kleiber, & Jackman, 
2015). This allows all the data to be considered vice the abnormal amount of zeroes skewing the data; 
thereby, inhibiting proper analysis. Econometric models originally employed the hurdle concept; however, 
other areas of study look to employ this statistical structure to buttress their scientific endeavors. 
Zero-inflated models provide, yet, another option for handling excess zeroes. The zero-inflated model 
structure breaks the data into a two-component mixture structure. Modeling the zeroes as a point mass 
using a binary or Bernoulli distribution, while modeling the count variables as a Poisson, a negative 
binomial, or a geometric (Zeileis, Kleiber, & Jackman, 2015). 
66  Mean Absolute Error (MAE) – is the measure of the average absolute difference between the actual 
and model predicted values (Levine, Berenson, & Stephan, 1998, pp. 690-693). Root Mean Square Error 
(RMSE) – is the square root of the mean difference between the observed values of the data and the 
model’s predicted values. Both metrics provide an indication of how well the model predicts the response. 
The lower the MAE or RMSE the better the explanatory variables predict the response variable (Ludecke, 
2019, p. 19). 
p-value – the observed level of significance indicates the probability of obtaining a result or test 
statistic equal to or more extreme than the one obtained from the sample data, which may or may not 
support the null hypothesis or H0 (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000; Levine, Berenson, & Stephan, 1998). For 
example, if the probability is high (i.e., p < 0.1), provides weak evidence against rejecting the null 
hypothesis, because the probability of drawing a test statistic or result equal to or more extreme than the 
current coefficient is 1 in 10 or 10%. While, if the probability was low (i.e., p < 0.01) offers stronger 
evidence for rejection of the null at a probability of 1% or 1 in 100. This observed level of significance 
indicates that the probability of deriving a coefficient value equal to or more extreme than the value derived 
is less than 1% under the null hypothesis; therefore, supporting rejection of the null and acceptance of the 
conjectured hypothesis. In general, a p-value of 0.05 (~5%) or less would allow for acceptance of the 
proffered hypothesis and rejection of the null. In this case, p-values shown in the bottom right hand corner 
of statistical output tables denotes the p-value in number of asterisks (i.e., *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, or *** p < 
0.01). These asterisk values lie to the right of each of the independent variables in the statistical tables 
indicating the probability discussed here (Levine, Berenson, & Stephan, 1998, pp. 348-349).  
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In other words, either an intrusion occurred and was counted today, which may or may not 
have coincided with a counted media event yesterday. This fact warrants using a discrete 
model structure (i.e., Poisson, negative binomial, geometric, etc.). Thus in this case, the 
Poisson provides the best fit as shown in the second column of Appendix D, with the tone, 
negative material, and verbal narratives described in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Narrative Tone Results 
Both Figure 5 and the table in Appendix D reveal some interesting characteristics 
drawn out by analyzing this data set with the macro model. First, the red line compares the 
positive and negative tone of all media narratives reported by all countries with a polity 
score of –7 directed at the United States over the period of analysis.67  Each line in Figure 
5 represents the multiplicative interaction between narrative tone and each set of countries 
level of democracy (i.e., Polity score).68  Notice how the red and blue lines pitch up when 
moving right to left from positive narrative tone to negative, while the green line decreases 
across the same range. Thus, as the tone of yesterday’s narratives transitions from very 
 
67 These countries include Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, Kuwait, Laos, and Vietnam 
as shown in Appendix G. 
68 This is because their product (i.e., narrative tone and polity) creates the first-order interactive term, 
which shows impact of yesterday’s narrative tone on today’s intrusions as the level of democracy changes.  
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positive (+10) on the right to negative (‒10) on the left, intrusion attempts increase—today 
from autocracies and anocracies, while intrusions coming from democracies decrease as 
narrative tone becomes progressively negative.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Media Results: Macro Model  
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The red (Negative Material Narratives) and green (Negative Verbal Narratives) 
appear to have an impact on intrusions attempts-today. As Figure 6 indicates as the number 
of yesterday’s negative material narratives increases a corresponding increase in today’s 
intrusions result, while negative verbal narratives record the opposite effect as their count 
increases.  Finally, increases in yesterday’s media tone variation, indicating narrative 
polarization depicted in the purple line, appears to score a negative impact on today’s 
intrusions.  
E. EVIDENCE OF MEDIA EFFECTS IN CYBERSPACE 
Unlike the macro model above and in Appendix D, which was useful in deciding 
on the correct model to apply, the research now turns to focus on  how the negative 
narratives (NN) types, tone, and polarization yesterday influence intrusion attempts today, 
as posited in the hypotheses. Simply, because the hypotheses focus on the negative 
narratives, the research going forward will emphasize the negative range of the narrative 
tone score, vice the entire range used in the all-narratives (i.e., macro) model that ranged 
from positive to negative discussed in the previous section. As such, the coefficients for 
narrative tone will focus on those days with dominant negative narratives emanating from 
the given set of countries. This change in research focus is highlighted by the change in 
narrative direction, specifically focusing on the NN tone, NN polarization, and the negative 
tone interaction term in Equation 2. 
Equation 2 with the results shown in Table 5 encompasses the explanatory variables 
that comprise the focus of this research going forward from the All-Regimes negative 
narratives model to specific regime types across this period of analysis. Each column of 
Table 5 shows the explanatory variables of interest and their coefficient values in relation 
to the dependent variable. The numbers in parentheses below each of the coefficients 
describe the standard error over which, plus or minus, the derived coefficient varies. Thus, 
Table 5 provides information to explore the dyadic relationship between the negative 
narratives of a given country or set directed at the United States yesterday and its impact 
on intrusion attempts on U.S. networks today. 
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𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐓𝐨𝐝𝐚𝐲 𝐋𝐞𝐚𝐝
 Log Negative Material Narratives country-day NmN
Log Negative Verbal Narratives country-day  NVN  
𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝𝐌𝐞𝐚𝐧 country-day Negative Narrative Tone
𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝𝐒𝐃 country-day Negative Narrative Polarization or NNp
𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝𝐌𝐞𝐚𝐧 country-day 𝒙 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 country-year  Negative Tone Interaction        
Log TotalNarratives 1  country-day  Log TotalIntrusionsYesterday  1  country-day  
Polity country-year  level of democracy Polity squared
InternetNotFree country-year MediaNotFree country-year 
 MediaSelfCensor country-year   InternetPenetrationRate country-year
Log Population 1  country-year  Log GDP 1 country-year  Day of Week
Month  Constant  
Equation 2:  Statistical Model: Negative Narratives 
This analysis of yesterday’s negative narratives reveals that as the number of 
negative material narratives generated by other countries about the U.S. and its interests—
increases, a corresponding increase in intrusion attempts today on U.S. networks from 
those countries will result. Therefore, at this level of analysis, it does appear that 
increasingly negative narratives describing material interactions between the U.S. and 
other sovereign states today results in greater cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks 
tomorrow. As such, at this level of analysis and across these regime types, evidence exists 
to accept H1 and reject the null hypothesis across all regime types depicted in separate 




69 Hypothesis #1 (H1): Increases in the number of conflictual material interactions reported in the 
media narratives of other sovereign states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, 
regardless of regime type, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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Table 5.   Results of Negative Narratives Models, across Regime-Types 
CYBER INTRUSION ATTEMPTS (Negative Narratives)           
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Intrusions ‒ Today  
Independent Poisson Model 
Variables (Yesterday)/Model All- Regimes Democracies Anocracies Autocracies 
Negative Material Narratives 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) 
Negative Verbal Narrative ‒0.24*** 0.08*** 0.0000 ‒0.23*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) 
NN Gold_Mean (Tone) ‒0.003*** 0.23*** ‒0.001 ‒0.21*** 
 (0.001) (0.01) (0.001) (0.02) 
Gold_SD ‒0.01*** ‒0.03*** ‒0.02*** 0.04*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Polity ‒0.01*** 0.77*** ‒0.01*** ‒2.75*** 
 (0.0001) (0.02) (0.001) (0.05) 
Polity squared ‒0.001*** ‒0.04*** ‒0.01*** ‒0.21*** 
 (0.0000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Internet Not Free 0.12*** 0.08*** ‒0.29***  
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.01)  
Media Not Free ‒0.21*** ‒0.12***   
 (0.003) (0.003)   
Media Self-Censorship 0.08*** 0.04*** 3.50***  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.45)  
Friday 0.22*** 0.29*** 0.56*** 0.17*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.004) 
Saturday 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.28*** 0.19*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.004) 
Sunday ‒0.32*** ‒0.27*** ‒0.29*** ‒0.31*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.01) (0.005) 
NN GoldMean x Polity 0.002*** ‒0.03*** 0.01*** ‒0.03*** 
 (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.003) 
Constant ‒4.49*** ‒5.99*** ‒11.69*** ‒13.75*** 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.47) (0.20) 
Observations 40,608 24,126 10,071 5,184 
MAE 36.9 22.2 15.7 137.1 
RMSE 581.0 202.8 118.9 1,309.9 
AIC 2,512,547.6 767,059.7 192,375.2 1,174,295.0 
Log Likelihood ‒1,256,240.8 ‒383,496.8 ‒96,155.6 ‒587,117.5 
 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Further, negative verbal narratives yesterday, originating from autocracies, seem to 
dampen cyber intrusions today; whereas, they appear to have the opposite effect on 
intrusion attempts coming from democracies. However, anocratic negative verbal 
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narratives yesterday appear to have no effect or no correlation with today’s intrusions. 
Although, this provides indications of support for H2, H3, and H4 at the All-Regime level, 
it was necessary to delve into the regime-type level of analysis to accept or refute the 
relationships claimed in these hypotheses.70 
Next, the research turns to the analysis of the negative narrative polarization 
coefficient (i.e., NN Gold_SD). All-Regimes, anocracies, and democracies track together 
recording negative coefficient values. While, autocracies tack in the opposite direction 
depicting that yesterday’s negative narrative media polarization shows an amplifying effect 
on today’s intrusion activity. Taken together this suggests support for H5 and H6; however, 
as in the hypotheses mentioned above, analysis at the regime-type level remains necessary 
for their refutation or acceptance.71   
Further, notice the first-order interaction term combining yesterday’s negative 
narrative tone (i.e., NN Gold_Mean) and the country’s level of democracy (i.e., polity 
score) to derive the negative tone interaction coefficients. Figure 7 graphically represents 
their interaction across the range of NN tone shown between ‒10 and +5 on the x-axis, 
while the y-axis quantifies the resulting number of intrusions today resulting from 
yesterday’s media tenor. The line coloration shown in the XY graphic and the z-axis 
represents the effect of NN tone ascribed to the median level of democracy for each regime 
type with green (+9) representing democracies, blue (2) representing anocracies, and red 
 
70  Hypothesis #2 (H2): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions reported in the 
media narratives of democratic states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, 
results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
 Hypothesis #3 (H3): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions reported in the 
media narratives of anocratic states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results 
in no change in cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today.  
 Hypothesis #4 (H4): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions reported in the 
media narratives of autocratic states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results 
in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today.  
71 Hypothesis #5 (H5): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased 
level of media polarization, across media stories originating from democratic and anocratic states directed 
at the U.S. and its interest—yesterday, results in decreased in cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—
today. 
 Hypothesis #6 (H6): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased 
level of media polarization, across media stories originating from autocratic states directed at the U.S. and 
its interest—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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(‒7) representing autocracies.72  The coloration of the z-axis corresponds to the change in 
levels of democracy for each discrete line described below.  
Figure 7 displays that for those –7 autocracies, in red, ascribing an increase in 
yesterday’s negative media tone results in an increase in intrusion attempts on U.S. 
networks today, with less intrusions resulting from anocracies shown in blue. While for +9 
democracies, in green, cyber intrusions today actually decrease as a result of yesterday’s 
increasingly negative media tone.  
This finding may seem inconsistent with results of H1 and H2 described above; 
however, they measure two different things. Negative material and verbal narratives, the 
coefficients used to test H1 and H2, are measuring the daily sum of each negative narrative 
type. As the number of NNs both material and verbal about the U.S. on a given day 
increase, this results in increased intrusions the following day.  
The negative tone interaction coefficient quantified in the first column of Table 5 
(i.e., All-Regimes model) and graphed in Figure7 measures the interaction of the mean NN 
tone—yesterday, at a given level of democracy, and their combined effect on intrusions 
today. Because the range of the x-axis spans from +5.5 in the positive range the figure to ‒
10, as one might expect even on NN days, positive narratives do exist; hence, those are 
captured in this analysis. Thus, as the average NN tone becomes more conflictual / negative 
yesterday the effect appears to dampen intrusion activity today for democracies. While, the 
effect of the interactive variable, visually appears to score a neutral impact from anocracies 
and an increasing effect for autocracies across the x-axis in Figure 7. As such, at this level 
of analysis the evidence provided in both column 1 of Table 5 and Figure 7 allows for the 
acceptance of H7.73  However, by reviewing the coefficient values for negative tone 
interaction in the columns for autocracies, anocracies and democracies, denotes a change 
 
72 Argentina, Bulgaria, India, Kenya, and South Africa provide examples of some of the countries 
described in the median Level of Democracy scoring a +9. Algeria encompass the only anocracy scoring a 
2 on the Polity scale. Finally, Azerbaijan, China, Iran, and Vietnam comprise some of the autocrats scoring 
-7 and included in that median value Level of Democracy shown in Figure 7.  
73 Hypothesis #7 (H7): Increases in the accumulated conflictual or negative tone of interactions 
reported in media narratives from other countries directed towards the United States (U.S.) and its 
interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today, with the effect 
becoming stronger as the level of democracy of the originating country increases. 
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in direction or sign of these variables. Thus, the regime sections that follow will explore 
this coefficient fully and either accept or reject H7 at the regime type level of analysis. 
Finally, as depicted by the red solid line in Figure 8, an increase in the daily sum of 
Negative Media (Material) narratives about the U.S.—yesterday, corresponds with an 
increase in cyber intrusion attempts on U.S. networks—today. The green dashed line shows 
a drop in intrusions on U.S. networks—today corresponding with an increase in negative 
media verbal narratives yesterday. Finally, the purple dot-dash line gauges yesterday’s 
level of negative narrative (NN) polarization scoring a drop in today’s intrusion activity as 
media polarization increases. The x-axis indicates the number or daily sum of negative 
media material or verbal narratives, and in the bottom frame of Figure 8, the degree of 
negative media polarization yesterday spanning from zero to eleven (~ +10.7). Whereas, 
the y-axis depicts the cyber intrusion attempts today. The shaded areas around each of the 
lines represents the 95% confidence interval predicting the resulting number of intrusion 
attempts today as yesterday’s media narratives become progressively negative or more 
polarized. 
 




Figure 8.  Media Results: All-Regimes’ NN Model.  
Thus, Figure 8 provides further evidence of the correlation between negative 
material media narratives—yesterday and cyber intrusions—today as H1 indicates. 
Further, the value of the negative material narratives (+0.03) and the low p-value further 
supports the rejection of the null hypothesis. Taken all together this evidence supports 
acceptance of H1, and evidence provided is consistent with that conclusion. 
Further, the negative media verbal narrative depicted by the dashed green line 
seems to refute H2 and H3, while supporting H4. Finally, the negative narrative 
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polarization coefficient shown in column 1 of Table 5 and represented by the purple line 
in Figure 8 describes a drop in intrusions as variability in media polarization increases 
supporting H5 but refuting H6. However, to refute or accept these hypotheses will require 
delving into the regime level of analysis. As such, subsequent sections will break down the 
data into the differing regime-types, beginning with democracies. So, how do cyber 
intrusion attempts on U.S. networks—today respond to yesterday’s negative media 
narratives originating from other democratic countries dyadically opposite to the US? 
1. Democracies in Cyberspace 
While the research will cover democracies and their incumbent characteristics 
extensively in the case study chapter to follow, here the intent is to provide a brief overview 
of the more relevant aspects that make democracies different from other regime types. 
Democracies rank amongst the freest in most aspects of society. Democracies provide 
access to the political system through individual voting mechanisms, participation in and 
support for political parties, and open access to government institutions. Normally, a 
democracy’s internet infrastructure does not promote government surveillance or 
censorship, but instead the free exchange of ideas; however,  many allow big technology 
firms to manage their on-line content resulting from myopic policies authored by 
shortsighted politicians (Barabasi, 2003; Goodman, 2015; Lukasik, 2011; MacKinnon, 
2012; Morozov, 2011). Yet, for the purposes of this research, democracies allow for a 
media environment free from censorship (Freedom House, 2017; MacKinnon, 2012). Thus, 
democracies do not appear to exercise the levers of societal control as much as other regime 
types (Freedom House, 2017; Gehlbach & Sonin, 2013; Stier, 2015).  
Democracies usually possess thriving civil societies with their incumbent debates 
around contemporary issues. Certainly, elites exist in democratic societies; however, their 
gravitas or influence may or may not necessarily stem from their heritage, wealth, or class. 
In democracies, elites’ influence may extend from their active participation and 
understanding of current political and cultural issues of the day, as opinion leaders (Higley 
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& Burton, 2006; Higley, 2018; Hoffman-Lange, 2018).74  These opinion leaders gain and 
maintain a working knowledge of ongoing media narratives, which provides them an 
amount of influence in most of these societies (Habermas, 2006; Newton, 1999).  
Within democratic societies, there exists a multiplicity of opinion leaders at various 
levels; thus, when political leaders or elites attempt to communicate discrete media 
messages to members of society, the message often comes off as chaotic, diffuse, or unclear 
(Bjola & Manor, 2018; Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017; 
Trumbore, Boyer, Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000). This creates an amount of 
cognitive dissonance in the individuals within a democratic society, which may cause them 
to seek to resolve their dissonance through information-seeking behavior (Case & Given, 
2016; Habermas, 1987; Turcotte, York, Irving, Scholl, & Pingree, 2015). This may lead 
some within these societies to resort to hacking behavior to assuage their dissonance 
(Valkenburg, Peter, & Walther, 2016, p. 321). Further, democratic regimes enforce very 
few prohibitions, except for criminal activity, on citizens’ use of the internet (Goodman, 
2015; Morozov, 2011). As such, the Democracies model focused on those democratic 
countries generating negative narratives regarding the US. 
First, notice the increases in both negative material and verbal narratives yesterday 
manifest a positive correlation with cyber intrusions on the next day in Table 5. Material 
narratives track consistently with increases in cyber intrusions the following day in the All- 
Regimes model. While, the parallel negative verbal narratives mark a unique direction shift 
between the All-Regimes and the Democracies model, as shown in Table 5 above. As 
discussed earlier, this may indicate democracy’s overall restrained use of societal control 
mechanisms. 
Further, while a given democracy may engage the U.S. in negotiations over some 
issue, that democracy may relentlessly use verbally negative storylines about the U.S. 
attempting to influence or control the on-going narrative within level-one (international 
 
74 Elite – individuals and small, cohesive groups who wield a disproportionate level of power or 
influence affecting national and supranational political outcomes in a substantial way on a continuing basis 
(Best & Higley, 2018, p. 3; Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 14). Throughout this text, elite is synonymous with 
opinion or proximate leader, particularly when discussing democratic elites. 
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politics) of two-level process theory. Simultaneously, these democracies attempt to 
influence their domestic or level-two process using media messaging, over which they 
enjoy very little, if any, real control (Aelst, 2017; Habermas, 2006; Higley & Burton, 2006; 
Putnam, 1988; Turcotte, York, Irving, Scholl, & Pingree, 2015). Thus, beyond the negative 
or positive polarities resident in media narratives, intruders on U.S. networks from other 
democracies appear to remain tone-deaf to the material-verbal nuance. Or these democratic 
hackers may be indulging in information seeking behavior seeking to salve their inquisitive 
nature to find out the rest of the story. This may occur because they live in relatively free 
societies where the ramifications of their cyber intrusive proclivities may not incur harsh 
legal consequences, as in other societies. Nevertheless, unlike the All-Regimes model, 
democratic hackers (i.e., intruders) appear unphased by subtle differences in the media 
narratives. 
Secondly, the negative narrative polarization (i.e., Gold_SD) remains consistent 
with the All-Regimes’ model also scoring a dampening effect on intrusions the day 
following the media event recorded. Thus, the entirety of this evidence appears to support 
what many scholars posit about democracies that the sheer multiplicity and diversity of 
media narratives, media outlets, and opinion leaders, drowns out the subtle changes in 
media tone or variation, beyond the positive or negative polarities in material or verbal 
narratives (Aelst, 2017; Turcotte, York, Irving, Scholl, & Pingree, 2015). 
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Figure 9.  Negative Narrative Tone Results: Democracies. 
Next, the negative tone interaction between yesterday’s increase in negative media 
tone and the level of democracy results in more intrusions today. In Figure 9, notice how 
the red line depicting the interaction between increasing negative tone and the lower 
democratic level yesterday decreases the level of intrusions today at a faster rate with the 
intrusion attempts decreasing by ‒40 per day across the NN tone range.75  The red line, 
equating to a polity score of –7, describes a mean value 50 intrusions per day. The higher 
level of democracy, the green line with a Polity Score of +9, records a mean value of 61 
intrusions, approximately 22% higher than low democracy countries, decreasing at a rate 
of –3 intrusions per day, 93% less than the red line countries, across the NN tone range.76  
Notice that the green line predictions, from countries with a higher level of democracy, 
crosses above the red and blue lines at +3 and +1 in narrative tone, respectively, and 
 
75 The red line begins at 72.5 intrusions on the right dropping to 32.2 on the left (72.5 – 32.2 = 40.3 ~ 
-40), spanning from positive tone of 5.13 and -10 NN tone, respectively. Some of the countries represented 
in the red line include Columbia, Georgia, Nigeria, and Tunisia. 
76 The mean value of the line across the entire red line and green line were calculated using R deriving 
62 and 51, respectively. By dividing the difference by 51 ((62-51) / 51 = 0.216) 22% is derived. Some of 
the countries represented in the green line include Argentina, Czech Republic, India, and South Africa. 
Further, by using R coding the predicted values for the given line were derived. At +5.13 on the NN tone x-
axis the green line records 63.3 intrusions and at the end of the line at -10, 60 intrusions were estimated. As 
such, 63.3 – 60 = -3.3 ~ -3 drop in intrusions across the green line. Finally, the green line decreases across 
the x-axis by -40, while the red line records a decrease of -3; thus, -40-(-3) / -40 or -37/-40 equals 92.5 ~ 
93% or a decrease 93% less than those countries captured in the green line. 
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remains above both of these lower level democracies across the remainder of the negative 
range. The differences in mean value and slope drop per day over the NN tone range 
indicate that today’s increasingly NN tone has a greater dampening effect on tomorrow’s 
intrusions coming from low-level democracies. This is a phenomenon this research intends 
to explore in the Democracies’ case study. Further, this finding is inconsistent with that of 
the All-Regime’s NN model and provides evidence for rejection of H7 for democracies.77  
Finally, Figure 10 graphically and numerically completes the analysis of the 
negative material and verbal and NN media polarization coefficients. As the number of 
each of these storylines, regardless of type, originating from democracies about the U.S., 
increase yesterday, this leads to cyber intrusion increases today. Observe the negative 
verbal narratives value and how it shifts opposite in sign and magnitude swinging to a 
positive marginal rate 1.3 times above the All-Regimes’ predictions.78   In democracies 
both material and verbal effects begin and remain at a level above the same values in the 
All-Regimes model, as depicted in the graphic and table at the bottom of Figure 10. 
Material negative narratives, depicted by the red long dash line in Figure 10, clock in at an 
average of +68 intrusions 13% above All-Regimes at +60 but show an average marginal 
effect (AME) 35% lower impact on intrusions across the x-axis.79  The NN polarization 
forecast value shows a precipitous drop, scoring an average marginal effect 87% below that 
of the All-Regimes model across the x-axis media polarization range.80    Further, the All-
 
77 Hypothesis #7 (H7): Increases in the accumulated conflictual or negative tone of interactions 
reported in media narratives from other countries directed towards the United States (U.S.) and its 
interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today, with the effect 
becoming stronger as the level of democracy of the originating country increases. 
78 The model used to derive the average marginal effect (AME) for both the All-Regimes and the 
democracies are the same. The predicted values of NmN, NvN, and NNP were derived by holding all of the 
other variables’ constant at their mean values. Thus, the AME values for the NmN, NvN, and NNp 
variables predicts the marginal change (effect) on intrusions, shown on the y-axis, per unit change in each 
of these independent variables across the x-axis. As such, the AME in the table at the bottom of Figure 10 
was derived through the use of the same model; thus, the All-Regimes negative verbal marginal change 
across the x-axis range clocks in at -2.1, with democracies scoring a +0.7, as such (-2.1 – 0.7)) / -2.1 = 
+1.33 ~ 1.3. 
79 Calculated as follows: 0.354 – 0. 2286) / 0.354 = 0.35 ~ 35% drop below the All-Regimes model. 
80 Calculated as follows: -1.82-(-0.97) / -0.97 = 0.867 ~ 87% drop below the All-Regimes’ prediction. 
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Regimes model records a slightly higher maximum NN polarization value recording a daily 
variation of 10.7 over democracies at 9.8 at 8% less, as shown in the bottom frame. 
Taken all together, this democracies model provides evidence that the phenomena 
hypothesized in H1, H2, and H5 may operate in the real world, particularly at this finer 
level of analysis.81  Consequently, these finding contribute valuable insights into the cyber 
realm. Next, the researcher will test the model on the hybrid or anocratic regime type at 
this same level of analysis. So, how do negative media narratives about the U.S. stemming 
from dyadic interactions with anocratic countries today impact cyber intrusions on U.S. 
networks tomorrow? 
 
81 Hypothesis #1 (H1): Increases in the number of conflictual material interactions reported in the 
media narratives of other sovereign states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, 
regardless of regime type, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #2 (H2): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions reported in the media 
narratives of democratic states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in 
increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #5 (H5): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased level 
of media polarization, across media stories originating from democratic and anocratic states directed at 




Figure 10.  Media Results: Democracies 
2. Anocracies in Cyberspace 
Anocracies, known as imperfect, partly free, hybrid or mixed democracies, occupy 
the middle ground between democracies and autocracies. This regime-type space appears 
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transitory, where some states seem destined to become either a democracy or autocracy, 
yet, others appear stuck in anocratic stasis, such as Russia, which appears to seek the 
economic trappings of a democratic regime while maintaining the societal control of an 
autocracy (Freedom House, 2017; Gunitsky, 2015; Hussain, 2016; MacKinnon, 2012; 
Manokha, 2018; Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017; Morozov, 2011; Zittrain, et al., 
2017). Or consider Turkey, which seems destined to discard the secular democratic ideals 
of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. As Turkey continues its journey to an autocratic neo-Ottoman 
future by leveraging mediatized and securitized instruments of a digital panopticon to 
cement societal control of the state (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Bilgiç, 2018).82   
Thailand, on the other hand, seems to shift between democracy and anocracy, as it 
struggles between supporting its centuries old monarchy and its populations craving for 
greater democratic access to government institutions (Pinkaew, 2016). In 2014, Thailand 
settled into the anocratic middle with its elites working hard to create and maintain a 
peaceful digital panopticon to monitor their population’s social media postings in an effort 
to sustain their culture and monarchial heritage (Gebhart, Anonymous, & Kohno, 2017; 
Pinkaew, 2016; Sinpeng, 2013). In still another example, Tunisia installed an interim 
government to chart a path toward democracy after the swift exit of their longtime 
President Zine el-Abidine Bin Ali to Saudi Arabia as a result of the 2011 Jasmine 
Revolution (Carrieri, Deibert, & Khan, 2016; Freedom House, 2017; Hinnebusch, 
2015).83 
Elites in this regime-type, unlike in democracies, often receive their status from 
hereditary or generational class affiliation. Incumbent with their status comes the wealth 
 
82 Mediatized – where persons construct their social reality, instead of engaging in face to face 
interactions, through the sharing of their views using communications [information] technology (i.e., social 
media, online news channels, blogging, and photo sharing), which because of its modalities can be recorded 
and monitored by the state,  (Bilgiç, 2018, pp. 261-262). 
Securitized – where a given country, under the auspices of national security, records, monitors, 
collects, and stores the everyday [information technology] interactions of its citizenry for use in addressing 
risks or threats to the state (Bilgiç, 2018, p. 262; Committee on National Security Systems, 2015).  
83 Subsequently, Tunisia has sought to modify or change its internet structure, originally built for state 
surveillance and control, to one where freedom of expression may thrive without the threat of government 
censorship (Chakchouk, Kehl, Ben-Avie, & Coyer, 2013; Wagner, 2012). Certainly, that transition will 
pose a challenge and may not occur as fast as the people of Tunisia may appreciate Tunisia gained 
democracy status in 2017 achieving a polity score of +6 (Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). 
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accumulated by their families, which enables their social mobility to higher levels in their 
class structure. This class structure may act for many as a barrier to entry into the elite 
ranks. Further, these anocratic elites permeate many of the vocations within a given 
country’s civil society. This positioning enables anocratic elites to perform the interlocutor 
function between a society’s leadership and the citizenry (Best & Higley, 2018; Newton, 
1999; Putnam, 1988). Further, this characteristic becomes acutely important when their 
country’s leadership engages in dialog, negotiations, or an exchange of narratives with 
another country (i.e., level-one of international relations theory) (Putnam, 1988).  
For the purposes of this study, the focus remains on negative narratives created by 
anocratic countries, reported by the media about the U.S. State leaders normally use these 
narratives as an instrument of negotiation to coerce, compel, or cajole the country opposite 
them in a dyad, in this case the U.S., into a position favorable to the negotiating nation. 
Further, if a state leader remains unencumbered by domestic (i.e., level-two / domestic 
politics) beliefs, opinions, or attitudes towards a given position, the greater the probability 
of success during an international negotiation (Putnam, 1988, p. 449). While no leader 
enjoys total immunity from domestic or level-two pressures during a negotiation, their 
ability to control or manage the media narrative aimed at domestic audiences would prove 
beneficial, particularly if anocratic regimes controls the media though outright ownership, 
legal or regulatory structures  (Best & Higley, 2018; Putnam, 1988). 
As hypothesized in H1, H3, H5, and H7 anocratic leaders, with their panoptic 
capabilities, execute greater influence over their press and their population’s use of the 
internet than democracies, during what Putnam (1988) refers to as level-one discourse (i.e., 
international negotiations / politics), thereby providing them with greater negotiation space 
during these discussions. Specifically, these anocratic leaders use these control 
mechanisms to regulate the narrative, particularly, during the verbal phase of level-one 
negotiations. This control serves to solidify the media narrative both at home and abroad.  
Simultaneously, the countries’ elites digest the telegraphed verbal narrative, 
following Lazarsfeld’s (1944) two-step information flow, and communicate these 
domestically (i.e., Putnam’s level-two), cueing their citizens to exercise patience as their 
leadership uses negative rhetoric to potentially improve their negotiating position with the 
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U.S. (i.e., Putnam’s level-one). The resulting flat line level of intrusions appears as a 
manifestation of societal control engendering disengagement, while their country’s leaders 
work through the negotiation process. Specifically, the two-step information flow may 
operate within, and reinforce, regime messaging within level-two of domestic politics. 
Table 5 and Figure 12 provide indications of this operationalization within anocratic 
regimes types. 
In Table 5, notice how the negative material narrative coefficients track closely in 
direction with the other models. Further, recognize how the negative verbal narratives 
yesterday appears to have no effect on intrusions today, quite different from the other two 
models. This negative verbal narrative coefficient indicates that the two-step process 
operates within and reinforces anocratic regime narratives at level-two of this international 
relations theory (i.e., domestic politics), potentially, revealing how anocratic leaders use 
the digital panopticon to manage and communicate with their domestic audiences through 
the media and elites during their verbal scuffling with the U.S. This management and 
communication mechanism signals to their citizens to cease their activities, while the level-
one (i.e., international negotiation) remains verbal, which leads to flat intrusion activity, 
an indication of the populations allowing their leadership more maneuver space in the 
negotiation process.  
Further, one could view the magnitude, direction, and p-value significance of the 
internet not free, dichotomous control variable as evidence to buttress this finding as shown 
in Figure 36 of Appendix F. Also, note the absence of a value for the media not free control 
coefficient, denoting that anocracies enjoy control of their media milieu. Thus, those 
anocracies that curtail internet freedoms can and do rheostat online activity using 
generational content controls and manifest strict control of media messaging allows the 
regime to exercise greater control over the internet and media environment. A convenient 
option at the regime’s disposal when engaged in level-one dialog with the US. 
Once the verbal media fracas ends, which signifies a real or material outcome of 
the dyadic interchange at level-one, anocratic leaders message the population through the 
media and the elites to resume their normal activities, while relaxing their use of 
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generational content controls. How the anocracy perceives the outcome will determine 
whether the media material narrative describing the actual result is positive or negative.  
Should the outcome prove unfavorable to the anocracy, an increase in negative 
material narratives—today may result. Table 5 and Figure 12 show that, as negative 
material narratives—yesterday describing the material or realized outcome of the 
negotiation between an anocracy and the U.S. increase, correlates to an increase in cyber 
intrusion attempts on U.S. networks the next day. These model results provide evidence 
that the two-step process operates within and reinforces the two-level process of 
international relations in anocratic regime-types.  
This mechanism could be further reinforced by internet content control 
mechanisms, as discussed above and in the literature review. Other possible hacktivist 
mobilization or demobilization mechanisms , as previously posited, might include social 
movement elites tuned into the issue being negotiated or state-sponsored hackers to 
perform these intrusions, which has been posited by multiple scholars (Biçakci, Doruk, & 
Mitat, 2015; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Gunitsky, 2015; Hussain M. M., 2016; Marcellino, 
Marcinek, Pezard, & Matthews, 2020; Pinkaew, 2016; Saka, 2018; Sinpeng, 2013; Yesil, 
Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017; Zittrain, et al., 2017). Indeed,  the average citizen within these 
anocratic regimes does not possess the capabilities or the internet access to execute such 
intrusions to this scale and so precisely to coincide with media events (Biçakci, Doruk, & 
Mitat, 2015; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Gunitsky, 2015; Hussain M. M., 2016; Marcellino, 
Marcinek, Pezard, & Matthews, 2020; Pinkaew, 2016; Saka, 2018; Sinpeng, 2013; Yesil, 
Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017; Zittrain, et al., 2017). While the fidelity of this data makes it 
difficult to discern which of these mechanisms or processes lead to increased intrusion 
activity, it is safe to say the latter two would rest upon the previously posited nesting of the 
two-step within level-two of international relations theory (i.e., domestic politics). 
Observe how the negative narrative polarization coefficient continues the trend of 
the other two models decreasing intrusions tomorrow as a result of increased negative 
media polarization today. Perhaps, this is a result of the hacktivist population knowing that 
they do not enjoy a free media, indicated by the absence of a coefficient value for media 
not free in Table 5. As such, any variation in media messaging would be regime sanctioned, 
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perhaps viewed by the hacktivist as faux narratives generated to further the regime’s 
purposes. Resulting in the dampening effect of yesterday’s NN polarization on intrusions 
today. 
Yet, for those anocracies that control their internet and media environments and 
foster media self-censorship, this latter control variable scores a high positive value with 
an accompanying statistically significant p-value. Taken together, in these regimes, known 
media self-censorship in reporting yesterday’s NNs triggers an increase in intrusions 
coming from anocratic hackers—today, ceteris paribus. These sensitized hackers could be 
indulging in information seeking behavior looking to assuage their curiosity, hunting down 
more information or seeking the rest of the story on the situation described in yesterday’s 
press. Figure 36 in Appendix F quantifies the magnitude of the change in evident media 
self-censorship with the predicted level of intrusions rising +42 for anocracies, while the 
All-Regimes and democracies models show rises of +4 and +3, respectively. 
Thus, media self-censorship displays a greater influence over today’s intrusions 
amongst anocracies than was seen in the other two models. As stated earlier, since anocratic 
citizens know the state controls the domestic media, this would logically lead journalists 
to self-sensor their narratives. The widely known media self-censorship, within the society 
magnifies intrusions, which ultimately drives intruders from these anocracies to the internet 
seeking information. 
Now to evaluate the negative tone interaction coefficient. The interactive effect of 
the negative media tone and level of democracy come in at the same sign (i.e., negative) as 
the initial model, but opposite to that of the Democracies model. The difference in the later 
comes from the negative or positive sign of the level of democracy ascribed to Anocracies 
spanning from +5 to ‒5 as shown on the z-axis of Figure 11. As such, for anocratic 
countries enjoying a higher level of democracy (i.e., open anocracies in the dark green line 
or +3 below) such as Tanzania and Turkey, this coefficient would have a dampening effect 
on cyber intrusions with a mean value of 34, dropping by –9 across the x-axis negative tone 
range depicted in Figure 11. Those anocracies closer to autocracies, for example Ethiopia, 
Myanmar, Rwanda, or Thailand (i.e., the red line or –3), record a slightly greater 
amplifying effect on cyber intrusion attempts, recording a mean value of 40, rising by +11 
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across the negative tone range, essentially doubling the impact over more democratic 
anocracies, increasing today’s intrusions as shown in Figure 11. Thus, this finding is 
consistent with Figures 5 and 7 allowing for the acceptance of H7 for anocracies at this 
level of analysis.84 
 
Figure 11.  Negative Narrative Tone results: Anocracies. 
Further, as shown in Figure 12, this Anocracies model provides evidence in support 
of the posited hypotheses, H1, H3, and H5. These anocracies appear to manifest many 
similarities to democracies, except for how negative verbal narratives—today affect cyber 
intrusions—tomorrow, which shows no significant effect. The researcher explained earlier 
how the two-step information flow operated within, and reinforced, anocracies domestic 
narratives used in the level-two domestic narrative (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; 
Putnam, 1988). Figure 12 graphically suggests that anocracies material narratives mirror 
the results of the All-Regimes model, but at an average marginal effect (AME) rate 77% 
 
84 Hypothesis #7 (H7): Increases in the accumulated conflictual or negative tone of interactions 
reported in media narratives from other countries directed towards the United States (U.S.) and its 
interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today, with the effect 
becoming stronger as the level of democracy of the originating country increases. 
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higher than All-Regimes’ material narratives, providing further evidence for the acceptance 
of H1.85  While yesterday’s negative verbal narratives records a statistically insignificant 
or no effect on today’s intrusion activity, which supports H3.86 
Finally, notice how yesterday’s negative media polarization coefficient seems to 
produce a dampening impact on today’s intrusions producing an average marginal impact 
35% less than the All-Regimes model, which supports acceptance of H5. Thus, at this level 
of analysis H1, H3, and H5 can be accepted and the null rejected.87  Now, the research 
turns to the final regime type—autocracies, seeking to answer the same question. How do 
negative media narratives about the U.S. resulting from dyadic negotiations or dialog with 
autocratic countries today affect cyber intrusions on U.S. networks tomorrow?  
 
 
85 The model used to derive the AME for anocracies is shared with autocracies and removes the 
Internet and Media Not Free and Media self-censorship control variables because they do not vary for 
autocracies and the media self-censorship fluctuates very little for anocracies. Since, the predicted values of 
NmN, NvN, and NNP are being used holding all of the other variables constant at their mean values, while 
the prediction estimate is derived, very little, if any change in these coefficient value was observed due to 
the removal these control variables, which allows for prediction of the AME in each case. Therefore, by 
comparing the NN Polarization AME prediction values in Figure 12 confirms that the All-Regimes scores a 
+0.354 and the anocracies clock in at +0.626 giving a projected negative material rate 74% greater than the 
All-Regimes or (0.626 – 0.354) / 0.354 = .768 ~ 77%. 
Hypothesis #1 (H1): Increases in the number of conflictual material interactions reported in the media 
narratives of other sovereign states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, 
regardless of regime type, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
86 Hypothesis #3 (H3): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions reported in the 
media narratives of anocratic states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results 
in no change in cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
87 Hypothesis #5 (H5): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased 
level of media polarization, across media stories originating from democratic and anocratic states directed 




Figure 12.  Media Results: Anocracies. 
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 *p < 0.01; **p < 0.001; ***p < 0.0001 
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3. Autocracies in Cyberspace 
The autocratic form of government spans from monarchs to dictators.88  Yet, most 
autocratic states share the same method of governing their citizenry. First, most autocracies 
have pre-existing barriers to entry for admission and acceptance into the ruling or elite class 
of civil society. These barriers usually hinge upon a person’s genealogy, allegiance to the 
ruler, affiliation with the ruling party or the dominant religious group. Certainly, the elite 
class evolves, changes, and refreshes periodically; however, the periodicity of renewal 
cycles happens less often than in democracies and anocracies (Cotta, 2018). Secondly, 
autocratic regimes tend to enjoy greater stability and continuity, since as implied above, 
changes to the ruling or elite structure rarely occur. As a result, the average, non-elite 
citizen holds very little influence over their society’s governing structures, laws, or 
operations (Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). Autocratic regimes hold fast to either 
ideological or religious tradition and do not appreciate transgressive movements or 
behaviors, regardless of rationality (Gebhart, Anonymous, & Kohno, 2017; Greitens, 2013; 
Hussain M. M., 2016; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Rød & Weidmann, 2015; Stier, 2015).  
While autocracies share many common characteristics, they also possess distinct 
differences, which seem to originate from their unique histories. For example, many of the 
autocratic countries spanning the Middle East, as former protectorates or vassal states of 
Britain or France, chose to combine what they learned from their past colonizers into their 
pre-existing governing structures (Best & Higley, 2018). Some with great success (i.e., 
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), others resulting in failed 
states such as Syria, while others, specifically Iran, seem to remain in constant turmoil with 
itself and others (Henry, 2018; Higley, 2018; Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017; Pollack, 
2004).  
Some emergent autocracies blend in new ideologies (i.e., Communism) with past 
governing structures, throwing out some of the old and keeping some of the new to create 
 
88 The nineteen autocratic regimes included in this study span Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bahrain, China, 
Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, Syria, 
United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. 
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the governing structure uniquely their own. This group of autocracies include Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, China, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Laos, North Korea, and Uzbekistan (CIA, 2019). The 
most populous of these is China, whose rise has encountered some setbacks recently with 
repression of democracy in Hong Kong and the coronavirus outbreak. 
Amongst these autocrats, Iran remains unique, blending Islamic religious ideology 
with mechanisms of government that appear democratic. Adhering to their historical roots, 
where the country’s leader, then the Shah and now the Ayatollah, stand as the central figure 
of leadership and governance (Ansari, 2017; Duindam, 2018; Pollack, 2004). Iran remains 
distinctive as a theocracy, which appears to manifest all of the governmental mechanisms 
of a democracy (i.e., national elections), yet, when taken in sum remains firmly autocratic 
(Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017; Pollack, 2004). A subsequent chapter will explore 
the enigmatic Iran in greater detail. 
All of this taken together permits autocracies to develop an internet infrastructure 
that facilitates state censorship and surveillance, thus allowing the state to propagandize 
media narratives in support of the regimes’ policies (Diamond, 2010; Freedom House, 
2017; Gunitsky, 2015; Morozov, 2011; Rød & Weidmann, 2015; Shirky, 2011; Stier, 2017; 
Zittrain, et al., 2017). These regimes control, surveil, and trace their citizens using the 
internet and associated IT media platforms (Morozov, 2011). They view this technology as 
an instrument of repression, not liberation, fully embracing the digital panopticon, 
exploiting its vast capabilities to achieve their desired ends (Gebhart, Anonymous, & 
Kohno, 2017; Morozov, 2011; Pinkaew, 2016; Sinpeng, 2013; Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 
2017; Zittrain, et al., 2017). Further, these autocracies, deliberately, build the physical and 
syntactic layers that make up their indigenous internet to provide optimal control. This 
optimal control enables the regime to effectively monitor, manage, and manipulate the 
semantic layer; thereby, ensuring the supremacy of their chosen media narrative (Greitens, 
2013; Libicki, 2007; MacKinnon, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012; Manokha, 2018; Ruijgrok, 
2017). These autocratic traits play out well in the Autocracies model.  
In Table 5, notice how the negative material narrative coefficient remains positive 
tracking with the other models. Further, observe how the negative verbal narratives 
coefficient tracks closely with the All-Regimes model but opposite of democracies in sign 
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value trending negative as opposed to the neutral Anocracies, each provides evidence of 
the operation of H1 and H4.89  Secondly, see how the NN polarization coefficient tacks 
opposite in direction to the All-Regimes model and other regime types. 
Next, notice how the internet and media freedom coefficients, as well as, the media 
coefficient for media self-censorship do not vary and, consequently, are blank in Table 5. 
This signifies that autocracies, as stated earlier, as a regime type do not allow or foster 
freedom of the press or of the internet and uniformly encourage media self-censorship. 
Now observe the analysis of the multiplicative interaction term combining NN 
media tone and each country’s level of democracy, which provides some interesting results. 
Note how the NN tone coefficient, in Table 5, tracks in the same direction as the 
Democracies model, but appears to have greater negative influence over today’s intrusions 
when comparing the y-axis values in Figures 9 and 13, respectively. This interaction results 
in a decrease in intrusions today coming from autocracies, whose polity scores range from 
‒6 to ‒10, as yesterday’s tone of NN’s originating from these autocrats increases. 
Visually, one can view the red line in Figure 13. Note how increases in yesterday’s 
NN tone predicts decreases the number of intrusion attempts today for NN emanating from 
countries similar to Swaziland, Syria, and Uzbekistan with a polity score of ‒9. Further, 
the mean value intrusions per day captured by the red line is 62, while decreasing over the 
range by 89 less intrusions as yesterday’s NN tone becomes increasingly negative across 
the x-axis. While, the green line depicts the same effect but at a different level forecasting 
a decrease in intrusions today resulting from an increase in yesterday’s NN tone for 
narratives originating from a country similar to China, Cuba, Iran, or Vietnam. The number 
of intrusions per day coming from these autocracies with higher levels of democracy (i.e., 
the green line) falls across the increasing NN tone range from 263 to 179, a drop of 84 
intrusions per day and scores a mean predicted intrusion value of 218. That mean value of 
 
89 Hypothesis #1 (H1): Increases in the number of conflictual material interactions reported in the 
media narratives of other sovereign states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, 
regardless of regime type, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #4 (H4): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions reported in the media 
narratives of autocratic states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in 
decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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the green line equates to a greater than two-fold increase in intrusions per day above those 
autocracies represented by the red line.90  Thus, these autocracies recording higher levels 
of democracy appear to intrude more actively on their U.S. rival’s networks, even though 
they manifest a decreasing trend as the NN tone becomes more negative. This result calls 
for the rejection of H7 for autocracies, acceptance of the null, and efforts to use this finding 
to proffer further hypotheses relating to China and Iran in Chapter IV.91 
 
Figure 13.  Negative Narrative Tone Results: Autocracies. 
Now the research turns to addressing H1, H3, and H6, the results of which were 
discussed above and are graphically depicted in Figure 14. Notice how autocratic leaders 
engage with the U.S. in verbal rhetoric at level-one, where the effect of negative verbal 
interactions becomes increasingly negative, as they communicate with their citizens at 
level-two through the media and through their elites or rheostat their sovereign internet 
through the use of generational content controls. First, their elites digest the media narrative 
 
90 (218 – 62) / 62 = 2.52 ~ > 2 times greater. 
91 Hypothesis #7 (H7): Increases in the accumulated conflictual or negative tone of interactions 
reported in media narratives from other countries directed towards the United States (U.S.) and its 
interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today, with the effect 
becoming stronger as the level of democracy of the originating country increases. 
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and then communicate the regime message to the citizens encouraging restraint in their 
internet activities while the negotiations at level-one remain verbal. Second, once the 
outcome of the negotiations become tangible or material at level-one, elites receive the 
narrative and cue their citizens or state-sponsored groups to resume or increase internet 
activity, with the material long-dashed red line trending consistently above the green dotted 
line depicting autocratic verbal NNs. 
Finally, unlike any of the other models, increases in yesterday’s negative narrative 
polarization predicts an increase in today’s intrusions for autocracies. Apparently, 
autocracies with their patent lack of media freedoms leads their intrusive population to be 
triggered by NN polarization indulging in information seeking behavior, scoring a thirty-
fold shift over the All-Regimes dampening effect shifting to the significantly heightened 
effect on today’s intrusion coming from autocracies.92  Alternatively, autocratic regimes 
could use NN polarization to mobilize their hacktivist population either through social 
movement connections or state-sponsored groups; nevertheless, this mobilization may rely 
on the two-step process operating within level-two conveying the message to hack. 
 
92 The model used to derive the AME for autocracies is shared with anocracies and removes the 
Internet and Media Not Free and Media self-censorship control variables because their values do not vary 
for autocracies. Thus, the predicted values of NmN, NvN, and NNP are being used holding all of the other 
variables constant at their mean values, while the prediction estimate is derived, no change in these 
coefficient value resulted from removal these control variables, which allows for prediction of the AME in 
this case. Therefore, through use of the NN polarization values in the table in Figure 14, the All-Regime 
records an average marginal effect of -0.9696 intrusions across the x-axis range, while autocracies score a 
growth of +27.9613 across the same range, an increase of intrusions thirty times greater [(27.9613– (-
0.9696) / 0.9696 = 29.8 ~ 30) than the All-Regimes model.  
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Figure 14.   Media Results: Autocracies. 
This explanation does not imply consistency of direction in that verbal always leads 
to material, certainly, the opposite could occur. Further, the polarization of NN’s could 
occur at any time in the process. Nevertheless, these three pieces taken together describe 
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 *p < 0.01; **p < 0.001; ***p < 0.0001 
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how the two-step process theory operates and reinforces communications and control 
within level-two of domestic relations in autocracies, as shown graphically in Figure 14. 
Thus, by reviewing this statistical evidence discussed here, the research provides evidence 
to support hypotheses H1, H4, and H6, which surmise that this phenomenon operates in 
autocracies.93  
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 14, notice how the material and verbal result from 
the autocracies appear to mirror those from the All-Regime model, except each clocks in 
at a much higher average marginal effect. Notice in Figure 14, it is easy to see that negative 
material narratives score a forty-five-fold increase in predicted intrusions, while verbal 
narratives record a six-fold decrease in intrusions, above or below the corresponding All-
Regimes’ AME values. Yet, the researcher still cannot account for the fact that the set of 
intruders might use IP anonymizers or ONION routing to mask the true origin of the 
intrusion. Nevertheless, the model remains consistent in its predictive properties across all 
regime types at this level of analysis, as shown above, in the plots in Appendix F, and in 
the model coefficient comparison plots in Appendix I. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter began by describing the macro model and the eleven focused models, 
displaying their output statistics in Appendix D. Subsequently, the basic Poisson 
distribution model was chosen because it best fit the discrete, per country-day data, and 
recorded the lowest Mean Average Error (MAE) and Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) 
calculated from the test sample drawn from the main data set used in this research. Then, 
the research focused the chosen model on those countries that reported negative narratives 
directed at the U.S. over the period of analysis. This next level of research began with an 
 
93 Hypothesis #1 (H1): Increases in the number of conflictual material interactions reported in the 
media narratives of other sovereign states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, 
regardless of regime type, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #4 (H4): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions reported in the media 
narratives of autocratic states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in 
decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today.  
Hypothesis #6 (H6): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased level 
of media polarization, across media stories originating from autocratic states directed at the U.S. and its 
interest—yesterday, results in an increase in cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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All-Regimes’ Negative Narratives model and then proceeded to apply the model to 
different regime-types: democracies, anocracies, and autocracies. The research revealed 
that negative material narratives today strongly correlated with cyber intrusion attempts on 
U.S. networks tomorrow across all regime types. These results supported the expectations 
of H1 across all regime types. Next, the research discovered that negative verbal narratives 
emanating from democracies today also increases intrusions on U.S. networks tomorrow, 
allowing for the acceptance of H2 and the rejection of the null hypothesis.  
Subsequently, the research analyzed how yesterday’s negative verbal narratives 
generated by anocracies and autocracies resulted in no effect (i.e., no correlation) or a 
dampening effect (i.e., negative correlation) on cyber intrusion attempts on U.S. networks 
today, respectively. These results support the expectations for H3 and H4, as well. Next, 
the NN polarization coefficient was evaluated for each model, finding increased NN 
polarization—yesterday resulted in fewer intrusions today for democracies and anocracies 
supporting H5. On the other hand, NN polarization in autocracies swung the other direction 
with increased polarization leading to increased intrusions, which supported and allowed 
for the acceptance of H6. 
Taken together, these results indicate that two-level process theory of international 
and domestic politics and two-step flow of communication theory operate within 
anocracies and autocracies (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; Putnam, 1988). While 
these theories may apply within democracies, the analysis at this level does not provide 
evidence of their operation. However, anocracies and autocracies manifest significant 
indications that the two-step flow operates and reinforces level-two of domestic politics, 
providing the population with input on how to respond to negative material and verbal 
narratives or NN polarization about the U.S. originating from their country’s leadership. 
At any rate, these actuated hackers, who may be individuals, part of a social movement 
groups, or state-sponsored actors (which is impossible to determine precisely with this 
dataset) appear to be conducting these intrusions. 
Finally, in reviewing the analysis of the interactive variables, H7 holds across All-
Regimes and anocracies indicating that increases in NN tone decrease cyber intrusions as 
the level of democracy becomes more positive. However, H7 was rejected for democracies 
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and autocracies as it appears that increases in NN tone increase intrusions coming from 
autocracies and democracies at higher levels of democracy within each regime types. 
Although intrusions decreased across the x-axis range as the NNs became more negative 
for both regime types, in each case higher levels of democracy produced more intrusions, 
a finding that the research will explore in subsequent chapters. In these case study chapters, 
the research will explore each of these regime types down to the country level to ascertain 
whether the hypotheses remain valid at deeper levels of analysis or whether differing 
hypotheses should be offered at the country level based on closer examination. Logically, 
the case study starting point will begin where this chapter ended, with autocracies. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES: AUTOCRACIES IN CYBERSPACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Autocracies appear to manifest some unique characteristics in this media effect 
realm and its impact in cyberspace. This research will explore two countries with frequent 
and ongoing contact with the United States-China and Iran. For a complete list of the 
nineteen autocracies and all the other countries, per regime type, the reader can review 
Appendix G. 
First, this chapter will begin by briefly introducing how autocracies view and use 
cyberspace. Second, the case study will survey the extent literature to examine the 
similarities and differences between China and Iran, focusing specifically on how they 
control the internet, the narrative, and its impact on their unique civil societies. As the 
exploration of these nuanced civil societies proceeds, other hypotheses will be proffered 
for both countries. Thirdly, the author provides a brief review of some of the conclusions 
discovered about autocracies using the model introduced in the last chapter. Finally, the 
researcher shall apply the existing model described in the previous chapter to China and 
Iran to discern how yesterday’s negative material and verbal narratives, tone, and variation 
affect cyber-intrusions on U.S. networks. 
B. AUTOCRACY IN THE THIRD WAVE 
Autocratic regimes span across countries that include China, Cuba, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, North Korea, and Syria  (Marshall & Cole, 2014; Marshall & Elzinga-
Marshall, 2017). These states approached the adoption and use of the internet slowly at 
first potentially due to their inability to control the information on it, their initial lack of 
understanding of it, and their reticence to embrace this technology due to its alleged 
democratic properties (Morozov, 2011). However, their pace of adoption and use began to 
accelerate in the early 2000s, because autocrats began to understand how to use the internet 
to efficiently meet the Orwellian needs of every autocracy—the unencumbered use of 
censorship, propaganda, and surveillance to sustain the status quo at home and gain 
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influence abroad (Morozov, 2011, p. 82; Orwell, 1949; Rød & Weidmann, 2015; Walker, 
Kalathil, & Ludwig, 2020).  
Thus, some autocracies proceeded slowly in their adoption of the internet, 
presumably due to WWW’s inherit characteristic of enabling open and transparent access 
to media in its many forms. Some have conjectured how the internet spawned many 
apparently leaderless protests from the Philippines (2001) to Iran (2009 / 2017‒2018), 
viewed by scholars as one side of the dictator’s dilemma (Al Jazeera, 2018; Shirky, 2011; 
Morozov, 2011). The other side being a dictator’s understanding that any state not 
connected to the internet will remain behind economically and technologically, both threats 
to the longevity of an authoritarian regime (Morozov, 2011, pp. 93-97; Shirky, 2011). 
Many believed that the internet would allow repressed populations to access the global 
media sources. This media exposure would transform their citizens into netizens, thereby 
enlightening them to the means with which autocratic regimes maintain control of their 
countries. Ultimately, this would spawn a social movement within these countries and lead 
to democratization-liberation technology theory (Diamond, 2010; Gunitsky, 2015; 
Morozov, 2011; Rød & Weidmann, 2015; Shirky, 2011; Stier, 2017).94  However, what 
liberals and realists, neo or otherwise, fail to realize is that any new technology can lead to 
multiple often unexpected uses and outcomes.95  For example, while western democracies 
 
94 Netizen – citizen of the internet (Diamond, 2010; Lindsay J. , 2014). 
95 Liberalism – an analytical approach to international relations where states are part of a global 
society that modulates their interactions based on norms and rules established through interaction, initially 
through transnational and more recently international trade (Nye J. S., 2007, p. 288). National borders 
signify moral importance because states represent the collective ideals and rights of the peoples inhabiting 
them; thus, it follows that respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a given state shows respect 
for the rights of its citizens (Nye, 2007, pp. 23-24; Walzer, 1977; Walzer, 1980).  
Neo-Liberalism – similar to liberalism except that state actions are constrained by economic 
interdependence and international institutions (Nye, 2007, p. 288). 
Realist – an analytical approach to interstate relations based on the societal, economic, or military power 
structure. Individual states react, interact, and counteract the actions of other states to maintain their power 
base, in effect, attempting to strike a balance. This concept of balance of power is foundational to the realist. 
Each state continually seeks to defend or expand their territory or interests, to grow their economy, or to 
enhance their influence internationally. For the realist preserving the balance of power creates order, which 
leads to peace – a moral imperative (Morgenthau, 1947; Nye, 2007, p. 25; Waltz, 1979). Morality requires 
that states make tradeoff choices as they seek to maintain or better their position on the world stage (Nye, 
2007, p. 23). Regardless of the tradeoff choices made by the states involved in a given interaction and 
irrespective of just or unjust nature of the peace achieved, if order and balance were maintained – the ends 
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view the internet as a liberating technology, authoritarian regimes may use it as a repressive 
technology employed to censor, propagandize, surveil, and trace their populations (Deibert, 
2015; Greitens, 2013; Mackinnon, 2011, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Quinn, 2017; Rød & 
Weidmann, 2015). 
This chapter will explore the two autocracies at the center of this study: China and 
Iran. The former a well-established communist regime, which chooses to compete 
regionally and globally effectively using all instruments of national power. The later, a 
theocratic republic, often appears at odds with itself, desperately trying to hold itself 
together, while draining its resources by engaging in proxy wars jousting with its regional 
and global rivals. Though both are autocracies, each possesses different levels of 
proficiency and capability, choosing to use their stylized versions of the internet as a 
repressive technology domestically and as an instrument of influence, coercion, and 
industrial espionage abroad.96 
Each created their own version of a national internet or state intranet, as a proactive 
measure (Golkar, 2011; Rahimi, 2015). Iran created the Halal internet and China’s version 
resides behind the Great Firewall of China (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Aryan, Aryan, & 
Halderman, 2013; Barme & Ye, 1997; MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Pinkaew, 
2016).97  Both created their respective national internets to maximize control, optimizing 
their regimes’ ability to swiftly censor any narratives critical of state policy and replace 
 
justify the means. The realist views the tradeoffs between justice and order as situationally dependent; further, 
the spatial and temporal position of the state matters in the transactional nature of international affairs.  
Neo-Realist – an analytical approach to interstate relations in which each state’s actions are governed 
by the structural balance of military power (Nye J. S., 2007; Waltz, 1979). 
96 Non-Monarch autocracies seem to follow similar patterns in cyberspace seeking to gain a capability 
through espionage or theft (Lindsay & Cheung, 2015; Stier, 2017; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). 
Authoritarian regimes find it difficult to foster innovation while propagandizing, censoring, or surveilling 
their populations; thus, stealing intellectual property or national security secrets from more innovative 
states provides a suitable alternative to nurturing homegrown innovation when competing with an 
ingenious rival (Lindsay & Cheung, 2015; Stier, 2017; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). Yet, 
dependence on industrial espionage not only stifles domestic innovation, but also may not necessarily 
ensure that the state parlaying in stolen technologies can even replicate the manufacturing process 
necessary to achieve the capability (Lindsay & Cheung, 2015; Stier, 2017; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 
2018, p. 165). Most other non-monarch, authoritarian regimes follow the same behavior patterns, although 
regionally (Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018).  
97 Halal – in Arabic means lawful, referring to any object or act considered as permissible under 
Islamic law (MacKinnon, 2012, p.55). 
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them with propagandized stories favorable to the regime, while simultaneously sustaining 
a surveillance apparatus efficient enough to know precisely what their citizens are 
discussing and with whom (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Aryan, Aryan, & Halderman, 2013; 
Barme & Ye, 1997; MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Pinkaew, 2016; Ruijgrok, 2017). 
In this aspect, China displays a remarkable level of sophistication far superior to 
other autocracies including Iran (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Deibert, 2015; MacKinnon, 
2012; Morozov, 2011; Rød & Weidmann, 2015). China leverages quantity over quality of 
intrusion, as seen in Appendix J, while Iran appears to employ the intrusion level necessary 
to achieve their goal. Ultimately, each state’s capacity drives their customized use of the 
digital panopticon, leading each to employ their capabilities in different ways; yet, most 
strive to achieve China’s level of efficiency (Deibert, 2015; Hussain M. M., 2016; 
MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011). Indeed, these cultural and economic differences imply 
how each state views the use and the employment of the internet to further their specific 
domestic and international aspirations in cyberspace. 
1. China in the Third Wave 
Internally, China can only be described as a true digital panopticon, both digitally 
and physically (Greitens, 2013; Gunitsky, 2015; Hussain M. M., 2016; MacKinnon, 2011; 
Morozov, 2011; Ramli, Bergen, & Hunter, 2018; Rød & Weidmann, 2015; Shi, 2020). 
Again amongst authoritarians, China remains the leader in sophisticated censorship tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, which allows the regime to effectively surveil and 
propagandize its population, using censorship to quash any organized dissent and to control 
the media narrative—simultaneously by leveraging the internet and its capabilities (Custer, 
Prakash, Solis, Knight, & Lin, 2019; Freedom House, 2017; Greitens, 2013; King, Pan, & 
Roberts, 2013; Lindsay, 2014; Richet, 2013; Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011; Wang & 
Minzner, 2015; Zittrain, et al., 2017).98  Employing the most advanced use of artificial 
 
98 The Chinese continue to hone their methods of controlling the media narrative in cyberspace, 
beginning in the mid-1990s, through a sophisticated labyrinth of censorship and surveillance created by a 
public-private partnership between the internet providers and the Chinese government (Greitens, 2013). This 
sophisticated means of control begins with censorship policies placed on internet providers making them 
accountable for any content seen as anti-regime or subversive (Barme & Ye, 1997; Greitens, 2013; Lindsay 
J. , 2014; MacKinnon, 2011; Morozov, 2011; Rød & Weidmann, 2015; Shirky, 2011; Stier, 2017). This 
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intelligence (AI) to surveil the Chinese population, unencumbered by any of the moral 
quandaries that accompany the use and development of AI (Ramli, Bergen, & Hunter, 
2018).99  Further, by enacting restrictive telecommunications laws and regulations or by 
simply owning the Internet Service Providers (ISP) outright, the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) in effect controls Chinese society through the efficient use of censorship, 
surveillance, and propaganda (Deibert, 2015; Golkar, 2011; Greitens, 2013; Lindsay, 2014; 
Morozov, 2011; Rød & Weidmann, 2015; Shirky, 2011; Stier, 2017).100 
Many western companies, who provide internet services in China, chose to submit 
to the PRC demands for censorship and surveillance (Deibert, 2015; Greitens, 2013; 
MacKinnon, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Quinn, 2017; Rød & Weidmann, 
2015). The economic advantages of having a presence in the Chinese market are just too 
lucrative; however, for some companies the cost is too high. For example, Google chose 
not to submit to demands for monitoring, removing, and reporting online content dubbed 
 
coerces private ISPs to establish unique departments whose sole purpose is to police users and censor content 
to avoid the possibility of fines, license termination, or shut down by the Chinese government (MacKinnon, 
2011, p. 38; MacKinnon, 2012, p. 36). Above the internet providers exists an elaborate bureaucracy of 
Ministries, Bureaus, and Offices with subordinate organizations reaching down to the provincial, municipal, 
and county level policing media and online content (Greitens, 2013). Within these bureaucracies reside the 
internet police, who enforce the internet laws and can penalize anyone from the internet provider down to the 
individual. These internet police may incarcerate any Chinese citizen for creating transgressive content (i.e., 
political dissent, collective action, social mobilization, etc.) (Greitens, 2013). Rebecca Greitens (2013) 
estimates the size of Chinese Internet Police Force to be between 20,000 and 50,000. This organization 
possesses the authority to warn, detain, arrest, or imprison anyone with China’s jurisdiction suspected of 
engaging in political dissent (MacKinnon, 2011). Further, the regime added another larger layer for depth, 
known in e-parlance as the fifty-cent party. Retired Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members, college 
students or other citizens who may be aspiring to join the CCP fill the ranks of the fifty-cent party and receive 
half a yuan (~ 50 cents) for positive post, blog, electronic statement made online about the regime (Deibert 
R. , 2015; Greitens, 2013; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013). The fifty-cent party’s size is estimated to be 
approximately 250,000 to 300,000 strong (Greitens, 2013; MacKinnon, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012). This group 
of paid volunteers monitor content, report political deviant narratives, and author positive regime storylines 
– essentially guiding the on-line conversation toward themes complementary of the CCP and the government 
(Greitens, 2013; MacKinnon, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012).  
99 Artificial Intelligence (AI) – the theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks 
that normally require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, 
and translation between languages (Oxford Dictionary, 2015, sec. “AI”). 
AI’s moral quandaries have been showcased in science fiction literature as well as motion pictures. 
The scenario usually involves the unfettered development of AI by mankind followed soon after by an 
uprising of artificially intelligent machines bent on dominating or destroying humanity. 
100 Internet Service Provider (ISP) – An organization that provides access to the Internet, as well as 
other services such as web hosting or e-mail. It is a primary control point, since all traffic from an 
individual or organization flows through its ISP (Singer & Friedman, 2013, p. 74). Synonymous with 
Internet Provider in this paper. 
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unlawful by the PRC leaving mainland China (i.e., .cn domain) for Hong Kong (i.e., .hk 
domain) in 2010 (Lindsay, 2014; MacKinnon, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011; 
Nye, 2011; Quinn, 2017). 
The Chinese system consists of a legally justified, interlocking behemoth of 
technology enabled humanity, which effectively monitors, modifies, blocks, or removes 
content, deemed as transgressive, replacing it with media narratives favorable to the 
regime’s actions, objectives and policies (Greitens, 2013; MacKinnon, 2011; MacKinnon, 
2012; Ruijgrok, 2017). Further, Stockmann and Gallagher (2011) discovered that the 
majority of Chinese citizens, mainly in urban centers, were susceptible to believe media 
messaging particularly when stories covering social problems or legal grievances, 
principally at the local-level, were sensationalized. Additionally, they found consistent 
flow of information (i.e., propaganda) contributed to the tractability of media messages 
(Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). 
Simultaneously, this Chinese digital panopticon enables the efficient surveillance 
of their properly propagandized population.101  In 2014, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) rolled out the Social Credit System (SCS), about five years after India began its 
similar Aadhaar project, which will be discussed in the democracy case study. However, 
the CCP had been planning for the establishment of a SCS and its envisioned Orwellian 
capabilities since 2002 (Botsman, 2017; Creemers, 2018). Initially, the SCS was described 
by the state-run media as being similar to the credit systems (i.e. Equifax, Experian, & 
TransUnion) used in capitalist economies to evaluate a citizen’s financial creditworthiness 
(Creemers, 2018; Shahin & Zheng, 2020). Yet soon after, the CCP media narrative quickly 
morphed into a description of SCS as a system that also evaluated an individual citizen’s 
sincerity, trustworthiness, and creditworthiness, revealing their true intention (Creemers, 
2018; Shahin & Zheng, 2020). The additions of sincerity and trustworthiness allow for the 
CCP to monitor and track an individual’s social associations, behavior, contacts, online 
activity, and what bills or taxes they paid or did not pay (Botsman, 2017; Shahin & Zheng, 
 
101 In China, political dissent of any type, broadly defined, is a punishable crime (MacKinnon, 2011, 
p.41; MacKinnon, 2012).  
China’s population was estimated to be 1,382,323,332 (Internet Users by Country, 2017). 
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2020). Further, the development of the SCS allows for the CCP to electronically centralize 
its power structure making it the guarantor of sincerity, trustworthiness, and morality 
(Creemers, 2018).102  Ultimately, positioning itself as morally superior to local authorities 
(Creemers, 2018, p. 6). A theme played out in state-media narratives that will be discussed 
later. 
In conjunction with this advanced system of societal control provided by the SCS, 
the PRC developed the proactive measure of creating a state-sponsored high-speed internet 
alternative in order to stave off their citizen’s use of western media outlets and platforms 
(Diamond, 2010; Greitens, 2013; MacKinnon, 2012; Rahimi, 2015; Walker, Kalathil, & 
Ludwig, 2020; Zittrain, et al., 2017). Thus, empowering the regime to maintain absolute 
control of the tone, type, and variation of domestic narratives, which remain the focus of 
this study. 
The PRC’s main motivation for creating this vast digital panopticon appears 
focused on the prevention of any social unrest, public demonstrations or dissent, and 
collective action or expression, while allowing criticism of some local or state officials and 
policies (Custer, Prakash, Solis, Knight, & Lin, 2019; Greitens, 2013; King, Pan, & 
Roberts, 2013; Lindsay, 2014; Richet, 2013; Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011; Wang & 
Minzner, 2015). On the surface, this may appear to be oxymoronic; however, the 
Tiananmen Square demonstration and the nearly coincidental fall of the former Soviet 
Union motivated elites within the CCP to proactively monitor and prevent social unrest, 
while allowing some criticism and legal leveeing of grievances with local and state officials 
or policies, using the later to prevent the former (Cong, 2013; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; 
Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011; Wang & Minzner, 2015). As such, the Chinese digital 
panopticon allows for some dissent with local or state officials and/or policies, but harshly 
censors any narrative residing in the semantic layer encouraging, emboldening, or inspiring 
any type of collective action, dissent, or protests (Custer, Prakash, Solis, Knight, & Lin, 
 
102 Enrollment and participation in the SCS will be mandatory throughout China by 2020, which is 
also when each citizen will receive their first SCS score (Botsman, 2017). 
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2019; Greitens, 2013; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; Lindsay, 2014; Richet, 2013; Wang & 
Minzner, 2015). 
Further, by banning the use of virtual private networks (VPN)s and IP anonymizers, 
such as TOR, the PRC further cements its grasp on the narrative (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; 
Deibert, 2015; Ensafi, Winter, Mueen, & Crandall, 2015; MacKinnon, 2011; Morozov, 
2011). Thus, in China, the true digital Panopticon exists, allowing for the censoring and 
control of information residing in the semantic layer. Enabling them to effectively employ 
the information instrument as sharp power to bend the harmonized domestic and 
international narrative to their will (Custer, Prakash, Solis, Knight, & Lin, 2019; Diamond, 
2018; Walker & Ludwig, 2017; Walker, Kalathil, & Ludwig, 2020). 
Externally, China led the way amongst the top 10 states across the globe who 
engaged in rivalrous cyber disputes between 2000 and 2014, potentially, because of its 
desire to gain and maintain position as a regional hegemon and a global challenger of the 
U.S. and its policies (Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, p. 
73). As such, most of the cyber incidents initiated by China began with a malicious vector 
(~ 95%) leading ultimately to an information seeking objective (~ 79%) (Valeriano, Jensen, 
& Maness, 2018, pp. 143-170). 
The Chinese objectives span from stealing intellectual property or weapon system 
plans, to covertly surveying network vulnerabilities, which they intend to exploit at some 
future date (Axelrod & Iliev, 2014; Lindsay, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano 
& Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018).103  Simply, China pursues this 
information seeking behavior, preferring mass over cyber sophistication in their intrusions 
(see Appendix K), to surveil the U.S. and its regional rivals, to monitor plans and 
capabilities in all domains, and to ensure that no other state is able to achieve predominant 
competitive advantage (Axelrod & Iliev, 2014; Ball, 2011; Lindsay, 2014; Porter, 1991; 
Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 
 
103 China’s malicious intent method calculation equates to 58 out of 61 incidents equating to 0.9508 
or approximately 95% (Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, p. 160). The information seeking intent 
calculation equates to 48 out of 61 incidents equaling 0.787 or approximately ~ 79% (Valeriano, Jensen, & 
Maness, 2018, p. 158). 
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2018).104  Further, China’s cyberspace capability is augmented by a well-resourced and 
well-cultivated labyrinth of influence leeching into academic, entertainment, and 
commercial sectors of their global and regional rivals, employing what some scholars have 
described as sharp power (Custer, Prakash, Solis, Knight, & Lin, 2019; Diamond, 2018; 
Walker & Ludwig, 2017; Walker, Kalathil, & Ludwig, 2020).  
Even though China does not have established doctrine like the reflexive control, 
advanced by the Soviets, their actions reflect what realists describe as sharp power. China’s 
patience in husbanding the development of their influence network abroad is impressive, 
spanning across academic, entertainment, and commercial sectors.105  Inevitably, their 
effort to cultivate influence has bolstered their impact abroad. When the PRC chooses to 
prudently use their influence, they bend the narrative to suit Chinese interests 
internationally (Diamond, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012; Nathan, 2017; Walker & Ludwig, 
2017; Walker, Kalathil, & Ludwig, 2020; Wong, 2020). Domestically, the PRC seeks to 
stifle any opposition, whatsoever, by simultaneously saturating the domestic media 
narrative with normative stories tightly aligned with the PRC objectives (Diamond, 2010; 
Freedom House, 2017; MacKinnon, 2011; Morozov, 2011; Walker, Kalathil, & Ludwig, 
2020; Wong, 2020).  
Thus, through its influence abroad and control domestically, China employs a vast 
array of informational tools. These tools underpin PRC’s ability to effectively manage the 
international narrative, while controlling domestic storylines, residing in Habermas’ (1991) 
public sphere, in effect controlling the two-step process operating within and reinforcing 
within level-two domestically within China. Essentially, the PRC manipulates the levers in 
 
104 As for remainder of these incidents (~ 21%), China intends to manifest their cyber capability with 
a subversive intent to pushback, metaphorically speaking, against the U.S. or other competitors (Valeriano, 
Jensen, & Maness, 2018, pp. 143-170).  
105 In academic circles, they provide scholarships, fund research, and create academic partnership 
through their Confucius Institute network across the globe (Custer, Prakash, Solis, Knight, & Lin, 2019; 
Diamond, 2018; Walker & Ludwig, 2017). Their span of influence in the commercial realm is vast, with 
their low cost of labor, many private sector companies have come to rely on China for their supply chain 
needs, which include the assembly, manufacture, and transportation of products destine for global markets. 
(Lindsay, 2014; Tripp & Kubota, 2020). Indeed, as seen during the recent coronavirus outbreak, a 
disruption in China can lead to a global disruption (Tripp & Kubota, 2020). Yet, in either case, whether it is 
access to Chinese research funding on the academic side or access to Chinese markets on the other, each is 
contingent on compliance with the PRC’s state objectives and narrative (Diamond, 2018). 
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the digital Panopticon, allowing the elite narratives of the CCP to dominate their national 
media environment and effectively squelching any dissenting stories or messages that run 
counter to their objectives. Their manifest ability to control the level-two narrative, via the 
two-step process, allows the Chinese greater opportunities in level-one negotiations (Bjola 
& Manor, 2018; Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017; Trumbore, 
Boyer, Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000).  
Previously, in Figure 14 in Chapter III, this research provided evidence of the 
operation of the two-step flow of information within level-two domestically for 
autocracies. Further, Figure 14 quantified how increased NN polarization in today’s media 
stories directed at the U.S., leads to increased intrusions tomorrow. Additionally, the 
evidence shown in Figure 13 in Chapter III, also indicated that increases in NN tone on a 
given day in autocracies corresponded to a decrease in cyber intrusions on the following 
day. Particularly when considering the green line in Figure 13, it predicts a decrease of 
intrusions on the day following the narrative as the NN tone becomes more negative for 
countries comparable to China and Iran who come in at a higher level of democracy 
amongst the autocrats (i.e., –7). Perhaps, these autocracies use negative media tone as a 
way of controlling domestic politics at level-two, while the rhetoric at level-one heats up 
in reference to a given issue between some autocracy and the US. 
Thus, the next step in this research will be to separate the Chinese negative 
narratives and cyber intrusions from those other countries in the data set. Then use the 
model, described in Chapter III, to discern if Chinese negative narrative types, variation, 
and tone on a given day effects cyber intrusion attempts on U.S. networks the next day. As 
such, the research seeks to use the previous model applying it to this dyadic relationship 




Figure 15.  China ‒ Case Study Hypotheses 
Many states emulate different aspects of China’s manifest capabilities, but none 
can surpass the sheer breadth and capability attained by its regime. Iran provides an object 
lesson of how authoritarians imitate the Chinese way of taking the slow yet deliberate path 
of internet diffusion within their populations (MacKinnon, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012; 
Morozov, 2011).106  In this research, Iran appears to be walking that deliberate path, but 
does not seem to possess the apparent capacity either in population nor in resources 
necessary to achieve China’s level of societal control. However, where they have gaps in 
technology, the Iranians cover with humans, using the same tactics and procedures to 
achieve similar, if not more effective results on their population. 
 
106 First, by allowing the government to become familiar with the domain (Greitens, 2013; Morozov, 
2011). Next, they emplace controls to manage censorship and surveillance capabilities, build the 
infrastructure, and establish the necessary legal governance to legitimize their control. Finally, they begin 
to allow access, first to the elites and then slowly to the public writ large (Greitens, 2013; Morozov, 2011). 
Hypothesis #8 (H8): Increases in the number of conflictual (i.e. negative) material 
interactions reported in Chinese media narratives directed at the United States (US) or 
its interests—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from 
China, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #9 (H9): Increasingly conflictual (i.e. negative) verbal interactions 
reported in Chinese media narratives directed at the United States (US) and its 
interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from 
China, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #10 (H10): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating 
an increased level of media polarization, across media stories originating from China 
directed at the U.S. and its interests—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion 
activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #11 (H11): Increases in the conflictual or negative tone of interactions 
reported in media narratives from China directed at the United States (US) and its 
interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—
today. 
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2. Iran in the Third Wave 
On the world stage, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) faces different circumstances 
than China, which causes the regime to approach their censorship and surveillance 
capabilities, brought about by advances in information technology, differently. First, Iran’s 
relationship with the West writ large, particularly with the U.S., has flirted with 
cooperation, but by and large remains rivalrous and conflictual to date. Secondly, as stated 
in Chapter II, Iran often hurts itself both regionally and internationally as it lashes out at its 
rivals, eroding its position globally and draining its resources domestically, as is common 
with most locked in—long standing rivals. For example, Iran involves itself in regional 
proxy wars (i.e., Iraq, Syria, and Yemen), which engenders western countries to impose 
economic sanctions. Sanctions result in domestic shortages falling the hardest on the 
average Iranian, ultimately isolating the regime internationally and causing domestic strife 
and protests (Ansari, 2017; Henry, 2018; Mattis, 2018; Price, 2012; Sadjadpour, 2020; 
Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Zittrain, et al., 2017). Thirdly, Iran’s leadership over the past 
25 years has oscillated from reformists, to Islamic fundamentalists, and now to moderates 
residing between the two extremes (Ansari, 2017; Best & Higley, 2018; Blout, 2017; 
Golkar, 2011; Hussain, 2016; Jones & Newlee, 2020; Pollack, 2004). These extremes have 
taken their toll on the Iranian economy and its people, manifesting itself in their control, 
establishment, and use of the internet. Specifically, the era under the Islamic fundamentalist 
leadership of Mahmood Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) saw the build out of the Iranian version 
of the digital panopticon setting in place many of the elements necessary to effect societal 
control, albeit focusing on First-Gen internet content controls (Blout, 2017; Deibert & 
Rohozinski, 2010; Golkar, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011; Price, 2012; Rahimi, 
2011). 
On the international stage, Iran remains constrained and clandestine in its chosen 
cyber tactics (Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). Iran ranks 
seventh among the top 10 states that engaged in rivalrous cyber disputes between 2000 and 
2014 (Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, p. 73). In general, Iran tracks closely with many 
of China’s autocratic techniques of cyber incidents choosing malicious vector as their 
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method of choice for gaining access to their rival’s networks.107  However, Iran’s cyber 
objectives do not align with China’s. More often, Iran seeks to achieve a subversive intent 
(~ 60%) with an information seeking objective coming in second (~ 40%).108  Iran appears 
set upon using the information instrument to push back against the power or influence of 
their regional (i.e. Israel, Saudi Arabia, etc.) and global rivals (i.e., the US), ultimately 
seeking to demonstrate their cyber prowess, while in general falling far behind its rivals in 
cyber sophistication (Anderson & Sadjadpour, 2018; Lindsay, 2013; Maness & Valeriano, 
2016; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018; Valeriano & Maness, 2015).109  Their use of 
cyber tactics runs parallel with their use of terrorism, because Iran cannot compete 
militarily with its rivals (Findley, Piazza, & Young, 2012; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). 
Thus, it deliberately chooses these low-cost tactics to coerce, deter, or pushback its 
adversaries, which provides plausible deniability and shows restraint, while resisting their 
rival’s manifest desires (Lindsay, 2013; Maness & Valeriano, 2016; Valeriano & Maness, 
2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018).  
The Iranians regime manifests a peculiar obsession with the West, particularly the 
U.S., seeing every action, deed, or statement made by the West, however benign, as an 
attempt to exert undue influence over their country and culture (Ansari, 2017; Blout, 2017; 
Golkar, 2011; Jervis, 1976; Heradstveit, 1979; Maoz, 1990; Maoz & Mor, 2002; Price, 
2012). Certainly, ample historical facts exist of the West applying an outsized influence 
over Iranian internal affairs, which has resulted in this quasi-phobic regime behavior 
pattern (Blout, 2017; Pollack, 2004; Price, 2012). Indeed, this behavior remains consistent 
with rivalry behavior; yet, it fails to explain why Iran’s leadership waxes and wanes in its 
engagement with the West (Ansari, 2017; Blout, 2017; Golkar, 2011; Jervis, 1976; 
 
107 Iran’s malicious intent method calculation equates to 9 out of 15 incidents equaling 60% 
(Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, pp. 215-224 & 230-237). 
108 Iran’s subversive intent objective equates to 9 out of 15 or 60%, with the remainder having a 
information seeking objective or 6 out of 15 or 40%  (Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, pp. 215-224 & 
230-237).  
109 This lack of cyber sophistication mainly stems from Iran’s economic and political isolation, which 
severely constrains the acquisition of cyber technology and the expertise to use it (Anderson & Sadjadpour, 
2018). 
 120
Heradstveit, 1979; Maoz, 1990; Maoz & Mor, 2002; Price, 2012). An answer for the later 
point resides in the regime’s power structure. 
Domestically, Iran is definitely enigmatic; on the one hand it adheres closely to its 
constitution, with its elaborate system of checks and balances, and its mandate for periodic 
elections, which does allow for changes in government from time to time (Ansari, 2017; 
Freedom House, 2020; Henry, 2018). The most recent election of Hassan Rouhani as 
President of Iran (2013–present) is believed by many to be a move toward a more moderate 
position (Best & Higley, 2018; Blout, 2017; Hussain, 2016; Jones & Newlee, 2020; 
Rahimi, 2015). On the other hand, when Islamic fundamentalist were in charge, under 
Ahmadinejad (2005‒2013), domestic tactics employed by the regime both physically and 
in cyber space were consistently dictatorial, absolute, and draconian.110 
The real power in Iran resides in the office of the Supreme Leader, who is 
simultaneously Commander in Chief of the armed forces and approves the leadership of 
all three branches of government: judiciary, legislative (i.e., the Majlis), and executive 
(Ansari, 2017; Baharan, 2009; Freedom House, 2020; Pollack, 2004). The Supreme 
Leaders possess the authority over who may and may not run for election in the Majlis, the 
executive, and appointments to the judiciary (Ansari, 2017; Freedom House, 2020; Pollack, 
2004; Rahimi, 2016). The Islamic fundamentalists make up the Supreme Leader’s 
 
110 The Islamic fundamentalist believed that very idea of democracy was ill-suited to Iran under its 
present circumstance (Ansari, 2017). Although, many reformist leaders had dabbled with the idea of 
democracy, many of the conservatives (i.e. Islamic fundamentalists) believed that politics itself only 
existed for a chosen few, who had been elected, and thus, were uniquely qualified to rule (Ansari, 2017). 
Setting aside the elected part, many of the former Shahs and autocratic leaders would have found this line 
of thought quite familiar (Ansari, 2017; Best & Higley, 2018; Hussain, 2016; Morozov, 2011). The 
conservatives used this argument as a means to justify the position of the Supreme Leader, their elite 
position in the regime’s power structure, and their need to control the society to shield their population 
from the secular mores and debaucherous culture of the West (Ansari, 2017; Blout, 2017; Golkar, 2011; 
Price, 2012; Rahimi, 2016). 
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powerbase.111  So, while some Iranian Presidents may dabble with reform and flirt with 
the West, on occasion, the regime’s power structure rests on the conservative Islamic 
fundamentalists who underwrite the Supreme Leader and serve as the monolithic and 
immutable basis of this theocratic republic, which in reality operates as a theocratic 
autocracy (Ansari, 2017; Blout, 2017; Freedom House, 2020; Golkar, 2011; Morozov, 
2011; Pollack, 2004; Rahimi, 2016). Thus, as in most autocracies—control of the internet 
and all IT systems remains a priority in the facilitation of societal control (Blout, 2017; 
Freedom House, 2020; Golkar, 2011; Morozov, 2011; Pollack, 2004; Rahimi, 2016).  
In 1998, soon after internet technology arrived in Iran, a large student protest 
showed the regime how the students used their internet connections to organize the protest 
(Golkar, 2011; Jones & Newlee, 2020).112  Several years later, Ayatollah Khamenei, the 
current Supreme Leader of Iran, ordered ISPs to begin filtering internet websites, shortly 
thereafter, the Supreme Council for the Cultural Revolution decreed that all ISPs should 
be brought under state control (Golkar, 2011). This form of state control seems to follow 
the Chinese model of strict regulation coupled with some ownership, ultimately, placing 
the onus and responsibility on the ISPs for policing, removing, and reporting content that 
does not align with regime objectives (Anderson C. , 2013; Aryan, Aryan, & Halderman, 
2013; Deibert, 2015; Golkar, 2011; Gunitsky, 2015; Jones & Newlee, 2020; Morozov, 
2011; Rahbarqazi & Baghban, 2019; Rahimi, 2015). While Iran’s digital panopticon may 
not have achieved the level of sophistication attained by the Chinese, many scholars have 
recorded its effectiveness in societal control. 
 
111 Iran has had two Supreme Leaders Ayatollah Khomeini (1979 – 1989) and Ayatollah Khamenei 
(1989 – present). They both wore the black turban identifying them as Sayyid or lineal descendants of the 
Prophet, designating them as religious elites (Ansari, 2017). Both manifested a certain disdain of western 
democratic system, declaring Iran unfit for such a system of government (Ansari, 2017). Religiously and 
ideologically, both are closely aligned with the Islamic fundamentalists, who permeate the branches of 
government, the ruling councils (i.e., the Guardian Council), and the military of Iran (Ansari, 2017; 
Freedom House, 2020; Iran Development Organization, 2010; Price, 2012; Pollack, 2004). Conservative 
Islamic fundamentalists make up a large portion of the bureaucratic and elite structures of Iran (Price, 
2012). The policy intends to insulate the regime from those Iranians who might be antagonistic of the 
system and attempt to damage it from the inside out (Iran Development Organization, 2010; Price, 2012). 
112 In 1998, the Iranian regime had chosen to shut down a leading reformist newspaper – Salam, 
which was the catalyst for the protest (Jones & Newlee, 2020). 
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The presidency of Ahmadinejad presided over the greatest build out of the digital 
panopticon across Iran enhancing its censorship, propaganda, surveillance, and tracing 
capabilities, second only to China (Rahimi, 2011).113  Over that period, Iran followed 
China’s more deliberate path mirroring its use of censorship and surveillance of the 
population, while falling short in the propaganda arena and sheer scale (MacKinnon, 2011; 
MacKinnon, 2012). Further, following China’s lead, the Iranian regime grasped the 
internet’s ability to trace, track, monitor, and intercept digital communications. This 
enabled the regime to leverage this technological nuance to become the world’s premier 
jailer of journalists and bloggers during the 2009 Green movement protests, coming in 
second behind China in 2010 (MacKinnon, 2012, pp. 54-56). Impressive—considering 
that, Iran’s population is approximately 6% of China (MacKinnon, 2012, pp. 54-56).114  
Further, evidence exists of the use of a time-honored tradition of extrajudicial killings or 
 
113 The Islamic Fundamentalist regime, building off of Joseph Nye’s (2007) Soft Power theory, 
invented the term Soft War to describe and reify the subtle infiltration of Western culture and ideals into 
Iranian civil society, first through television and then subsequently through the internet (Blout, 2017; 
Golkar, 2011; Price, 2012). By consistently using this reified language to describe Iran’s relationship with 
the West and to outline in concrete terms how the West was using media sources to corrode the very 
foundation of their Islamically pure society, the regime has adequately framed its relations with the West 
for its population (Blout, 2017; Golkar, 2011; Price, 2012). Consequently, the conservatives built this Soft 
War narrative to justify their need to defend Islamic ideals against the relentless, decadent attacks 
exogenously emanating from the West. In effect, using the age-old autocratic trick of focusing their citizens 
on some exogenous threat to distract them from the corruption and malfeasance of their own government. 
Finally, the Islamic regime effectively painted the vector of these Soft War attacks as emanating from the 
internet; thereby, justifying their need to physically and technologically control it through censorship and 
surveillance, which consequently provide the means to control the narrative through regime generated 
propaganda.  
Ahmadinejad began the build out of the digital panopticon by first resourcing and leveraging the Basij, 
the paramilitary arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to develop a cyber-capability 
specifically for censoring content, propagating propaganda, and surveilling the population (Blout, 2017; 
Golkar, 2011; Jones & Newlee, 2020; Price, 2012; Rahimi, 2011; Rahimi, 2015). In 2010, Price (2012) 
estimated that annual funding of the Basij arm of the IRGC focused in cyber and the Soft War to be about 
$10M. The Basij membership stood at approximately 4 million strong in 2010 (Golkar, 2011). In that same 
year, they had complete built out the digital panopticon by establishing a presence in over 40,000 districts, 
facilities, offices, organizations, schools, and villages using an exclusive system of internet cafes (Golkar, 
2011). Finally, as of 2009, the IRGC gained a controlling interest in the Iranian Telecommunications 
Company, which manages all ICT hardware and some of the biggest ISPs in Iran – further cementing their 
control (Alfoneh, 2010; Golkar, 2011). This system allows the Iranian autocracy to effectively surveil the 
population, censor internet for any content not favorable to the regime, and ensure that all media narratives 
are laced with Islamic fundamentalist dogma (Blout, 2017; Golkar, 2011; Jones & Newlee, 2020; Price, 
2012; Rahimi, 2011). 
114 As of 2016, Iran’s population was estimated to be 80,043,146; whereas, China’s population was 
estimated to be 1,382,323,332 (80 / 1,382 = .0578 ~ 6%) (Internet Users by Country, 2017).  
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enforcement to effectively extinguishing the voices of those that disagree with the regime 
or its policies (Baharan, 2009; Pollack, 2004). 
Iran uses their national internet internally to simultaneously monitor and cloister its 
population, minimizing access to the outside world, disrupting protest coordination, and 
attempting to control the domestic narrative by relying heavily on a combination of filtering 
and throttling, enabled through the use of deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies 
(Anderson C. , 2013; Aryan, Aryan, & Halderman, 2013; Deibert, 2015; Golkar, 2011; 
Gunitsky, 2015; Jones & Newlee, 2020; Morozov, 2011; Rahbarqazi & Baghban, 2019; 
Rahimi, 2015; Solomon, 2020).115  Essentially, rheostating their netizen’s access to outside 
information, while serving up a daily diet of Islamically pure information that paints the 
regime and its efforts in a positive light through state-owned, regulated, or controlled media 
sources.116   
Further, the Iranian population seems to peer through the propaganda observing the 
true nature of the regime’s intent, which is to maintain societal control by staving off the 
flow any of transgressive information (Anderson, 2013; Aryan, Aryan, & Halderman, 
 
115 Throttling – Adjusting or governing the amount of bandwidth to or from a server. The term is 
often associated with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that limit the speed to users based on the volume or 
type of traffic being transmitted (PC Mag Digital Group, 2020, sec. “throttling”).  
Filtering – A software routine that analyzes incoming data packets and forwards them or discards them 
based on one or more criteria such as address, range of addresses and type (email, file transfer, etc.). Packet 
filtering is generally performed in a router, in which case the router is known as a “screening router” (PC 
Mag Digital Group, 2020, sec. “filtering”). 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) – data travels across the internet in discrete units referred to as packets. 
Each individual packet contains an address and the piece of content (i.e., photos, e-mails, blog texts, videos 
…). DPI interrogates each packet traveling through the internet and can severely decrease the packet transit 
time, which can be used to filter or throttle a specific portion of the internet; further, it can also allow for 
content manipulation (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Anderson C. , 2013; Aryan, Aryan, & Halderman, 2013; 
Deibert, 2015; Jordan S. , 2017; Rahimi, 2011; Zittrain et al., 2017).  
116 Additionally, Iranian ISP broadband services are traditionally curtailed for the average citizen, in 
2010 multiple authors reported that most households were governed to 128 kilobits per second (Kbps), 
which was extremely slow for the time (Aryan, Aryan, & Halderman, 2013; Golkar, 2011; Sreberny & 
Khiabany, 2010). In 2020, Ookla Speed Test clocked Iran’s download speed at 12.13 megabits per second 
(Mbps), which is 89% slower than the U.S. (115.67), 85% slower than China (89.43), and 68% (40.75) 
below the global average (Ookla, 2020; World Population Review, 2020).  
Iran’s download broadband rate rests at 13.12 mbps in the latest 2020 speed test. In comparison with 
other countries, Iran reports in at 32 % (13.12 / 115.67 = 32 %) of the U.S. speed or 68% (1 – .32 = .68 ~ 
68%) slower than the U.S. The same calculations were made, as show, for China and the average. These 
rates depict the download speeds, as this is the common measure used for comparison.  
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2013; Golkar, 2011; Gunitsky, 2015; Jones & Newlee, 2020; Morozov, 2011; Rahbarqazi 
& Baghban, 2019; Rahimi, 2015; Solomon, 2020). Simply, most Iranian citizens question 
the veracity of traditional media sources (Blout, 2017; Golkar, 2011; Rahbarqazi & 
Baghban, 2019; Rahimi, 2011). They view the narratives of their national media as regime 
propaganda, which drives them to seek out other media forums, with some assuming the 
role of citizen journalists uploading to blogs or social media platforms, enabling others to 
comprehend current events inside Iran (Ansari, 2017; Blout, 2017; Golkar, 2011; Rahimi, 
2011; Rahimi, 2015; Rahimi, 2016). Thus, the regime’s censoring or shuttering of any 
opposition media reporting has caused Iranian citizens to fill in the gap and perform the 
function of the idealized fourth estate, leveraging this technologically enabled, discursive 
space—the WWW (Blout, 2017; Golkar, 2011; Rahbarqazi & Baghban, 2019; Rahimi, 
2011; Whitten-Woodring & James, 2012).117  Therefore, while the two-step flow may 
operate and reinforce level-two in domestic politic within Iran, the media narratives 
directed or manipulated by the Iran regime in reference to the U.S. on a given day may not 
provide a good indicator of cyber intrusions on U.S. networks originating from Iran on the 
following day. Simply, the type of narratives described by citizen journalists posting to 
social media may be a better indicator of cyber intrusions, but lie beyond the scope of this 
research.118  Thus, the Iranian citizenry may not be activated by increasing negative tone, 
type, or variation of media narratives directed by the regime toward the U.S. and its interest. 
Further, the Iranian regime’s penchant for control of the internet and its content within their 
physical borders parallels that of Russia, who views their .ru net as their sovereign territory 
similar to that of the air, land, sea, and space domains  (Choucri, 2012; Deibert & 
Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 2015; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 
2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). As such, the current model will be used to test 
the following hypotheses. 
 
117 Fourth Estate – the idealized role of journalism is that it serves as a “watchdog,” keeping 
government honest and watching out for the interests of people (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001, pp. 50-53). 
118 Social Media – forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and 
microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal 
messages, and other content (such as videos) (Webster, 2017, sec. “social media”). 
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Figure 16.  Iran ‒ Case Study Hypotheses 
Thus, the combination of filtering and throttling, enabled by DPI or simply by 
limiting the speed of the internet to households, allows the Iranian regime to rheostats the 
internet speed as needed as a form of societal control. Further, while Iranian citizens may 
be sensitive to increases in NN tone, they may seek media information from sources other 
than regime-controlled mainstream news, which means that applying the current model to 
Iran may not provide results consistent with other autocracies, as hypothesized above. 
Finally, Iran appears to manifest the same level of sophistication in its cyber intrusive 
tactics but seems to employ them to achieve different objectives. These two later points 
were buttressed by the findings in Chapter III, when comparing other regime types to 
autocracies, and will be reviewed in the evidence section to follow. In the following 
section, this research will apply the existing model to Iran and China to test this set of 
hypotheses. 
C. EVIDENCE OF MEDIA EFFECTS IN CYBERSPACE 
At this point, it seems prudent to review where the research left autocracies at the 
end of Chapter III. The research had provided evidence to support H1, H4 and H6 for 
autocracies and enabled the author to conjecture that the two-step process operates and 
Hypothesis #12 (H12): Increases in the number of conflictual (i.e. negative) 
material and verbal interactions reported in Iranian media narratives directed at the 
United States (US) and its interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion 
activity, emanating from Iran, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #13 (H13): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, 
indicating an increased level of media polarization, across media stories originating 
from Iran directed at the U.S. and its interest—yesterday, results in decreased cyber 
intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #14 (H14): Increases in the conflictual or negative tone of interactions 
reported in media narratives from Iran directed at the United States (US) and its 
interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. 
networks—today. 
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reinforces level-two of domestic politics.119  Basically, in autocratic regimes, the elites 
within the power structure digest the daily media narratives and telegraph their 
interpretation to the country’s citizens, causing them to act accordingly. Finally, the NN 
type and polarization of the narrative matter. First, negative material narratives and NN 
polarization increased today; this predicts a corresponding rise in intrusions on U.S. 
networks tomorrow. Second, an increase in the number of negative verbal stories on a given 
day decreases cyber intrusions on U.S. networks on the following day, as shown in Figure 
14 in Chapter III. 
Further, the analysis in Chapter III (Figure 13) allowed for the research to test and, 
ultimately, reject H7 at the autocratic regime level of analysis.120  This analysis showed 
that for those autocrats among the highest level of democracy for autocracies (i.e. –7) and 
those with increasing NN tone described in media events about the US–yesterday 
correlated with a lower level of intrusion attempts on U.S. networks—today. However, 
those autocracies at successively higher level of democracy intruded at a higher rate than 
those at lower levels. Thus, even though the autocratic trend was decreasing at all levels of 
democracy, those autocracies closer to anocracies intruded at a higher rate, a finding 
running opposite to H7 and causing the researcher to reject H7 for autocracies. 
Additionally, this finding coupled with the information provided above concerning China 
and Iran led to the proffering of H10 for China and H13 for Iran in the hopes of gaining a 
deeper understanding of impact of NN tone in these countries. Thus, the analysis to follow 
is expected to show that as the NN media tone rises—today, a declining number of 
 
119 Hypothesis #1 (H1): Increases in the number of conflictual material interactions reported in the 
media narratives of other sovereign states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, 
regardless of regime type, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #4 (H4): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions reported in the media 
narratives of autocratic states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in 
decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #6 (H6): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased level 
of media polarization, across media stories originating from autocratic states directed at the U.S. and its 
interest—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
120 Hypothesis #7 (H7): Increases in the accumulated conflictual or negative tone of interactions 
reported in media narratives from other countries directed towards the United States (U.S.) and its 
interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today, with the effect 
becoming stronger as the level of democracy of the originating country increases. 
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intrusions originating from either of these autocrats should occur—tomorrow, as depicted 
in Figure 13. Since, this polity score is shared by other autocracies (i.e. Cuba, Laos, 
Vietnam, etc.) at –7, the analyst will seek further evidence in the China and Iran evidence 
sections to gather before accepting or rejecting the pertinent hypotheses. 
Further, the autocratic model tracks well with the All-Regimes model in most 
respects with the exception of NN polarization sign that tacks positive, as shown above in 
Figure 14. The expectation is that the Chinese results will parallel with these previous two 
models. Meanwhile, Iranian citizens do not view their mainstream news media as credible. 
As scholars have recorded, they appear to rely upon social media news created by citizen 
journalists, as such, the results for Iran may not prove as reliable as these previous models. 
Thus, the researcher will test the hypotheses proffered beginning with China followed by 
Iran. 
1. Chinese Evidence 
As shown in Table 6, China seems to track quite closely with the All-Regimes and 
autocracies model in most respects. Showing a higher response from negative material, a 
rate nearly four times (~ 3.6) higher than the significantly lessened response to negative 
verbal narratives emanating from China. Also, observe how the NN media polarization 
coefficient tracks in direction with both types of narratives, but at a higher rate of growth 
in intrusions across the variation range in Table 6 and Figure 17. Further, notice each of 
these variables correlates to a high rate of intrusions today from China above that of 
autocracies, as depicted in Figure 18.121  Lastly, note the tight small standard error values 
shown in parenthesis underneath each coefficient. This tightness indicates the extent of 
each coefficient’s variation around its calculated value an indication of model’s robustness 
and goodness of fit. 
 
121 This is a result of the control variables accounted for in the autocracies model, but not in the China 
model. The lines in the figure are calculated holding all other regression coefficients at their mean value. 
Thus, the autocracies model used the mean for population and GDP of all the 19 countries captured in this 
research, while the China model uses China’s population and GDP, which are much higher than the global 
mean values used in the former model. 
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Table 6.   Results of Negative Narratives Models for China and Iran.  
CYBER INTRUSION ATTEMPTS – Today (Autocracy Comparison)              
 Dependent Variable 
 TotalIntrusions ‒ Today 
 Poisson Model 
Independent Variables 
(Yesterday) / Model 
All Negative 
Narrative Autocracies China Iran 
Negative Material Narratives 0.03*** 0.14*** 0.42*** ‒0.12***  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Negative Verbal Narratives ‒0.24*** ‒0.23*** 0.09*** ‒0.22***  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
NN Gold_Mean (Tone) ‒0.003*** ‒0.21*** 0.12*** 0.02***  
(0.001) (0.02) (0.001) (0.001) 
NN Gold_SD ‒0.01*** 0.04*** 0.15*** ‒0.07***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 










Internet Not Free 0.12*** 
   
 
(0.003) 
   
Media Not Free ‒0.21*** 
   
 
(0.003) 
   
Media Self-Censorship 0.08*** 
   
 
(0.003) 
   
Thursday 0.29*** 0.72*** 1.02*** 0.15***  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01) 
Friday 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.58*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) 
Saturday 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.66*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sunday ‒0.32*** ‒0.31*** ‒0.17*** ‒0.27*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01) 
NN Gold_Mean x Polity 0.002*** ‒0.03***   
 (0.0001) (0.003)   
Constant ‒4.49*** ‒13.75*** 3,209.80*** ‒13,296.73*** 
 (0.03) (0.20) (77.65) (104.99) 
Observations 40,608 5,184 288 288 
MAE 36.9 137.1 1,245.2 841.9 
RMSE 581.0 1,309.9 4,466.3 1,905.6 
AIC 2,512,547.6 1,174,295.0 414,419.0 364,709.0 
Log Likelihood ‒1,256,240.8 ‒587,117.5 ‒207,185.5 ‒182,330.5 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Further, note the Goldstein Mean (i.e., NN tone) score, though it cannot be 
compared to the All-Regimes or the autocracies models, because of the use of the 
multiplicative interaction variables in those models, which calculates these coefficients 
combining NN tone with the groupings of countries level of democracy (i.e., Gold_Mean 
x Polity). As such, this would not be a correct comparison (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 
2006). Nevertheless, the magnitude, the degree of variation shown below NN tone, and the 
positive polarity track perfectly with the results of the interaction term for autocracies 
graphically represented in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17.  Negative Narrative Tone Results: China 
The figure groups China with the eight other Autocracies ranking a –7 as their level 
of Democracy, depicted in the green, along the x and z-axis122  Further, the figure depicts 
China’s NN tone effect in the dotted red line. By breaking out China’s NN tone yesterday 
discretely in the figure, one can verify visually that, although the coefficients for the 
 
122 The other Autocracies, as shown in Appendix G, include Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, 
Kuwait, Laos, and Vietnam. 
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negative tone interaction in the autocracies model (‒0.03) and the NN tone in the China 
model (+0.12) track opposite of each other in sign value, the resulting impact on today’s 
intrusions remains the same. Both record a dampening impact on intrusions today, as NN 
tone increases. Further, notice how China’s NN tone range (‒5 to +3.8) is considerably 
tighter than all autocracies (‒10 to +6) providing further evidence of the PRC’s tight control 
of the level-two domestic narrative. Thus, the statistical evidence provided supports the 
acceptance of H11 for China.123  
Further, as shown in Figure 18, both negative material narratives and NN 
polarization track closely in sign direction with the results of the autocracies model, with 
both at a marginal rate twenty-three and thirty-five times, respectively, higher than 
autocracies.124  Yet, the negative verbal narratives comes in at a AME of five times higher 
than autocracies. Notice how the negative material narrative and NN polarization increase 
more rapidly than the autocracies model, while the verbal type increases but at a distinctly 
lower rate than the other two coefficients. Finally, observe the tightness of the color 
shading around each line, indicating the 95% confidence interval around the line predicted. 
Interesting, how the PRC does not drive intrusions into the negative range while 
the negotiations remains verbal. Again, China’s marginal effect across the x-axis shifts in 
sign, remaining positive, and scores five times higher than autocracies sloping upward 
showing an increase of intrusions. Perhaps, this is indicative of the PRC rheostating down 
intrusions from their rather substantial general population activated by elites, social 
movements, or party affiliation, while their state-sponsored hacktivists (i.e., fifty-cent 
 
123 Hypothesis #11 (H11): Increases in the conflictual or negative tone of interactions reported in 
media narratives from China directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in 
decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
124 The same model was used to derive the AME for each country removing all non-fluctuating 
variables (i.e., polity, Internet and Media Not Free, Media self-censorship, internet penetration rate, 
population, and GDP) because their values do not change except for Turkey and the UK in this study. As 
such, the predicted values of NmN, NvN, and NNP are being used holding all of the other variables 
constant at their mean values, while the prediction estimate is derived, very little, if any, change was 
observed as a result of the removal of these control variables, which allows for prediction of the AME in 
this case. Thus, China’s AME in Figure 18 below predicts a marginal intrusion rate of +396.9 for NmN and 
+993.1 for NN polarization, respectively, while autocracies score +16.4 and +28 for the same variables. 
Thus, China’s NmN comes in at [(396.9 – 16.4 / 16.4 = 23.2] twenty-three times that of autocracies, as NN 
polarization clocks in at [(993.1 – 28) / 28 = 34.5 ~ 35] thirty-five times higher. 
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party) remains active. This finding could validate how Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness 
(2018) described China’s presence in cyberspace as consistent and constant. 
 
 
Figure 18.  Media Results Comparison: China. 
Media Variable Prediction Comparison Table: China 
Model or Regime Type /            
Calculated Variable Autocracies China 
Difference from 
Autocracies 
















Average Marginal Effect (AME) 
Negative Material Narrative (NmN) 
Negative Verbal Narrative (NvN) 
Negative Narrative Polarization (NNp) 
Standard Error (SE) 
 
Statistical Significance – p-Level: 
 *p < 0.01; **p < 0.001; ***p < 0.0001 
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Considered comprehensively, this highlights how the PRC ratchets down the NN 
through media messaging to their CCP elites using the two-step process reinforcing the 
level-two narrative, while negotiations remain verbal and the material result has not yet 
been realized. To state in another way, while the negative narrative indicates verbal 
jousting between China and the U.S., the elite message is rheostat down intrusion activity; 
thereby, providing Chinese leadership maximum flexibility in level-one discourse with the 
U.S. Yet, maintaining their ubiquitous presence throughout as an indication of their cyber 
vigilance as a signal to their U.S. rival (Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, pp. 143-170). 
However, once or if a physical or tangible (i.e., material) outcome has been 
realized, the PRC signals their elites using both NN type and variation to return to the 
normal high rate of intrusions. Potentially, employing their colossal state-sponsored cyber 
capabilities through the malicious vector to engage in information seeking behavior 
maintaining careful observation of their global rival—the U.S. Again, this is not meant to 
imply directionality, certainly the narrative could begin with material and digress to verbal, 
as well. 
Further, as the number of negative material or verbal narratives and NN polarization 
increase, notice the amplifying effect on cyber intrusions on U.S. networks the following 
day, shown graphically in Figure 18. In addition, notice China’s tolerance of NN 
polarization scores only 11% less than the group of autocracies. This finding buttresses the 
argument that China tolerates some amount of descent, as shown here in media 
polarization, to hedge against outright collective action or physical protests. These results 
provide ample statistical evidence to support the acceptance of accept H8 and H10 surmise 
that the two-step process operates within and reinforces level-two of domestic politics in 
China.125  Yet, the evidence provided supports rejection of H9 and acceptance of the null, 
because the level of intrusions only decrease in magnitude, but do not decrease as the 
 
125 Hypothesis #8 (H8): Increases in the number of conflictual (i.e., negative) material interactions 
reported in Chinese media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) or its interests—yesterday, results 
in increased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from China, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #10 (H10): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased 
level of media polarization, across media stories originating from China directed at the U.S. and its 
interests—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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number of negative verbal narratives per day increase.126  When viewed in its entirety, this 
evidence suggests an extreme level of societal control enabled by the digital panopticon in 
China as posited by this research. Next, this research turns its focus to Iran. 
2. Iranian Evidence 
As depicted in Table 6, Iran records a coefficient that changes in direction to that 
of China in negative material and verbal narratives and in the opposite direction when 
compared to the autocracies model’s NN polarization coefficient, both of which were 
hypothesized in H12 and H13 respectively,127 indicating that the Iranian regime’s 
extensive use of First-Gen internet controls, such as filtering and throttling as mentioned 
earlier.  
Further, the day of the week coefficients Friday, Saturday, and Sunday score at a 
higher rate than the other models in both positive and negative directions. Perhaps, this is 
because the Iranian workweek spans from Saturday through Wednesday of a given week 
(Anderson & Sadjadpour, 2018, p. 24). Consequently, Thursday’s (i.e. Iran’s Saturday) 
clocks in at a statistically significant coefficient value of +0.15 predicting Friday’s level of 
intrusions. Friday’s (i.e., Iran’s Sunday) coefficient value scores a +0.58 forecasting a 
nearly threefold increase in Saturday’s (i.e., Monday) intrusions. Saturday’s coefficient 
value of +0.66, which only portends of a modest ~ 14% increase in Sunday’s (i.e., Tuesday) 
intrusions. Finally, Sunday predicts a 140% drop in the following day’s intrusions 
originating out of Iran. This appears to mirror Iran’s pattern of life and will be discussed in 
more detail later in the analysis. 
 
126 Hypothesis #9 (H9): Increasingly conflictual (i.e., negative) verbal interactions reported in 
Chinese media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in 
decreased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from China, on U.S. networks—today. 
127 Hypothesis #12 (H12): Increases in the number of conflictual (i.e., negative) material and verbal 
interactions reported in Iranian media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—
yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from Iran, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #13 (H13): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased 
level of media polarization, across media stories originating from Iran directed at the U.S. and its interest—
yesterday, results in decreased in cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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Figure 19.  Negative Narrative Tone Results: Iran 
NN media tone (i.e., Gold_Mean) on a given day and its effect on cyber intrusion 
attempts the next day traces in direction with China, with a tight standard error range. Thus, 
as with the Chinese model, the researcher cannot create an interaction variable because the 
level of democracy for Iran remains constant. Yet, the analyst can compare the coefficient’s 
magnitude, variation, and direction in comparison to the line ascribed to Iran and eight 
other autocracies in Figure 19. As such, one would expect Iran to track closely with the 
others described by the green line in the figure corresponding to a polity score of ‒7.128  
As done in the China analysis above, Iran’s NN tone effect was placed into the Figure 19 
depicted by the dark red dotted line. Figure 19 reveals, as in the China case, that even 
though yesterday’s NN tone coefficient tacks opposite in sign direction to the negative tone 
interaction coefficient used in the All-Regimes and autocracies model today’s intrusions 
decrease in the same manner. Thus, increases in NN tone in stories emanating from Iran, 
corresponds to a decrease of intrusions on U.S. networks the following day. Further, 
consider the NN tone range (‒10 to +4) employed by Iran in its rhetoric toward the U.S., 
 
128 The other Autocracies, as shown in Appendix G, include Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Cuba, 
Eritrea, Kuwait, Laos, and Vietnam. 
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which stands as considerably less constrained than China at ‒5 to +3.8 as shown in Figure 
17. Thus, revealing that the regime does not appear concerned about the impact of 
yesterday’s rhetoric inciting Iranian hackers to intrude on U.S. networks today, perhaps 
due to their tight control of their indigenous cyberspace through the use of generational 
content controls. This evidence supports the acceptance of H14 for Iran at present, 
following the same methodology for acceptance of H11 used in the Chinese case.129 
Now to return to the negative material and verbal narratives and NN polarization 
coefficients. Unlike any of the models, thus far, both the negative narrative material and 
verbal variables score as negatively correlated to cyber intrusion attempts the day 
following. Thus, intrusions drop considerably faster in response to verbal narratives than 
in response to material narratives, when comparing difference in forecasted intrusions 
across the count range in Figure 20. Further, the NN media polarization coefficient tracks 
negatively as well. When taken together coefficients seem to indicate what some scholars 
have pointed out about Iran (Blout, 2017; Golkar, 2011; Rahbarqazi & Baghban, 2019; 
Rahimi, 2011; Whitten-Woodring & James, 2012).  
First, in general, their population does not rely on the mainstream media sources 
for their news. The average Iranian seem to turn to the social media citizen journalist for 
their news. As such, since these coefficients are derived from mainstream news media 
events, the research model may not be exposed to the right data necessary to provide 






129 Hypothesis #14 (H14): Increases in the conflictual or negative tone of interactions reported in 
media narratives from Iran directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in 
decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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Figure 20.  Media Results Comparison: Iran. 
Media Variable Prediction Comparison Table: Iran 
Model or Regime Type /            
Calculated Variable Autocracies Iran 
Difference from 
Autocracies 
















Average Marginal Effect (AME) 
Negative Material Narrative (NmN) 
Negative Verbal Narrative (NvN) 
Negative Narrative Polarization (NNp) 
Standard Error (SE) 
 
Statistical Significance – p-Level: 
 *p < 0.01; **p < 0.001; ***p < 0.0001 
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Secondly, notice how negative material narratives score an AME value of 
intrusions five times lower than autocracies and verbal narratives clock a negative AME 
seven times more negative.130  This, for Iran, may be indicative of the IRI’s extensive use 
of their favorite First-Gen censoring technology to throttle and filter content, particularly 
considering the magnitude of the effect of negative verbal narratives, which have a greater 
negative effect on intrusions than material ones as the number of conflictual narratives for 
a given day increase, as shown in Figure 20. Notice how the long-dashed red line drops 
drastically from left to right but not as rapidly as the dotted dark green line depicting the 
negative verbal narratives, as discussed earlier. Additionally, note how the NN 
polarization, the violet line, drops from left to right—at an AME rate of ten times less than 
autocracies.131 
Perhaps, this is a result of the regime leveraging throttling and filtering 
technologies, as each of yesterday’s NN variables record a coefficient dampening effect on 
today’s intrusions with material coming in at 46% less than verbal. This small change may 
signify the regime’s attempt to slow the population’s realization of the physical or tangible 
consequences reported in negative material narratives they will ultimately have to endure. 
Whereas, at level-one, the Iranian regime increases its use of throttling and filtering during 
negative verbal jostling with the U.S., to provide their leadership with room to negotiate. 
Both allow the regime maximum flexibility in negotiations at level-one and enable the 
domestic control of the narrative via the two-step flow at level-two.  
Further, since neither the freedom of the media nor of the internet exist in Iran, the 
statistical significance of these three coefficients may be more indicative of the fact that 
the regime can and does exercise consistent, documented control over both the dependent 
and independent variables in this regression equation. As such, this detail may enjoy a 
 
130 Using the table in Figure 20, NmN clocks in at a AME five times less [16.4 – (-71.1) / 16.4 = 5.3 ~ 
5] and NvN scores an AME seven times less [-14.9 – (-121.2) / -14.9 = 7.1 ~ 7] than autocracies, 
respectively. 
131 As shown in the same table, the predicted average marginal effect (AME) on intrusions today 
based on yesterday’s NN Polarization emanating from autocracies scores a 28, while Iran’s predicted AME 
on intrusions drops by a -242.2. Thus, Iran’s AME falls ten times faster [(28 – (-242.2)) / 28 = 9.65 ~ 10] 
than autocracies over the same range. 
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greater impact on the data used in the model than the Iranian citizen’s choice of reliable 
media narratives. Nevertheless, the later argument may also contribute to these findings, 
but the magnitude of the contribution remains difficult to quantify, without exposing the 
model to data beyond the scope of this study. 
Finally, turning to the day of the week coefficients. Friday is the Islamic holy day 
of the week, equivalent to Sunday in western cultures, the coefficient records a rate three 
times higher than Thursday, Islamic Saturday, followed by a modest 12% increase of 
intrusions on Saturday, or Islamic Monday. Perhaps, this is symbolic of the Islamic faithful, 
ginned up by the normal fiery rhetoric dispensed by Islamic fundamentalist imams (i.e., 
religious elites) at Friday prayer toward the U.S. and the West, leading them to seek to 
intrude upon U.S. networks at a significantly higher rate on Saturday and Sunday—the 
equivalent of western Monday and Tuesday. Ultimately, this spat of cyber intrusion activity 
exhausts itself in a 140% drop of intrusion attempts on Monday (i.e., Islamic Wednesday), 
as indicated by the ‒0.27 recorded for the Sunday day of the week coefficient. Interesting 
that the model appears to capture this aspect of Iran’s pattern of life.  
Thus, considering the entirety of the information provided by this model and by 
scholars who have studied Iran extensively, provides sufficient evidence to support H12 
and H13, rejecting the null hypothesis in each case.132  Further, this model provides 
evidence that the Iranian regime controls the internet and the media content quite 
extensively. Upon review of this Chapter, various clues pointed to this finding, which arose 
earlier in the discussion. 
D. CONCLUSION 
First, consider how the conflictual material and verbal narratives and NN 
polarization yesterday correlated negatively with today’s cyber intrusions on U.S. networks 
 
132 Hypothesis #12 (H12): Increases in the number of conflictual (i.e., negative) material and verbal 
interactions reported in Iranian media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—
yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from Iran, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #13 (H13): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased 
level of media polarization, across media stories originating from Iran directed at the U.S. and its interest—
yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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in the Iran model. Within the China discussion, it was pointed out that the PRC wields its 
censorship arsenal against any narratives that incites collective action, dissent, or protests, 
but allows for some criticism of state and local officials (Custer, Prakash, Solis, Knight, & 
Lin, 2019; Greitens, 2013; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; Lindsay, 2014; Richet, 2013; Wang 
& Minzner, 2015). While Iran seems to view narratives encouraging any dissent as 
equivalent to narratives criticizing the regime, particularly censoring any chronicles using 
disparaging language in reference to the Supreme Leader, as a crime punishable by death 
(Ansari, 2017; Baharan, 2009; Blout, 2017; Freedom House, 2020; Golkar, 2011; Hussain, 
2016; Jones & Newlee, 2020; Morozov, 2011; Rahbarqazi & Baghban, 2019; Rahimi, 
2016). 
The Iran model bears this out showing a negative correlation for the negative 
material and verbal narratives and NN polarization, revealing the IRI’s extensive use of 
throttling and filtering to slow internet access and speeds—one facet of their intent to 
control the narrative. Further, as the regime’s NN tone increases toward the west the use 
of throttling and filtering appears to apply here as well. These only serve as indicators of 
the IRI’s determination to control the narratives and their population actions on-line, 
leaving little room for any type of message running contrary to that approved by the regime. 
Only in the dichotomous control variable capturing Friday’s narrative can the impact of the 
NNs produced by Iranian Imams be gauged. Perhaps, a nuance unique to this culture or 
merely a by-product of the fiery rhetoric heaped on the population by the religious elites. 
Finally, both the China and Iran models scored a consistently positive correlation in their 
NN tone coefficients resulting in a dampening of intrusions the following day, as the 
narratives became progressively conflictual. 
Multiple scholars have noted that the Iranian population relies more heavily on 
citizen journalists then the mainstream (i.e., state run) media. Thus, for Iran, a better 
explanatory variable might be negative Twitter or, the Russia-owned, Telegram social 
media activity on a given day and its influence over cyber intrusion attempts the following 
day. Perhaps, this could be the focus of some future research in this arena. For these 
reasons, the Iran coefficients for negative material narratives and NN polarization provide 
results that differ from the autocracies and China models. Negative verbal narratives track 
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consistent with autocracies but shift opposite in sign to China, whereas the China model 
tracks quite closely in most respects with the autocracies model, except for negative verbal 
narratives, as shown in Figure 18 and Appendix I. 
Yet, when reviewing their use of the internet externally, Iran and China manifest 
different objectives. Iran’s focus remains on its regional rivals and keeping them in check 
using the level of sophistication necessary to manage its global rivalry in order of priority, 
gaining access through the use of the malicious vector chiefly to achieve a subversive intent 
or a secondary objective of seeking information. Whereas, China leverages the malicious 
vector as a means of intruding to achieve an information seeking objective 79% of the time. 
Preferring mass over complexity in its intrusion tactics, China’s focus seems intent on 
keeping tabs on the U.S. and other regional rivals, intent upon monitoring or stealing their 
information and secrets  (Valeriano & Maness, 2015). Further, China leverages their sheer 
mass of numbers to achieve its cyber objectives as manifested by its use of low level risk 
intrusions in Appendix J, which stands in sharp contrast to Iran that uses whatever cyber 
intrusion technique necessary for them to achieve their goal.  
Both effectively rheostat the narrative and their population’s use of the internet to 
anticipate and manage intrusions on U.S. networks on the day following the media event. 
Both regimes use the internet to achieve their greater aspirations, goals, and objectives in 
cyberspace. In different ways, both regimes use the internet, using their incumbent 
generational content controls, to animate the digital panopticon enabling this repressive 
technology to censor, propagandize, surveil, and trace their populations. This domain 
technology is properly controlled and tailored by both China and Iran to gain, maintain, 
and sustain their stylized autocratic ambitions. 
Next this research will delve into the hybrid, anocracy regime type. The following 
case study will focus on Russia and Turkey. The intent is to explore how anocracies use 
the media and cyberspace to control their domestic and international narratives, to 
influence their rivals, and to control their respective societies. 
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V. CASE STUDIES: ANOCRACIES IN CYBERSPACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will cover anocracies, also known as hybrid, partly free, mixed or semi 
democracies (Colomer, Banerjea, & Mello, 2016; Freedom House, 2017; Marshall & 
Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). They occupy the regime-type middle ground between 
democracies and autocracies displaying some democratic leanings, while leveraging some 
autocratic governance structures and processes. This case study will cover two countries 
that the U.S. comes in frequent and continuous contact with on both regional and 
international issues—Russia and Turkey. The former a long-term, locked-in rival of the 
U.S. The later, an ally of the U.S. over the past century. Appendix D contains the complete 
list of countries categorized as anocracies, in accordance with the Polity IV classification 
and framework (Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). 
First, the chapter will open with a review of how anocracies operate in and utilize 
cyberspace both domestically and internationally. Second, the case study will cover the 
unique aspects of Russia and Turkey’s use of cyberspace, surveying the impact of that use 
on their civil society’s debates and operation. Each of these sections will culminate with a 
set of hypotheses covering how their separate negative narrative types (either material or 
verbal), tones, and polarizations about the U.S. or its interests, on any given day, will affect 
cyber intrusion attempts on U.S. networks the next day. Ultimately, the existing research 
model will be applied to Russia and Turkey to validate or invalidate the conjectured 
hypotheses. Finally, the chapter will culminate with a discussion covering the differences 
and similarities in how these two anocracies use cyberspace to maneuver in internationally 
or wield domestically to either control or manage the day’s narrative judging from its 
impact on the following day’s cyber intrusion attempts. The chapter will be laid out as 
described below. 
B. ANOCRACY RIDING THE THIRD WAVE 
Anocracies occupy this awkward position in the middle between democracies and 
autocracies. These states combine elements of autocracies and democracies into an often-
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incoherent mix of governance structures affording their citizens varying degrees of 
individual rights, civil liberties, and political access (Marshall & Cole, 2014). For some of 
these countries, this regime type allows time for transition from autocracy to democracy or 
vice versa, while others linger in the anocratic realm  (Marshall & Cole, 2014; Marshall & 
Elzinga-Marshall, 2017).  
Those who tarry as an anocracy do so, perhaps, as a hedge against the Dictator’s 
Dilemma or as a means to buy time to embark on a slower rate of governmental change, 
while avoiding the chaos that would result from a drastic regime shift. Some of these 
anocratic states employ various autocratic methods to control the media narrative both 
domestic and international to buy time needed for transition to another form of government 
(Marshall & Cole, 2014; Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). While others realize that, 
because of their country’s culture and history, their citizens simply do not have the capacity 
to immediately affect such a radical change from one type to the other. The realization that 
led to this decision normally occurs within the generational, ruling elite power structure, 
which often leads to anocratic stasis (Best & Higley, 2018; Colomer, Banerjea, & Mello, 
2016; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018). 
Anocracy describes the governance structures of states that include Russia, Turkey, 
Thailand, Egypt, Sudan, and Venezuela (Marshall & Cole, 2014; Marshall & Elzinga-
Marshall, 2017). Many anocracies follow the autocratic practice of developing their own 
internet, engineering in the control of information, vis-à-vis the narrative, within the state’s 
boundaries (Akgül & Kırlıdoğ, 2015; Ron Deibert, 2015; Diamond, 2010; Gebhart & 
Kohno, 2017; Greitens, 2013; Mackinnon, 2012; Rød & Weidmann, 2015; Ruijgrok, 2017; 
Sinpeng, 2013). Some anocrats, like the autocrats, seem set on creating a digital panopticon 
by layering government and non-governmental structures intent upon censorship, control, 
and surveillance of their population (Hussain, 2016). For example, Thailand chooses to 
place layers of government and co-opted private groups to assist in monitoring their 
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citizen’s internet activity, similar to the Chinese model, seeking to discover any derisive 
content about their long-standing monarch.133 
Since the 1990s, Thailand has vacillated between democracy and anocracy two 
consecutive times in as many decades (Marshall & Cole, 2014; Marshall & Elzinga-
Marshall, 2017). The most recent transitions coincided with several government collapses 
ending in the coups d’états of September 2006 and May 2014 (Gebhart, Anonymous, & 
Kohno, 2017; Pinkaew, 2016; Sinpeng, 2013).134  It will be interesting to see if Thailand 
can find its way back to democracy while a significant part of their populace censors and 
surveils the anti-monarchist portion of their civil society. As of 2017, Thailand continues 
to linger on as an anocracy (Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). 
 
133 Similar to many of the autocracies, Thailand has created a cyber-militia of sorts named cyber 
scouts program (Pinkaew, 2016, p. 204; Sinpeng, 2013, pp. 432-433). The King’s patronage makes the 
organization possible recruited in their youth to serve, many are ultra-royalists, who police and report 
content viewed as being transgressive or anti-royalist. The Cyber Scouts, comprised of pro-royalist groups 
such as the Garbage Collecting Organization, the Seri Thai Movement, the Thai Netizen Network, and the 
People’s Alliance for Democracy, along with other government-sponsored groups buttress the Thai 
government’s surveillance apparatus  (Pinkaew, 2016, p. 204; Sinpeng, 2013, pp. 432-433). The Cyber 
Scouts police internet sites reporting, publicly shaming, or intimidating those who make statements against 
the monarch (Pinkaew, 2016, p. 205). The lineage of these organizations tracks back to similar elements 
and tactics used to effectively, ferret out insurgent communist groups operating in Thailand during the Cold 
War (Pinkaew, 2016, p. 205; Sinpeng, 2013). Essentially, the Thai government repurposed this Cold War 
era apparatus to meet their growing need for societal censorship and surveillance (Pinkaew, 2016; Sinpeng, 
2013).  
As a result, the military backed government enacted the Computer-Related Crime Act (2007) (CCA) 
(Sinpeng, 2013). This act provided the government with very broad legal power to prosecute cybercrimes 
(Sinpeng, 2013). As the government, transitioned back to a tract toward democracy the CCA remained in 
place, potentially as a hedge against future societal disorder. Certainly, the CCA proved its usefulness in 
and after the 2014 unrest (Sinpeng, 2013). Subsequently, due to the use of broad and vague language in the 
CCA, the use of censorship and surveillance became a common government tactic in cyberspace (Gebhart, 
Anonymous, & Kohno, 2017; Pinkaew, 2016; Sinpeng, 2013). In addition, the CCA effectively 
criminalizes the concealment of an individual’s IP address – one of the less vague authorities granted by the 
act (Gebhart, Anonymous, & Kohno, 2017). Even autocratic regimes such as China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
and Vietnam do not resort to such measures to institute internet censorship (Gebhart, Anonymous, & 
Kohno, 2017, p. 418).  
134 Each transition was precipitated by unstable societal conditions inextricably tied to polarized 
political discourse in the media and cyberspace concerning the King, royal family of Thailand, and the lèse 
majesté laws (Gebhart, Anonymous, & Kohno, 2017; Pinkaew, 2016; Sinpeng, 2013). In both cases, the 
polarized political discourse involved dueling narratives, one supporting the constitutional monarch and the 
other supporting the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, deposed in the 2006 coup, his followers 
support a more democratic form of government. Article 112 of the Thai Penal Code prohibits any insults or 
defamation of the King or any Thai Royal in acts, speech, or writing, commonly referred to as lèse majesté  
(Gebhart, Anonymous, & Kohno, 2017; Pinkaew, 2016; Sinpeng, 2013). 
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On the other end of the spectrum resided the state of Tunisia. After 24 years as an 
anocracy, in the throes of the January 2011 Arab Spring and immediately following the 
departure of their despotic President, the Tunisian transitional government sought to 
quickly gain control of the situation and buy time to figure out how to meet the demands 
of the population and ultimately transition to democracy (Chakchouk, Kehl, Ben-Avie, & 
Coyer, 2013; Freedom House, 2017; Hinnebusch, 2015; Marshall & Cole, 2014; Marshall 
& Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). Amongst the foremost challenges, the fledgling regime 
inherited a pervasive internet construct with censorship and surveillance engineered into 
every aspect of access to monitor content and push their pro-government narrative 
(Chakchouk, Kehl, Ben-Avie, & Coyer, 2013; Hinnebusch, 2015; Ruijgrok, 2017). 
Nevertheless, Tunisia became a democracy in 2013 moving towards an open media 
environment and internet freedoms (Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017; Polity IV, 
2018).135   
This leads the discussion to Russia, which seems stuck, perhaps intentionally, in 
anocratic stasis. Within this category, Russia is the most active in cyberspace (Valeriano 
& Maness, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). 
Turkey’s interaction in this arena seems focused on gaining control of their domestic 
internet. Both Russia and Turkey have frequent and ongoing contact with the U.S. across 
all domains and each wields the instruments of national power in uniquely different ways. 
Russia is a locked in, longtime rival of the U.S., who remains quite active in cyberspace  
(Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 
2018). Turkey, seemingly friendly toward the U.S., a NATO partner, and a once secular 
democracy, appears to be drifting towards autocratic, Islamic fundamentalism and at 
present appears to focus its resources in cyberspace internally. (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015). 
Of the two, Russia’s level of sophistication reflects the sheer breadth of their internal digital 
panopticon built intentionally to control the domestic narrative through censorship, 
propaganda, and surveillance, while influencing the international narrative. The Russian 
 
135 Tunisia’s strong civil society made this possible by working diligently to strike a polyarchic 
balance, conscientiously seeking compromises with Islamic groups to assuage their religious concerns 
(Hinnebusch, 2015, p. 359).  
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digital panopticon remains unparalleled and even superior, in some aspects, to that of China 
(Akgül & Kırlıdoğ, 2015; Asmolov, 2016; Baarda, 2017; Duffy, 2015; Freedom House, 
2020; Gabdulhakov, 2020; Marcellino et al., 2020; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018; Paul 
& Matthews, 2017; Snegovaya, 2015; Strovsky, 2015; Zhukov & Baum, 2016). 
1. Russia in the Third Wave 
Russia stands as the most threatening anocracy in the international realm of 
cyberspace, largely due to its capabilities and presence in cyberspace, as discussed earlier 
(Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 
2018). Russia appears to be following the monarchist—anocratic model—attempting to 
stabilize as an anocracy accruing the economic benefits of a democracy while maintaining 
the control, censorship, and surveillance characteristics of an autocracy, as a hedge against 
the Dictator’s dilemma (Freedom House, 2017; Gunitsky, 2015; Hussain M. M., 2016; 
MacKinnon, 2012; Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017; Morozov, 2011; Zittrain, et al., 
2017). In effect, a populist monarch has ruled Russia since 2007, indulging in what 
MacKinnon termed as Digital Bonapartism (MacKinnon, 2012; Marshall & Elzinga-
Marshall, 2017).136   
Vladimir Putin, backed by the Duma, various government ministries and loyal elite 
oligarchs, has essentially locked down all digital media, networks, and platforms inside 
Russia with the intent of controlling the ongoing narrative, ultimately, to ensure public 
opinion remains positively disposed toward the regime (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Baarda, 
2017; Duffy, 2015; Freedom House, 2020; Gabdulhakov, 2020; Marcellino, Marcinek, 
Pezard, & Matthews, 2020; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018; Snegovaya, 2015).137  
Vaulting over first-generation media content controls to focus its efforts on second and 
 
136 Digital Bonapartism – essentially a populist demagogue, who uses democratic oratory and 
symbolism to legitimize their rule and political leadership through the manipulation of public opinion by 
controlling digital media, networks, or platforms (MacKinnon, 2012, pp.66-67). 
137 A 2018 survey of Russian citizens queried those who knew that their personal correspondence sent 
via on-line services (i.e. Telegram, e-mails, etc.) could be monitored by law enforcement officials, nearly 
59% stated that this was done to combat crime or terrorism (Levada Center, 2019, p. 114). Only, 11% 
stated that this was done as a means of censorship or to limit freedom (Levada Center, 2019, p. 114). Both 
of which are testament to the effectiveness of Russian domestic propaganda. 
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third-generation domestically and to use the Fourth-gen to gain traction internationally 
(Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert R. , 2015). Consequently, the regime leverages its 
monopoly on media outlets (i.e., Channel One, NTV, RT, or Sputnik) and the absolute 
control of the internet via the .ru domain to push that narrative both inside and outside their 
physical borders (Freedom House, 2017; Gabdulhakov, 2020; MacKinnon, 2012; 
Marcellino, Marcinek, Pezard, & Matthews, 2020; Morozov, 2011; Nocetti, 2015; 
Ognyanova, 2018; Paul & Matthews, 2017; Snegovaya, 2015). Indeed, it appears that 
nearly 90% of Russian citizens consume media from these sources, with RT being the 
most-watched news source on the internet (Freedom House, 2020; Levada Center, 2019; 
Ognyanova, 2018; Paul & Matthews, 2017; Snegovaya, 2015). In addition, the regime uses 
the internet’s efficient surveillance capability to monitor, to trace, and, if necessary, to 
physically target individuals through judicial or extra-judicial arrest, assault, or 
intimidation to quash their dissenting opinions (Freedom House, 2020; Gabdulhakov, 
2020; MacKinnon, 2012; Maréchal, 2017; Morozov, 2011; Strovsky, 2015). Certainly, 
Russia’s appetite to use intimidation tactics, along with the time honored censorship, 
propaganda, and surveillance, to control its population appears more effective, expansive, 
and pervasive than in other anocracies.138  To this point, the Duma has enacted laws, 
similar to Iran, which prohibit criticism of senior political figures (i.e., the president, the 
prime minister, or the cabinet of ministers) (Gabdulhakov, 2020; Hussain, 2016; Maréchal, 
2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018). While this may seem quite draconian on its face, 
if one considers Russia’s history, specifically the leadership of czars, one first secretary, 
several general secretaries, and now a mixture of seemingly democratic titles, who appear 
bent on regaining the status of their formers, it does fit quite nicely (Best & Higley, 2018; 
 
138 Indeed, Russia’s system of judicial and extra-judicial intimidation by far surpasses all anocracies 
and most autocracies (Freedom House, 2020; Gabdulhakov, 2020; MacKinnon, 2012; Maréchal, 2017; 
Morozov, 2011; Nocetti, 2015). Gabdulhakov (2020) describes the Russian system as rhizomatic using a 
botanical comparison of a mass of plant life that appears on the surface to be multiple distinct plants; yet, 
beneath the surface exists a network of roots connecting the plants together as one, not the many discrete 
set of plants one might observe from the surface. This metaphor describes the Russian digital panopticon 
surveilling and tracing their population using a conjoining labyrinth of civil servants, citizen vigilantes, and 
state police enabled by information technology undergirded by an intentionally vague legal system, which 
enables the total control of civil society and the domestic narrative (Asmolov, 2016; Baarba 2017, Baum & 
Zhukov, 2015; Freedom House, 2017, 2020; Gabdulhakov, 2020; Mackinnon, 2012; Marcellino et al., 
2020; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018; Paul & Matthews, 2017; Romanyuk, 2011; 
Snegovaya, 2015; Strovsky, 2015; Zhukov & Baum, 2016).  
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Colomer, Banerjea, & Mello, 2016; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018). 
Nevertheless, their control over the narrative, the media, and the internet remains absolute, 
effective, and panoptic (Asmolov, 2016; Baarda, 2017; Duffy, 2015; Freedom House, 
2020; Gabdulhakov, 2020; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018; Paul & Matthews, 2017; 
Snegovaya, 2015; Zhukov & Baum, 2016). 
Russia’s swift employment of second and third-generatoin content controls appear 
to be the result of three near simultaneous events occurring on the global stage with distinct 
cyber overtones: the Arab Spring (2011); the Russian Presidential and Parliamentary 
elections (2012), which led to mass protests in their largest cities; and the leaking of 
classified National Security Agency (NSA) files describing U.S. surveillance practices of 
foreign governments (2013) (Akgül & Kırlıdoğ, 2015; Asmolov, 2016; Duffy, 2015; 
Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018).139  Although all of the pieces had been 
in place prior to 2011, the domino effect of those events brought the specter of a digitally 
enabled panopticon in Russia to the fore. The Russian people, wishing to avoid any legal 
or extra-legal entanglements, engage in what has been widely recorded as self-censorship 
because of the omnipresent gaze of the digital panopticon existing within the .ru domain 
(Asmolov, 2016; Baarda, 2017; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Gabdulhakov, 2020; Galič, 
Timan, & Koops, 2017; Manokha, 2018; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 
2018; Zhukov & Baum, 2016). Thus, creating the embodiment of Foucault’s prediction in 
modern day Russia (Asmolov, 2016; Bentham, 2012; Foucault, 1977; Gabdulhakov, 2020; 
Galič et al., 2017; Loadenthal, 2018; Mackinnon, 2012; Morozov 2012; Manokha, 2018).  
In international affairs, like Iran, Russia displays a similar quasi-phobic distrust 
toward the U.S. and western democracies. However, its phobia exists for different reasons. 
Russian leadership views the internet as a domain similar to air, land, sea, and space, a 
domain where the state must control, maintain, and secure all aspects of it, as a means of 
maintaining Russian sovereignty (Choucri, 2012; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 
 
139 A month before the 2012 Presidential Election, Putin declared “the Internet doesn't deserve any 
real attention, and it's the place where pornography dominates” (Duffy, 2015; Northam, 2012). Then just 
over two years later in 2014, Putin declared the internet “special project of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA)” (Duffy, 2015; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018) 
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2015; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & 
Maness, 2018). This domain is where the terms information security and information space 
possess important philosophical and political meanings for the Russian state—itself 
(Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Jaitner & Mattsson, 2015; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; 
Ognyanova, 2018). This domain is where state sovereignty, as set forth in the Treaty of 
Westphalia, must be respected (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Duffy, 2015; Maréchal, 2017; 
Nocetti, 2015). This domain is where the U.S., throughout the Post-Soviet era, has 
demonstrated a pervasive, seemingly inexorable expansion into Russian spheres of 
influence and control, thereby, trampling upon their state sovereignty and threatening their 
national security (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Duffy, 2015; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 
2015; Ognyanova, 2018; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). 
Consequently, on the international stage, Russia ranks highest amongst the 
anocracies that engage in rivalrous cyber dispute activity between 2000‒2014 (Valeriano 
& Maness, 2015). Within the Russian anocracy, the line between the intelligence services 
and cyber criminals remains blurred; some scholars describe the relationship as historically 
symbiotic (Kello, 2013; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). This trait gains currency 
when scholars empirically review Russian cyber tactics. Inherently, Russian initiated cyber 
incidents use the malicious intent vector to achieve a primarily subversive objective (~ 
56%) while secondarily seeking other pertinent information about the target state (~ 44%) 
(Snegovaya, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, pp. 110-142).140  The Russians 
tend to definitively use these cyber tactics in an attempt to intimidate or coerce its former 
satellites into aligning with their national security objectives as in Estonia (2007), Georgia 
(2008), Lithuania (2009), and Ukraine (2014) (Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011; Gartzke, 2013; 
Jaitner & Mattsson, 2015; Lindsay J. , 2015; Nye J. S., 2017; Snegovaya, 2015; Valeriano, 
Jensen, & Maness, 2018). Regardless of their subversive intent bent on coercion, they have 
yet to succeed in coercing any of the states targeted (Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, 
p. 118). Essentially, Russia uses its cyber abilities, often wielded by patriotic hacktivists, 
 
140 Malicious intent calculation equates to 32 out of 45 incidents equating to 0.711 or approximately 
71% (Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, p. 120). Subversive intent and Information seeking intent 
calculations equate to 25 out of 45 incidents equaling 0.555 (~ 56%) and 20 out of 45 incidents equaling 
0.444 (~ 44%), respectively (Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, p. 119). 
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to advance a very specific narrative designed to create bedlam and undermine public 
confidence in the targeted countries governance structures  (Calamur, 2017; Farwell & 
Rohozinski, 2011; Gartzke, 2013; Jaitner & Mattsson, 2015; Kello, 2013; Nye J. S., 2017; 
Thornton & Miron, 2019). 
Largely, Russia or its proxies use several Soviet era operational concepts namely 
active measures and reflexive control in tandem to an attempt to coerce, influence, or 
compel another state to yield. Active measures describes the use of an array of operant 
covert and overt psychological methods intent on influencing the opinion-making process 
of an adversary (Metzl, 1974, p. 921; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, pp. 113-115).141  
Active measures operate through the disruption or manipulation of information. The 
manipulation occurs by creating and then grafting a competing narrative onto existing 
media events to bend the message into a theme that achieves Russia’s purpose (Inkster, 
2016; Snegovaya, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018).  
Reflexive control, while similar to perception management in the West, focuses on 
control of the subject, in this case public opinion of a state or the civil society within a 
target country (Thomas, 2004, p. 237). Reflexive control explains the use of specifically 
tailored information that would influence a rival to voluntarily make the pre-determined 
decision framed and preferred by the preparer or originator (a.k.a. the opposing state in 
dyad) (Thomas, 2004, pp. 237-238; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, pp. 113-114). 
Ostensibly, the Russians attempt to use active measures through their crafted narrative to 
achieve reflexive control of their target using their cyber capabilities. Domestically, these 
tactics appear to have had a dramatic effect. On the international stage these stratagems 
have caused and continue to cause much consternation throughout the world; yet, any 
exploration of this lies beyond the scope of this research. Finally, Russia’s ability to 
 
141 Active measures – describes the employment of an array of operationally covert and overt 
psychological methods intent on polluting and subverting the opinion-making process of an adversary 
(Inkster, 2016, pp. 28-29; Metzl, 1974, p. 921; Snegovaya, 2015, pp. 14-15; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 
2018, pp. 114-115). 
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compel, influence, or coerce an adversary or target country remains suspect (Valeriano, 
Jensen, & Maness, 2018, pp. 110–142).142 
Hence, it appears that the Russian state has locked its citizens behind a digital Iron 
Curtain (Gabdulhakov, 2020, pp. 4-5). Beyond the brief opportunity between the fall of the 
Soviet Union (~ 1991) and Vladimir Putin’s assumption of the Presidency (~ 1999), 
Russian media remains under the strict control of the state (Asmolov, 2016; Baarda, 2017; 
Buckley, 2004; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Ognyanova, 2018; Strovsky, 2015). 
Further, the internet prior to the events of 2011–2013 remained relatively open and 
uncontested (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010, Duffy, 2015; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; 
Ognyanova, 2018). However, the combined effects of the Arab Spring (2011), the social 
unrest caused by the presidential and parliamentary elections (2012), and the Snowden 
affair (2013) became the catalyst for the drastic increase in censorship (often self-
censorship), surveillance, and propaganda of the internet within Russia.143  As such, both 
the media and the internet are controlled and monitored quite extensively; thus, both sides 
of the equation that forms the model in this research may be affected. Therefore, based on 
this and other information contained in this section, these hypotheses (i.e., H15, H16, and 
H17) are provided. 
 
142 Yet, the evidence surrounding the U.S. Election of 2016 remains firm. Some have conjectured that 
Russian agents armed with their bots and trolls, spending between $150,000 and $247,000 on fake 
Facebook and Twitter accounts, swayed 62.9M American citizens to vote for the 45th President (Lazer et 
al., 2018; Maréchal, 2017; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). It seems difficult to make such an 
assumption or conjecture—particularly if one adheres to the scientific method. Yet, scholarship and science 
appear simply carried away by their sheer disdain for an Executive who is entirely different from past 
Presidents (Lazer et al., 2018; Maréchal, 2017; Valeriano, Maness, & Jensen, 2017). Perhaps, scholarship 
and science should focus on what they do best—scholarship and science—and refrain from analysis based 
on the cacophony of emotional opinions.  
143 Recent research conducted on Democracies shows that in those states where confidence in 
traditional media sources is low—substitutes emerge and where censorship of offline media is high the 




Figure 21.  Russia ‒ Case Study Hypotheses 
2. Turkey in the Third Wave 
Turkey, after an unbroken 28 years as a secular democracy, began to transition in 
2014 from an open to a closed anocracy, ultimately becoming one in 2016 (Freedom 
House, 2017; Marshall & Cole, 2014; Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). This in effect 
closed anocracy displays some sectarian leanings and employs methods of censorship and 
surveillance very similar to those seen in autocracies. Turkey intends to design and develop 
a domestic version of the Google search engine and e-mail service. These efforts align with 
its internet censorship laws, which rest on the pretext of providing its population with 
culturally pure content, an action promptly followed by Iran and Russia (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 
2015; Morozov, 2011, p. 237; Rød & Weidmann, 2015; Zittrain, et al., 2017).144  Further, 
Turkey enacted new laws to protect national security interests because of the failed 2016 
coup attempt that greatly expanded powers of the state to censor, surveil, detain, or arrest 
individuals suspected of creating subversive content, specifically media content (Akgül & 
Kirlidoğ, 2015; Deibert, 2015; Freedom House, 2017; Levin, 2016).145  As such, this once 
thriving secular democracy seems destined to become an autocracy, in time, with all of its 
 
144 https://turkeyblocks.org/2017/01/06/turkey-building-domestic-search-engine-and-email/ 
145 In December 2016, Turkey jailed 81 journalists – the highest number in the world at the time 
(Freedom House, 2017, p. 12). 
Hypothesis #15 (H15): Increasingly conflictual (i.e. negative) material and verbal 
interactions reported in Russian media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) 
and its interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity, emanating 
from Russia, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #16 (H16): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, 
indicating an increased level of media polarization, across media stories originating from 
Russia directed at the U.S. and its interest—yesterday, results in decreased cyber 
intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #17 (H17): Increases in the conflictual or negative tone of interactions 
reported in media narratives from Russia directed at the United States (U.S.) and its 
interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. 
networks—today. 
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incumbent cyber control mechanisms set on the creation of a digitally panoptic society 
(Foucault, 1977). 
Turkey’s slide into anocracy began in 2002, when the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP)146 won a landslide election led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and was swept into 
power. Abdullah Gül, a co-founder of AKP, became Prime Minister as Erdoğan, years 
earlier, had been legally censured by a Turkish Security Court for a speech given with 
religious overtones and was prohibited from participating in politics for life (Shambayati, 
2004, pp. 266-267).147  Shortly after assuming office, Gül and the AKP dominated Turkish 
Parliament amended the constitution, effectively annulling Erdoğan’s legal banishment 
from politics, allowing him to become Turkey’s Prime Minister in March of 2003 
(Shambayati, 2004, p. 269). He held this position he held until assuming the Presidency of 
Turkey in 2014, which he holds to this day and uses to effectively subsume the powers of 
the Prime Minister, making him the most powerful person in the country (Akgül & 
Kirlidoğ, 2015; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016). However, the rise of AKP did not happen 
unilaterally; they gained and maintained powerful allies within the Gülen movement 
(Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Altiparmak & Gürol, 2017; Bilgiç, 2018; Esen & Gumuscu, 
2016; Hussain & Hussain, 2017; Rodrik, 2014).148 
In 2002 and 2003, the relationship between AKP and the Gülen movement began 
out of their mutual disdain and distrust for the military and secular elites, who were solely 
 
146 All acronyms used in this section will use the Turkish convention for abbreviations. 
147 In a speech given in 1997, Erdoğan evoked several lines from a poem written by Ziya Gokalp 
(1876-1924), a famous Turkish Poet and Intellectual, describing a fictious conversation between an ancient 
Turkish Sultan and an Emperor of the Byzantine Empire. In the dialog, the Emperor affronts the Sultan by 
declaring that he will “burn the Koran and the Kaba,” both of which are deeply sacred to the Islamic Faith. 
The Sultan responds to the insult by stating: “minarets are [our] bayonets, domes helmets; mosques are our 
barracks, and the believers are [our] soldiers.”  Erdoğan, then the Mayor of Istanbul, used the Sultan’s 
statement in a speech to a political gathering in the primarily Kurdish city of Siirt. Turkish secularists found 
his use of these words profoundly offensive and alleged that they constituted a threat to the secular state 
and institutions of Turkey. Subsequently, Erdoğan was charged and convicted. His sentence constituted ten 
months in jail, of which he only served four, a fine, and from that point on prohibited from participating in 
politics for life (Shambayati, 2004, pp. 266-269). 
148 The Islamic scholar and Imam, Fethullah Gülen who has resided in the U.S. since 1999, founded 
the Gülen Movement. The movement is based on Islamic teaching, supports religious instruction at private 
schools and universities in over 180 countries through the world, and possesses substantial assets in the 
media, finance, and health sectors (Altiparmak & Gürol, 2017; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016). 
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responsible for the four previous (i.e., 1960, 1971, 1980, & 1997) coup d’états (Al Jazeera, 
2016; Bilgiç, 2018; Hussain & Hussain, 2017; Polity IV, 2018). Effectively, each of the 
previous coup d’états ended the rule of the four previous instantiations of the Islamic 
leaning AK Party in Turkey (Al Jazeera, 2016; Bilgiç, 2018; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; 
Hussain & Hussain, 2017; Rodrik, 2014). However, it is important to point out that the 
Turkish military and judiciary saw themselves as the Guardians of Democracy and were 
responsible for the 49 out of 54 years of democratic rule of the Republic since 1960 (Polity 
IV, 2018). Further, five of those 54 years bracketed periods of societal unrest and martial 
law characterized by executions, mass arrests, and disappearances, some of which are 
described as extra-judicial (Al Jazeera, 2018; Altiparmak & Gürol, 2017; Polity IV, 2018). 
Nevertheless, in each case within a few years of the successful coup, Turkey saw the return 
of order and democracy enabled by their military’s actions (Al Jazeera, 2016; Bilgiç, 2018; 
Hussain & Hussain, 2017; Polity IV, 2018; Shambayati, 2004). Also, in each case, those 
removed from office sought to curtail or even end the military oversight of the Turkish 
government, wrest control from the conservative Kemalist elites, and ring in an era of 
Islamic renewal (Al Jazeera, 2016; Altiparmak & Gürol, 2017; Bilgiç, 2018, Esen & 
Gumuscu, 2016 Hussain & Hussain, 2017; Rodrik, 2014). Thus, the period covered under 
this research amounts to the culmination of a decades-long struggle between the Secularists 
and the Islamists battling for the control and direction of the Republic of Turkey. 
After wresting control from the Kemalist Secularists in 2002, Erdoğan, the AKP, 
and their Gülenist allies began expanding their influence in the judiciary, military, police, 
and the ministerial functions of Turkey (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015, p. 15; Altiparmak & 
Gürol, 2017, p. 101; Gurdeniz, 2020, p. 83; Hussain & Hussain, 2017, p. 75; Rodrik, 2014). 
Further, AKP extensively leveraged Gülen followers in positions of influence throughout 
academia, the state bureaucracies, and the judiciary system, as well as, their extensive 
network in business, finance, journalism, and the media (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; 
Altiparmak & Gürol, 2017; Gurdeniz, 2020; Hussain & Hussain, 2017; Rodrik, 2014). 
Essentially, after years of strife with the military and their secularist allies, learning from 
their prior abortive attempts at obtaining control, AKP had finally attained control and open 
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access to all the levers necessary to gain and maintain rule over Turkey. They were not 
about to let it slip away again. 
First, they began building digital panoptic capabilities by tapping into the 
knowledge of the best—China and Russia (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Eldem, 2020; Yesil, 
Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017). Initially, through their acolytes in the judiciary and with a 
majority in parliament, AKP began placing the legal parameters necessary to deploy 
second-generation content controls tying internet censorship to existing vaguely written 
laws in the penal code (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 
2015; Eldem, 2020; Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017). They placed these new internet laws 
atop imprecisely written regulations that broadly criminalized any speech that insults 
Turkish ethnicity, government institutions, or the nation itself. The AKP enshrined these 
laws under the rubric of public health, order, safety, and morality, which ties directly to the 
coup de grace that will sound familiar-national security (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Arsan, 
2013; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 2015; Eldem, 2020; Yesil, Sözeri, & 
Khazraee, 2017).  
In 2007, the AKP regime legalized governmental use of first-generational content 
controls (i.e., deep packet inspection, throttling, and filtering) through the Parliament by 
enacting Law No. 5651 and other internet laws to the Turkish penal code, criminalizing 
discrete types of internet content and allowing for enhanced internet censorship and 
surveillance, each of which enabled them to gain control of the narrative (Akgül & 
Kirlidoğ, 2015; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 2015; Eldem, 2020).149  Over the 
ensuing years, as a result of a series of tumultuous, perhaps AKP orchestrated domestic 
events, these authorities expanded greatly from first to second-generation allowing the state 
 
149 The regime authorized implementation of internet law #5651 under a branch of the Information 
and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK)–the regulatory agency responsible for the telecom 
sector , the Presidency of Telecommunications and Communications (TIB) (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; 
Eldem, 2020; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016). As such, TIB, the BTK division, that had been given the legal 
mandate to execute telephone taps without a legal warrant, found its authorities greatly expanded from 
tapping telephones to blocking websites with no judicial oversight and broadened even further by 
legislative expansion of the laws authorities in 2014 (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015, pp. 4-6; Saka, 2018). Law 
#5651 introduced the term sufficient suspicion. If authorities had sufficient suspicion that an internet 
content offense was committed, gave the TIB adequate grounds to block, throttle, or remove content 
(Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Saka, 2018).  
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to censor and surveil its population with impunity (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 
2015; Eldem, 2020; Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017). Ultimately, these authorities have 
grown into the domestic elements of third-generation internet content controls under the 
guise of national security and the requirement for domestic safety of the population (Akgül 
& Kirlidoğ, 2015; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 2015; Eldem, 2020; Yesil, Sözeri, 
& Khazraee, 2017). 
This growth allowed the AKP to gain and maintain control of the domestic narrative 
becoming the new elite and dominating all media within Turkey, metaphorically shouting 
down any opposition from the former elites, namely the secularists and their advocates in 
the military (Arsan, 2013; Bilgiç, 2018; Eldem, 2020; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Saka, 2018; 
Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017; Zittrain, et al., 2017). Further, during the same timeframe, 
the AKP enacted a  series of reforms that criminalized any overt or covert intervention in 
Turkish politics by the military (Bardakçi, 2013, pp. 421-423; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016, pp. 
1585-1586). This huge development, especially when one considers the number of coup 
d’états executed by the secular Guardians of Democracy since 1960, essentially returned 
the Republic to Kemal Atatürk’s vision of a staunch non-religious democracy.150  By this 
action, the AKP laid the legal foundations that outlawed any future coup d’états led by the 
military and any future involvement of the military in Turkish politics, dealing a major 
blow to Atatürk’s secular military powerbase, the avowed political rivals of the AKP. 
Swiftly thereafter in late 2007, the AKP and their Gülen allies in the Presidency of 
Telecommunications and Communications (TIB), the national police, and the judiciary 
used their oversized domestic second-generation authorities to surveil, prosecute, and jail 
hundreds of military officers suspected to have secularist, western leanings, who were 
suspected of conspiring to overthrow the duly elected AKP government (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 
 
150 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk came to power 1923 as the President of Turkey, following the disastrous 
defeat of the Central Powers in World War I and the subsequent dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
(Gurdeniz, 2020). Ataturk envisioned a predominately secular, industrially modern Turkey, which he did 
not inherit from the Ottoman Islamic Caliphate that he deposed (Al Jazeera, 2016). Ataturk’s policies were 
staunchly secular, western leaning policies intent on tying Turkey to its European roots dominated its 
domestic and foreign policy for 79 years until AKP was swept into power in the democratically election of 
2002 (Al Jazeera, 2016; Bilgiç, 2018; Gurdeniz, 2020; Hussain & Hussain, 2017; Yesil, Sözeri, & 
Khazraee, 2017).  
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2015; Arsan, 2013; Bilgiç, 2018; Biçakci, Doruk, & Mitat, 2015; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; 
Gurdeniz, 2020; Rodrik, 2014; Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017). The dragnet of 
prosecutions that surrounded the Ergenekon, Balyoz, or Sledgehammer trials (2008–2012) 
encompassed not only military officers, but intellectuals, politicians, and journalists (Akgül 
& Kirlidoğ, 2015; Arsan, 2013; Bilgiç, 2018; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Rodrik, 2014). The 
defendants’ main defense was that the electronic records used by the prosecution had been 
fabricated, which was roundly disregarded by the Gülenist prosecutors and judges 
presiding over the trials (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Arsan, 2013; Bilgiç, 2018; Esen & 
Gumuscu, 2016; Gurdeniz, 2020, Rodrik, 2014). The court cases concluded in September 
of 2012, convicting 331 of 365 of plotting the coup attempt (Rodrik, 2014). Thus, at the 
end of 2012, the main guardians of democracy, the Turkish military, had been sufficiently 
silenced.  
Then came the next struggle for power in Turkey between the AKP and their former 
Gülenists allies, the latter of which, as it was subsequently discovered in December 2013, 
had engineered the military plot narrative and fabricated most of the electronic evidence 
used in the Ergenekon trials (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Bilgiç, 2018; Esen & Gumuscu, 
2016; Gurdeniz, 2020, Rodrik, 2014; Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017). It came to be 
known that the Gülenists leveraging their vast network were able to use their henchmen in 
the Presidency of Telecommunications and Communications (TIB), various government 
funded cyber organizations,151 the national police, the judiciary, and the media to execute 
the full array of offensive direct action capabilities resident in third-generation content 
controls to surveil, confuse, entrap, and disgrace their secular-military opponents (Akgül 
& Kirlidoğ, 2015; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 2015; Eldem, 2020; Rodrik, 2014; 
Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017).  
Suddenly in 2013, Erdoğan declared that the Gülenists had formed a dangerous 
“parallel state” bureaucracy within the state of Turkey that must be dealt with (Akgül & 
Kirlidoğ, 2015; Bilgiç, 2018; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Gurdeniz, 2020, Rodrik, 2014; 
 
151 Mainly the Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), which in 2010, merged with 
Informatics and Information Security Research Center (BILGEM). 
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Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017). Multiple AKP members openly professed that they had 
been misled by the Gülenists during the Ergenekon, Balyoz, and Sledgehammer trials 
(Rodrik, 2014). The judiciary reopened the cases in 2015, leading to dismissal of most if 
not all the charges fraudulently levied against those accused (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; 
Arsan, 2013; Bilgiç, 2018; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Rodrik, 2014). Simultaneously, 
Erdoğan’s AKP majority began the systematic post-Soviet style lustration of Gülenists 
embedded throughout the Turkish bureaucracy, media, and military (Altiparmak & Gürol, 
2017). The AKP purge fell particularly hard on several of the cyber ministries and centers, 
severely hampering Turkey’s cyber capabilities going forward.152 
Subsequently, the coup attempt in July 2016 led to a two-year state of emergency, 
which presented Erdoğan and the AKP with almost unlimited power to settle all scores 
against the secularists, the military, and their latest rival, the Gülenists (Altiparmak & 
Gürol, 2017; Bilgiç, 2018; Eldem, 2020; Freedom House, 2020; Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 
2017). The narrative engineered by the AKP blamed Gülenists embedded in the military 
for the abortive coup (Altiparmak & Gürol, 2017; Bilgiç, 2018; Eldem, 2020; Freedom 
House, 2020; Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017). By laying the blame on their arch-rival the 
Turkish military and their newfound rival the Gülenists, Erdoğan and the AKP gained and 
used their free hand in Turkey to eradicate any and all resistance, all the while, leveraging 
their well-cultivated control of the media to ensure their narrative painted these Gülenists 
as the traitors of the Republic. Thus, Erdoğan and the AKP used their preeminent command 
of domestic first, second, and third-generation content controls to ensure their rivals were 
effectively silenced internally, while broadcasting their message internationally, to the 
skepticism of some (Eldem, 2020; Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017). By July 2018, 
Erdoğan and the AKP cemented their control of the domestic narrative and all elements of 
 
152  Of particular interest in this research was the purge of their cyber expertise within Technological 
Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), Informatics and Information Security Research Center 
(BILGEM), and TIB losing nearly 1,000 scientist and researchers in 2015 and 80% of their administrative 
staff in 2014 (Akgül & Kirlidoğ, 2015; Bilgiç, 2018; Biçakci, Doruk, & Mitat, 2015, p. 35; Eldem, 2020; 
Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Yesil, Sözeri, & Khazraee, 2017). In fact, in 2015, BILGEM declined a Turkish 
law enforcement agency request to conduct digital forensic analysis on four hard drives because they 
lacked the expertise to do so due to personnel turbulence (Biçakci, Doruk, & Mitat, 2015, pp. 35-36). Thus, 
the AKP devised purge of Turkish Cyber ministries created a gaping hole in Turkey’s cyber capabilities.  
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cyberspace in the country devolving from a democracy in 2014 to a closed anocracy in 
2016 (Freedom House, 2020; Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017; Polity IV, 2018). 
Therefore, the intrusion data used in this research covered the period from right 
before the coup in early 2015 to right after the coup attempt 2016‒2017, essentially 
covering part of the state of emergency. Further, the media coded events appear quite 
sensitive to Turkish reporting. Specifically, the event coders found that Turkish reporting 
was distinctively different from other Middle Eastern countries, as such, they created a set 
of unique dictionary protocols to account for Turkey’s media events (Schrodt P. A., 2012, 
pp. 177-181).  
 
 
Figure 22.  Turkey ‒ Case Study Hypotheses 
This taken together with the data used in the regression equation covered highly 
mediatized events in Turkey from the reopening of the Ergenekon trials in 2015 to the state 
of emergency following the coup attempt. A period when the narrative would be tightly 
controlled by the AKP regime and the population would look to AKP elites for 
interpretation of the domestic narrative, shifting away from the secular elites. Thus, Turkey 
was enduring a turbulent time of shifting allegiances, internal strife, and AKP consolidation 
Hypothesis #18 (H18): Increasingly conflictual (i.e., negative) material interactions 
reported in Turkish media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) or its 
interests—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from 
Turkey, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #19 (H19): Increasingly conflictual (i.e., negative) verbal interactions 
reported in Turkish media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) and its 
interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from 
Turkey, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #20 (H20): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating 
an increased level of media polarization, across media stories originating from Turkey 
directed at the U.S. and its interests—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion 
activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #21 (H21): Increases in the accumulated conflictual or negative tone of 
interactions reported in media narratives from Turkey directed towards the United States 
(U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. 
networks—today, with the effect becoming stronger as Turkey’s level of democracy 
decreases. 
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of power. As such, the two-step process may have been operating and reinforcing the level-
two narrative in certain corners of Turkish society allowing the AKP regime to dictate the 
interpretation of the domestic storyline, while, the effect in others may be diminished. 
Further, the lustrating purge of the Gülenists and military from their governmental cyber 
centers, councils, and ministries no doubt led to a colossal loss in cyber expertise (see 
footnotes 152 & 153). The culminating impact of all of these factors most likely led 
Turkey’s leadership and population to focus internally, with the former consolidating 
power and the later paralyzed with doubt facing an uncertain future. 
Next, over the period of analysis, Turkey slid to opposite ends of the anocratic 
polity range allowing for the observation of negative tone interaction variable at the 
country-level of analysis. As the AKP would have dominated the level-two domestic 
narrative, which was well known by the population, consequently, the reaction would be 
expected to track as predicted by the anocracy model analyzed in Chapter III and shown 
graphically in Figure 11. Finally, while Turkey has yet to manifest its cyber prowess on 
the world stage as cataloged by Valeriano and Maness (2014, 2015, & 2016), ample 
evidence has been provided above that indicates the Turkish regime possesses and wields 
significant expertise in the cyber realm with 93% of their intrusions coming in at the highest 
average risk level shown in Appendix J. Over this period, their cyber prowess appears to 
have been focused internally. As such, the author proposes to test the above hypotheses in 
Figure 22 employing the same model used throughout this research.  
C. EVIDENCE OF MEDIA EFFECTS IN CYBERSPACE 
Again, a review of the research findings covering anocracies discussed in Chapter 
III appears practical at this point. Like autocracies, the research granted the acceptance of 
H1, H3, and H5 revealing that two-step [media] flow operates and reinforces regime 
narratives at level-two of international relations.153  The anocracies model tracks closely 
 
153 Hypothesis #1 (H1): Increases in the number of conflictual material interactions reported in the 
media narratives of other sovereign states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, 
regardless of regime type, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #3 (H3): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions reported in the media 
narratives of anocratic states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in no 
change in cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today.  
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with All-Regimes model, both of which are depicted in Figure 12 (Chapter III), each 
coefficient mirrors the other in direction and narrative type and media polarization. 
Specifically, this demonstrates that when the number of negative material narratives 
increase on a given day, a corresponding increase in the number of cyber intrusion attempts 
occurs on the following day in each model. Next, the All-Regimes model records a strong 
dampening effect resulting from yesterday’s negative verbal narratives, whereas anocracies 
yesterday’s negative verbal narratives result in the neutral impact on today’s intrusions. 
Finally, the given day’s NN polarization coefficient records a reduced effect on the 
following day’s intrusions. When considered comprehensively, these findings provide 
quantitative evidence of the operation of the two-step flow within level-two of domestic 
politics during international negotiations between anocratic regimes and the U.S. at level-
one. 
Interestingly, the interactive coefficient of today’s NN tone and level of democracy 
continues the trend established by the All-Regimes model, which allowed for the 
acceptance of H7, but notably was rejected for autocracies and democracies.154  Figure 11 
(Chapter III) graphically represents this interaction showing how today’s intrusions 
increase as yesterday’s NN tone becomes more conflictual and the level of democracy 
decreases—consisting of a doubling of intrusions per day from the green to red lines. Yet, 
for the purposes of this case study, Figure 11 supports the argument for the direction of the 
NN tone coefficient in the Russian models, because their level of democracy does not vary 
across this period of analysis, which is similar to China and Iran. Yet, as Turkey was 
enduring a rather tumultuous period of governmental change over this period of analysis, 
their level of democracy did vary beginning at +3 in 2014 drifting to a ‒4 in 2016. As such, 
the regression model calculates a coefficient for this interactive term. 
 
Hypothesis #5 (H5): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased level 
of media polarization, across media stories originating from democratic and anocratic states directed at the 
U.S. and its interest—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
154 Hypothesis #7 (H7): Increases in the aggregate conflictual or negative tone of interactions 
reported in media narratives from democracies, anocracies, and autocracies directed at the United States 
(U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, will result in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—
today, with the effect becoming stronger as the level of democracy of the originating state increases. 
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As stated in the hypotheses for both Russia and Turkey, it should be expected that 
each country may well react differently to the model. Russia’s use of second and third-
generation internet content controls, regime ownership and control of all domestic 
mainstream media outlets, and extensive use of propaganda may impact the connection 
between negative media narratives today influencing the cyber intrusion activity tomorrow. 
Further, Turkey’s activities seem to be primarily focused on getting their regime’s business 
in order, appearing to focus its internet efforts domestically, at least for now, but it does 
possess a burgeoning capability, if one considers its level of intrusion capability as shown 
in Appendix J. As such, the model’s results may not parallel the anocracies model, which 
stands as the reasons for the conjectured hypotheses in Figures 21 and 22. Thus, the 
research analysis will expose Russia and then Turkey to the model to test the conjectured 
hypotheses. 
1. Russian Evidence 
As depicted in Table 7, coefficients derived by the Russia model score differently 
than those of the All-Regimes and anocracies models. These results reveal that yesterday’s 
negative material narratives coefficient track negatively with today’s cyber intrusion 
activity emanating from Russia, similar to the Iranian model. While the negative verbal 
narratives tack closely to the All-Regimes model, with yesterday’s NN polarization 
coefficient tracking consistently in direction with the other models, recording a dampening 
effect on intrusions the following day. Taken as a whole, these terms appear to validate the 
strong grip the Russian government has over their indigenous internet and media space. 
Preferring to maintain sovereign control of their domestic internet space to leverage it both 
internally and externally for their chosen purpose, while manipulating the media message 
to placate the population with pro-regime narratives. Again, viewing the .ru net as their 




Table 7.   Results of Negative Narratives Models for Russia and Turkey. 
CYBER INTRUSION ATTEMPTS (Anocracy Comparison) 
 Dependent Variable 
 TotalIntrusions ‒ Today 
 Poisson Model 
Independent Variable 
(Yesterday) / Model All-Regimes All Anocracies Russia Turkey 
Negative Material Narratives 0.03*** 0.10*** ‒0.11*** 0.03 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.01) (0.03) 
Negative Verbal Narrative ‒0.24*** 0.0000 ‒0.12*** ‒0.41*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.01) (0.02) 
NN Gold_Mean (Tone) ‒0.003*** ‒0.001 0.001 0.01 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.02) 
NN Gold_SD ‒0.01*** ‒0.02*** ‒0.03*** 0.02** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.01) 
Polity ‒0.01*** ‒0.01***  ‒0.08*** 
 (0.0001) (0.001)  (0.01) 
Polity squared ‒0.001*** ‒0.01***   
 (0.0000) (0.001)   
Internet Not Free 0.12*** ‒0.29***   
 (0.003) (0.01)   
Media Not Free ‒0.21***    
 (0.003)    
Media Self-Censorship 0.08*** 3.50***   
 (0.003) (0.45)   
Friday 0.22*** 0.56*** 0.42*** 0.48*** 
 (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Saturday 0.12*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sunday ‒0.32*** ‒0.29*** ‒0.25*** 0.02 
 (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
NN Gold_Mean x Polity 0.002*** 0.01***  0.01** 
 (0.0001) (0.0004)  (0.004) 
Constant ‒4.49*** ‒11.69*** ‒47,474.37*** 1.86*** 
 (0.03) (0.47) (976.82) (0.20) 
Observations 40,608 10,071 288 288 
MAE 36.9 15.7 146.5 96.7 
RMSE 581.0 118.9 250.5 323.0 
AIC 2,512,547.6 192,375.2 33,555.2 37,022.5 
Log Likelihood ‒1,256,240.8 ‒96,155.6 ‒16,753.6 ‒18,486.3 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Next, notice the NN tone variable, which is consistent in positive value with the 
first-order interaction (i.e., negative tone interaction) shown in the two other models. 
However, scores no statistical significance, consider the graphical depiction of this 
multiplicative interaction in the anocracies model and the NN tone for Russia shown in 
Figure 23 below. Notice how all the lines similarly colored with variations of green track 
together, with the Russian NN tone discretely broken out at the top of the chart, scoring a 
decrease in today’s intrusions as yesterday’s NN tone becomes increasingly negative. 
Nevertheless, when analyzed together, due to the coefficient’s lack of statistical 
significance and the large standard error range H17 lacks support and stands as rejected in 
favor of the null hypothesis.155  Indeed, for Russia, increases in a given day’s NN tone has 
little to no influence on intrusions on U.S. networks the following day.  
Observe how yesterday’s negative material and verbal narratives and NN 
polarization terms track in the negative direction with their consistent lack of variation 
indicted by the tight standard error values of each. The parallels between these three 
variables as well as the NN tone coefficient above, each resulting in a dampening effect on 
U.S. networks ‒today. Hence, the negative direction of these coefficients in the Russian 
model provides evidence of the effective employment of second and third-generation 
internet content controls, often resulting in self-censoring behavior.156 
Additionally, note that most Russians receive their news from state-run internet or 
television sources both of which are not captured in the Phoenix media events data, 
meaning that the media variables, though significant, may not exemplify the optimal data 
source to provide evidence of two-step process operating within level-two domestic 
narrative when Russia is exchanging narratives with its principal rival the U.S. As in the 
case of Iran, this reveals that Russia views the domestic internet space as its sovereign 
domain as posited by many scholars (Choucri, 2012; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert 
R. , 2015; Maréchal, 2017; Nocetti, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, 
 
155 Hypothesis #17 (H17): Increases in the conflictual or negative tone of interactions reported in 
media narratives from Russia directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in 
decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
156 In 2019, the V-Dem project scored Russia’s media censorship as direct and routine, while scoring 
their media’s self-censorship as common, but incomplete (V-Dem Institute, 2019, pp. 185-188). 
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& Maness, 2018). Thus, those who operate out of the Russian .ru space do so at the will of 
the regime and also possess the skill set to intrude using a greater level of sophistication, 
recording 72% of intrusions emanating from Russia clocking in at the highest level of 
average intrusion risk, as shown in Appendix J. 
 
Figure 23.  Negative Narrative Tone Results: Russia. 
This signifies that those Russians who indulge in intrusive behavior, do so at a 
higher skill level, as stated. First, the Russian regime’s preferred use of patriotic hackers 
to perform acts via a malicious vector to realize either subversive or information-seeking 
objectives appears to be operating here. Russia employs these active measures for two 
reasons, one to apply pressure on the U.S. during negotiations and second, the exercise of 
their state-sponsored patriotic hackers, which also provides them with a level of plausible 
deniability (Calamur, 2017; Jaitner & Mattsson, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012; Snegovaya, 
2015; B. Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). Further, as a practical matter, hackers need 
to maintain their hacktivist skills in preparation for employment during times of need such 
as, Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), Lithuania (2009), and Ukraine (2014) 
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Figure 24.  Media Results Comparison: Russia. 
Media Variable Prediction Comparison Table: Russia 
Model or Regime Type /            
Calculated Variable Anocracies Russia 
Difference from 
Anocracies 
















Average Marginal Effect (AME) 
Negative Material Narrative (NmN) 
Negative Verbal Narrative (NvN) 
Negative Narrative Polarization (NNp) 
Standard Error (SE) 
 
Statistical Significance – p-Level: 
 *p < 0.01; **p < 0.001; ***p < 0.0001 
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(Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011; Gartzke, 2013; Jaitner & Mattsson, 2015; Lindsay, 2015; 
Nye, 2017; Snegovaya, 2015; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). As such, the number 
of high-risk intrusions emanating from this regime, as indicated in Appendix J, provides 
further quantitative evidence that this type of patriotic hacktivist behavior may operate in 
Russia.  
Thus, as shown in Figure 24, the Russian regime exercises significant control over 
the internet, using second and third-generation content controls, which appears to cause 
many in their media to self-censor. Observe Russia’s material and verbal NN records a 
precipitously faster decrease than anocracies, recording a marginal effect of twelve and 
whopping 347 times below anocracies’ AME, respectively. Notice, how Russia’s 
maximum NN polarization varies 26% less than that of other anocracies across the x-axis 
in the middle portion of Figure 24.157  Next, observe how the yesterday’s Russian NN 
polarization average marginal effect on today’s intrusions decreases approximately 
fourteen times faster than the anocracies model over the x-axis count range, as derived by 
using the values from the table at the bottom of Figure 24 and Figure 35 of Appendix F. 
Further, the fact that nearly 90% of Russian citizens consume news from state-run media 
organizations that are not included in this study’s data and given the models statistical 
significance, discussed above, provide ample evidence to support acceptance of H15 and 
H16, rejecting the null in each case.158 
2. Turkish Evidence 
The statistical coefficient comparison chart in Table 7 reveals how Turkey differs 
in most respects from other anocracies. First, notice the negative material narratives that 
scores a 0.3, but scores no statistical significance, unlike the All-Regimes and the 
 
157 Per Figure 24, the maximum variation in Russia’s NN Polarization score clocks in at +7.3, while 
the max for anocracies comes in at +9.9 – a difference of 2.6. Thus, the calculated percentage difference 
would be (2.6 / 9.9 = .26 ~ 26% less than anocracies.  
158 Hypothesis #15 (H15): Increasingly conflictual (i.e., negative) material and verbal interactions 
reported in Russian media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, 
results in decreased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from Russia, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #16 (H16): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased 
level of media polarization, across media stories originating from Russia directed at the U.S. and its 
interest—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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anocracies models. Secondly, observe how the negative verbal narratives remain consistent 
in direction with the All-Regimes, differing from anocracies in that the coefficient records 
a negative statistically significant value. Thirdly, note how the NN polarization coefficient 
value swings opposite in sign direction from the other models and clocks in at a lower level 
of statistical significance (p-value < 0.05). Figure 26 and Appendix I reveals the magnitude, 
sign direction, and predicted value differences for these coefficients between Turkey and 
the anocracies models. 
 
Figure 25.  Negative Narrative Tone Results: Turkey 
Fourth, as stated earlier Turkey swung from being an open anocracy (+3) in 2014 
to a closed anocracy (‒4) in 2016. Observe, how Turkey’s NN tone interaction coefficient 
tracks precisely in direction and varies slightly more than the other anocracies across their 
shift in level of democracy as indicated by the reduced p-value less than 0.05 a gauge of 
the models reduced predictive confidence for this coefficient. Figure 25 depicts both the 
similarities in sign direction and magnitude of differences for this interactive variable. 
Nevertheless, as Turkey’s polity score shifts lower shown in red and as yesterday’s NN 
tone increases more intrusion occur on U.S. networks today, as shown in Figure 25. This 
finding runs parallel to that of the anocracies model. Further, note the tighter NN maximum 
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tone range (‒7 to +3), which appears to signify the regime’s restraint or internally focused 
rhetoric toward the U.S. during period of governmental transition. Certainly, analyzing 
Turkey in this context provides a unique opportunity to observe the intrusion response 
resulting from this coefficient at the country level. Taken together, this provides the support 
necessary to accept H21 and reject the null.159 
This provides another indication of transitional turbulence facing Turkey over this 
period, Erdoğan declared a State of Emergency that lasted for two years from 20 July 2016 
to 20 July 2018 (Altiparmak & Gürol, 2017; Eldem, 2020, p. 461). The coup attempt that 
spawned the State of Emergency furnished Erdoğan and the AKP with optimal control of 
the internet and the media allowing them to leverage second and third-generation content 
controls to dominate the Turkish domestic narrative.160  Further consider how the freshly 
spurned, but cyber competent, Gülenists and Kemalist secularists, may be using their 
abilities to circumvent these controls turning to information seeking to gain some 
understanding of events beyond the NN tone fed to them by the recently dominant AKP 
regime. 
Also, the diminished statistical significance recorded by the NN polarization and 
NN tone interaction coefficients may indicate that Turkey’s internet and media space over 
this period of analysis was hotly contested. To state more clearly, the tech savvy Gülenists, 
banished from government positions, indulging in information seeking behavior, looking 
for information on the AKP controlled internet may have had a difficult time as well as 
AKP may have encountered difficulties in preventing the expelled Gülenists from gaining 
access to that information. Yet, externally Turkey’s presence and response appears more 
restrained. 
 
159 Hypothesis #21 (H21): Increases in the accumulated conflictual or negative tone of interactions 
reported in media narratives from Turkey directed towards the United States (U.S.) and its interests—
yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today, with the effect becoming 
stronger as Turkey’s level of democracy decreases. 
160  A year after the end of the State of Emergency (2019), the V-Dem project scored Turkey’s media 
censorship as indirect, but routine, while scoring their media’s self-censorship as common, but incomplete 
(V-Dem Institute, 2019, pp. 185-188). Additionally, Turkey’s internet censorship recorded a level denoting 
the government’s consistent attempts to block internet access, except for pro-regime or content devoid of 
political connotations, but allowing for possible circumvention of these controls. 
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Turkey has attained and maintains a significant proficiency in cyberspace as shown 
in the intrusion risk factor counts in Appendix J; yet, the regime appears to refrain from 
wielding it in any cyber conflicts, disputes, or incidents recorded by Valeriano and Maness 
(2014, 2015, and 2016) to date. Perhaps, this is because Erdoğan and the AKP have chosen 
to modify their foreign policy strategy. Turning away from the age-old policy of viewing 
Turkey as a bridge between the East and West, shifting to a tiered policy employing zero 
problems with neighbors and rhythmic diplomacy focused first regionally and second 
internationally (Dedeoglu, 2016; Hussain & Hussain, 2017; Tabansky, 2016).161  Finally, 
this noteworthy finding may not only signify a shift in Turkey’s foreign policy going 
forward, but also provide evidence to buttress the theory of cyber restraint, wherein Turkey 
chooses a more restrained posture in cyberspace so as to avoid misinterpretation of intent 
leading to miscalculation (Valeriano & Maness, 2015). 
Thus, returning to the analysis of yesterday’s negative material and verbal 
narratives and NN tone polarization values gauging their impacts on today’s intrusion 
attempts. Interestingly, the material narrative coefficient scores a positive value but shows 
no statistical significance, while the negative verbal narratives score a negative value with 
a higher level of statistical significance of p-value < 0.01 as shown in Table 7. The former 
could be the result of the smaller number of negative material narratives showing a max of 
eight on any given day with verbal storylines clocking in at a max of 14, 75% higher. 
Further, this coupled with regime’s apparent shift in strategy, discussed above, and the fact 
that Turkey remains an ally of the U.S. may result in a greater level of cyber restraint, 
which may contribute to the material narrative coefficient’s lack of significance. 
Yet, the negative verbal narratives score a solid, statistically significant, negative 
impact on tomorrow’s intrusions, recording an average marginal drop of 14 intrusions 
across the x-axis count range considerably below anocracies, which essentially scored zero 
coefficient value with no statistical significance. Perhaps, an indication of the freshly 
 
161 Ahmet Davutoglu, the foreign policy adviser to both Presidents Gul and Erdoğan, adjusted the 
state’s foreign policy arguing that Turkey’s historical legacy and geographic position made it indispensable 
to regional affairs and stability. This regional focus, as he envisioned, would enhance Turkish influence and 
gravitas globally (Hussain & Hussain, 2017).  
 170
dominant AKP elites use of their near total control of the domestic level-two narrative via 
the two-step flow. Further, this finding would be reinforced by the discussion above 
pertaining to Turkey’s policy of cyber restraint and the internal focus of the regime. 
Lastly, observe the NN media polarization scoring an increase in today’s intrusions 
at an albeit with minimal statistically significant at p-value < 0.05. Next, consider that 
Turkey’s maximum NN media polarization clocks in at a rate 22% less than other 
anocracies, which could be seen as an indicator of AKP’s control over variation in media 
message.162  Further, observe the table at the bottom of Figure 26 below, which records 
Turkey’s average marginal intrusion value seven times greater in today’s intrusions over 
that of anocracies resulting from rises in yesterday’s NN media polarity with a minimum 
p-value < 0.01. 
These values and their statistical significance are noteworthy, because they indicate 
that NN polarization in the AKP controlled press does result in an amount of curiosity 
leading to information seeking behavior—albeit constrained. Thus, much of Turkey’s 
governmental cyber expertise may have been purged during the Gülenists lustration, which 
sent these expert hackers into the private sector. Leading, these spurned professionally 
trained hacktivists and other members of the population to be triggered by media NN 
polarization and choose to satiate their curiosity of its origin by engaging in latent 
information seeking behavior. Particularly, in a government controlled, or at least heavily 
influenced, media environment, any variation in media messaging could activate Turkey’s 
spurned hacktivists. Appendix J records the Turkish intruder’s level of expertise with 93% 
of intrusions clocking in at the highest level of intrusion risk. Certainly, the coefficient 
value, the constrained media polarization, the average marginal effect difference in 
intrusions, and their collectively moderate level statistical of significance could indicate 
 
162 The same model was used to derive the AME for each country removing all non-fluctuating 
variables (i.e., polity, Internet and Media Not Free, Media self-censorship, internet penetration rate, 
population, and GDP) because their values do not change except for Turkey and the UK in this study. As 
such, the predicted values of NmN, NvN, and NNP are being used holding all of the other variables 
constant at their mean values, while the prediction estimate is derived, very little, if any, change was 
observed as a result of the removal of these control variables, which allows for prediction of the AME in 
this case. Per Figure 26, the maximum variation in Turkey’s NN Polarization score clocks in at +7.7, while 
the max for anocracies comes in at +9.9 – a difference of 2.2. Thus, the calculated percentage difference 
would be (2.2/9.9 = .22) ~ 22% less than anocracies.  
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that these former AKP allies may be engaging in information seeking behavior to find out 
the rest of the story. Each of these effects are graphically depicted in Figure 26 and in 
Figure 35 of Appendix F.  
Essentially, these findings depict how Turkey’s population over this period came 
to rely on fewer and fewer elites. As Erdoğan and the AKP had previously removed the 
military and secularists as prominent elite voices and then within this period of analysis 
was in the process of purging the Gülenists from their prominent positions in the 
government, the military, and private sector. As such, the Turkish population had no other 
choice but to rely on the AKP elites, who they had elected in 2002, when they were a 
democracy, ultimately leading to Turkey’s fall into the anocratic realm, which may only 
be a waypoint to a Neo-Ottoman autocracy. Nevertheless, these fewer voices, as in 
autocracies, enjoy outsized influence, which can be viewed in Figure 26. Thus, these newly 
minted AKP elites successfully neutralized the negative material narrative effect, enhanced 
the diminishing impact of negative verbal narratives, and caused their banished expert 
hacktivist to seek to assuage their curiosity resulting from NN media polarization. 
Figure 26 acutely shows this outsized influence by the dark green dotted line 
describing how drastically today’s intrusions fall, while the Erdoğan regime engages in 
yesterday’s negative verbal jousting with the U.S. as interpreted for them by the AKP elites. 
Then internally muffling any negative material rhetoric effect as depicted in the orange red 
long-dashed line. Finally, the uptick in today’s intrusions following increases in NN 
polarization in the Turkish media. Thus, while the model’s evidence does not support the 
acceptance of H18, the combination of empirical and statistical evidence does support the 
acceptance of H19 and H20, rejecting the null in each case.163  The latter two may indicate 
 
163 Hypothesis #18 (H18): Increasingly conflictual (i.e., negative) material interactions reported in 
Turkish media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) or its interests—yesterday, results in increased 
cyber intrusion activity, emanating from Turkey, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #19 (H19): Increasingly conflictual (i.e., negative) verbal interactions reported in Turkish 
media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber 
intrusion activity, emanating from Turkey, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #20 (H20): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased 
level of media polarization, across media stories originating from Turkey directed at the U.S. and its 
interest—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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that the two-step flow operates and reinforces level-two (i.e., domestic politics) for the 
negative verbal narrative type and polarization in Turkey over this period of analysis. 
 
 
Figure 26.  Media Results Comparison: Turkey. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Over this period of analysis, these anocracies experienced different national 
settings. Russia sought to maintain its position as an open anocracy, while tightening its 
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grip over the information residing in cyberspace within its sovereign borders treating 
cyberspace as just an additional domain to the air, land, sea, and space. Using second and 
third-generation content controls to sustain their age-old grasp on internal information, as 
captured by yesterday’s NN material, verbal, and polarization tone coefficients indicating 
the Russian regimes firm grasp over their domestic internet and media resulting in a 
uniformly diminishing effect on today’s intrusions. The regime employs the doctrines of 
active measures and reflexive control in an attempt to project influence beyond Russia’s 
sovereign borders, seeing the intended coercive impact of each fall terribly short abroad, 
while appearing quite effective domestically.  
On the other hand, over this period, Turkey was experiencing a convulsive 
transition through the anocratic realm apparently bound to end up as an autocracy. The 
analysis pointed out how beginning in 2002, Erdoğan and the AKP set upon a deliberate 
campaign to wrest power from the Guardians of Democracy (i.e., the military and 
secularists) seeking to set Turkey on a path towards a Neo-Ottoman future. After denuding 
Turkey’s military and their secularist allies through the use of powerful second and third-
generation content controls intent upon tracing, confusing, entrapping, and disgracing their 
intended targets, subsequently, the AKP shifted the aim of this cyber arsenal on their 
former Gülenists allies achieving the same effect. This left Erdoğan and his AKP elites as 
the only credible leaders remaining in Turkey, with a cyber arsenal at their disposal. 
Through the control of the media, which is quantified by the negative values of the negative 
verbal narrative and tone interaction coefficients, they appear to have consolidated their 
position within Turkey. This can be seen in these two variables and the muting effect on 
the NN material values, with NN verbal narratives scoring the highest diminishing effect 
on the following days intrusions across this analysis, as shown in Appendix I. 
Finally, by viewing the total counts of daily average intrusions risk types in 
Appendix J, one can see that both Russia and Turkey possess significant cyber expertise. 
However, each chooses to wield their cyber capabilities differently. Russia chooses to 
consistently employ its cyber prowess both regionally and abroad, while Turkey prefers to 
hone their cyber skills leveraging them internally but choosing to constrain their 
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provocative use beyond their borders. However, this could be a distinct result of Turkey’s 
tumultuous domestic affairs during the period of analysis.  
Nevertheless, as in Chapter IV, countries, like individuals, choose to operate in 
cyberspace in different ways, where context, culture, and political setting matter. Some 
seek to gain control of the internet within their borders to provide them with some amount 
of societal control, while others use the WWW to push back against their regional, 
international, or internal rivals. Regardless, cyberspace appears to be a dynamic 
environment, where countries and regime types manifest behaviors uniquely their own, yet 
similarities do indeed abound. 
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VI. CASE STUDY: DEMOCRACIES IN CYBERSPACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This final case study covers democracies. The democratic regime type encompasses 
countries such as the United States, Sweden, Germany, Mexico, Chile, Japan, Mongolia, 
and Nigeria to name a few. Appendix G contains the complete list of the democracies 
included in this study. Yet, most of the studies on regime type and the internet revolve 
around what some refer to as the cyber hegemon-the United States (Valeriano, Jensen, & 
Maness, 2018).164  Nevertheless, this research studies the U.S. as the target of intrusions 
and has shown that, for some, a country’s negative media narratives about the U.S. 
yesterday may result in intrusions today. As such, the thrust of this chapter will focus on 
the United Kingdom and India, one a former rival, but after the late-1800s became a solid 
ally of the U.S. weathering two World Wars and the other a former colonial protectorate 
of the United Kingdom (UK), which became a Republic in 1949. India has generally 
maintained a friendly relationship toward the U.S. since gaining its sovereignty. 
The chapter will progress as did the last two case studies. First, a short survey of 
how democracies generally view cyberspace and their position within the WWW. Second, 
the research will empirically explore how both the UK (Britain) and India control, monitor, 
or police their internal internets, leading to a series of hypotheses for each country. Third, 
the researcher will use the existing model to test each hypothesis and the chapter will 
concluded by comparing these two democracies’ media and cyber-space environments. 
 
164 As the principal state that won two world wars, propagated democracy across the globe, and 
developed the internet, all in the last century, has made the U.S. the most likely democratic regime to incur 
cyber intrusions on its networks (Axelrod & Iliev, 2014; Choucri, 2012; Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015; Kello, 
2013; Lindsay J. , 2013; Nye J. S., 2017; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). The U.S. prescribes certain 
agencies to handle different threats (i.e., incursions, infiltrations, exploitations, etc.) within cyberspace 
leveraging a whole of government approach. Additional, doctrine of how the U.S. intends to use and 
respond to potential threats in cyberspace is well documented its cyber strategy and joint publications, 
described as a combination of stealth and surgical strikes (Carter, 2015; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014; 
Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, p. 179).  
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B. DEMOCRACY RIDING THE THIRD WAVE 
Certainly, democracies embody some of the most politically messy regime types 
on the planet. Considering their open internet space, manipulation of the media riding on 
and through the WWW can originate from state, non-state, or even transnational actors all 
with different intentions and means to act upon those intentions. After the terrorist attacks 
on the U.S. in 2001, democracies became increasingly aware of enemies that might be 
residing in or moving through their populations, enemies who bore malice towards the state 
as a whole. As such, many enacted laws allowing for the prosecution, surveilling, and 
tracing of individuals involved in terrorist recruitment, planning, or propaganda on the 
internet (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). Terrorist acts, plus, the exploitation of children and 
copyright infringement mark the main thrusts of democratic censorship in cyberspace 
(Deibert, 2015; Goodman, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011). All the while, 
democracies continue attempting to maintain a balance between protection of their country 
and the right to freedom of speech and assembly. 
As such, many democracies enhanced their pre-existing laws or, as did the U.S., 
enacted new laws providing the government with the right to surveil its population using 
delayed notice,  sneak-a-peek, or no-warrant at all (Chesterman, 2011; Freedom House, 
2017; MacKinnon, 2012; McHugh & Ramirez, 2018; Morozov, 2011). Yet, most 
democracies, most anocracies, and even some autocracies seem to outsource censorship to 
third party companies, holding the likes of Apple, Facebook, and Google accountable for 
the content or narratives authored by their users. However, this policy outsourcing both 
causes and enables these companies to respond to the issue of the day, with very little 
thought going into a given censoring decision besides how it will affect their profit margin 
(Chesterman, 2011; Freedom House, 2017; Goodman, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012; McHugh 
& Ramirez, 2018; Morozov, 2011; Shahin & Zheng, 2020). 
Some countries within the European Union, India, and South Korea, placed the 
responsibility on these companies using broad, ill-defined terms such as spreading false 
information, grossly harmful, harassing, or ethically objectionable to describe illegal 
internet content (MacKinnon, 2012). Many others have adopted state-level filtering 
protocols directing ISPs to block certain illicit content (MacKinnon, 2012; pp. 95‒96). 
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However, one state’s harmful, misleading content is another’s right to free speech or artistic 
expression. On the internet the culture of the state matters when it comes to the amount of 
censorship their population may expect or tolerate—democracies epitomize this fact in the 
extreme (Morozov, 2011). 
Thus, democracies may possess significant surveillance structures as a hedge 
against crime and terrorism, but their media spaces, with their manifold competing 
narratives, may appear to some anocracies and autocracies as sheer and utter chaos.165  For 
western democracies, as many scholars have theorized and others have observed using 
communications, chaos, or systems dynamic theories, order emerges out of an apparently 
amorphous, chaotic system of systems (SOS) (Barabasi, 2003; Barabasi, 2016; Capra, 
1996; Johnson IV, Tolk, & Sousa-Poza, 2013; Sterman, 2010).166  While some autocracies 
and anocracies may not understand democracy’s media bedlam, they certainly manifest a 
respect for its capabilities and do, as recent U.S. presidential elections have shown, attempt 
 
165 Recently, in a journal article concerning media bias during the Libyan Civil War during (2010-
2011), Matthew Baum and Yuri Zhukov (2015) conjectured that during times of conflict, either internal to 
or between states, democratic media outlets tend to engage in a “framing war,” which coincides with the 
“shooting war.”  The authors discovered that the media narrative in democracies, being independent from 
government influence and driven by commercial preferences to maximize profits, tend to favor rebel – anti-
regime forces (Baum & Zhukov, 2015). Further, they describes democratic media biases that emphasize 
originality, conflict, proximity, and drama as basic criteria for newsworthiness (Baum & Zhukov, 2015, p. 
397). These biases seem to drive the media narrative. For example, democratic media appears to under 
report rebel atrocities, while over reporting regime violence, whereas, media in non-democracies (i.e., 
Autocracies and possibly Anocracies) the opposite is true (Baum & Zhukov, 2015). Further, the authors 
conjectured that anti-regime, democratic media bias could pressure western leaders to contemplate foreign 
intervention, particularly in cases of civil war, which empirically occurred in this case (Baum & Zhukov, 
2015, p. 397).  
166 System of Systems (SOS) – a super system or meta system comprised of elements which 
themselves are independent systems, and interact among themselves to achieve, either wittingly or 
unwittingly, a common goal (Johnson IV, Tolk, & Sousa-Poza, 2013, p. 284). Emergence of 
patterns/properties in a complex system will come about (emerge) through operation of the system 
(Keating, 2009, p. 170). 
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to influence it, perhaps out of their respect or fear of it (Inkster, 2016; Maréchal, 2017; 
Morozov, 2011; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018).167   
1. United Kingdom in the Third Wave 
As in most other case studies of the different regime types—culture matters. 
Consequently, Britain is no different. The United Kingdom is a long standing ally and has, 
in the recent century, enjoyed, what some describe, as a special, close, or intimate relations 
with the U.S. (Bull, 2012, p. 167; Marsh, 2012; Oliver & Williams, 2016; Treharne, 2015). 
Since, the late 1800s early 1900s, the U.S. and the UK have been on a non-rivalrous path 
(Millett & Maslowski, 1984). Both have endured and created a lot together as allies in last 
century’s two World Wars and one Cold War, strong trading partners for over a century, 
founding members of the post WW II North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 
signals intelligence partnership known as the Five Eyes (Buckley, 2004; Millett & 
Maslowski, 1984; Nye, 2007; Nye, 2014; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018).168  Finally, 
both hung together through the post September 11, 2001 (9/11) period, working through 
the difficult and protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Marsh, 2012; Oliver & Williams, 
2016; Strong, 2017). Perhaps, no two other countries personify the theory of democratic 
 
167 This respect or fear stems from the Radio Free Europe or Voice of America narrative, which 
attributed some or most of the responsibility for the fall of the Berlin Wall to democratic media 
programming beamed into the former satellites of the Soviet Union. As the story goes positive, media 
narratives broadcast into the Eastern bloc countries made that populations aware of freedoms and standard 
of living their western European brothers and sisters enjoyed under democratic forms of government. Some 
qualitative scholars theorized that West German Television (WGTV) broadcast into East Germany near the 
end of the Cold War, circa 1989, assisted in the coordination of anti-regime protests (Grix, 2000, pp. 32-33; 
Jarausch, 1994, p. 44; Kuran, 1991, p. 37; Opp & Gern, 1993, pp. 675-676). Crabtree, et.al. (2015), 
building on the work of other scholars in this arena, realized that WGTV was able to broadcast to some but 
not all of East Germany; thus, matching signal strength to spatial protest location found no statistical 
evidence that WGTV had an impact on anti-government protests in East Germany (Crabtree, Darmofal, & 
Kern, 2015; Grdesic, 2014; Kern, 2011). Out of this awareness sprang the distribution of clandestine 
samizdat materials, within eastern Europe, demanding increased freedoms and better standards of living 
conditions, ultimately, leading to the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequently, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Buckley, 2004; Crabtree, Darmofal, & Kern, 2015).  
168 Sometimes referred to as the allied cyber [intelligence] network, the Five Eye countries include; 
Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States, and New Zealand (Deibert R. J., 2013, p. 252; Eldem, 
2020; Nicholson, 2019; Nye J. , 2014; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, p. 195). 
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peace and its special relationship more than the U.S.-UK dyad (Buckley, 2004; Bull, 2012; 
McDonald, 2015; Strong, 2017).169 
This special relationship may indeed lead to the indexing of U.S. opinion leaders 
or elites in UK media, which results in reverberation (Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017).170  
Strong (2017) provided evidence of this phenomenon specifically in the U.S.-UK dialog 
leading up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the Libyan intervention, positing 
a third level to the original two-level process of domestic and international relations. This 
level-three process is best captured as foreign-domestic interaction as described in media 
reports about foreign, in this case U.S., elites’ or actors’ statements or actions, which 
reverberate in the target country’s media, in this case the UK, resulting in a modification 
of their international policy. (Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Putnam, 1988; Strong, 
2017). Indeed, the research done here may buttress Strong’s conjectures, but cannot 
provide sufficient evidence beyond level-one and two.  
Further, Reifler et al. (2014) in their analysis of public opinion surrounding 
Britain’s participation in the Afghanistan surge and in the Libyan intervention found 
Briton’s decisions in matters of foreign affairs to be decisively prudent and morally 
principled (Tomz & Weeks, 2013). Prudent in their war or intervention cost-benefit 
calculus as to whether either would damage their national interests or literally cost too 
much (Reifler, et al., 2014). Additionally, in each case Briton’s public opinion remained 
consistently against war and intervention, breaking sharply with their Members of 
Parliament (MPs) who remained staunchly supportive, indicating a disregard for elite cues 
(Reifler, et al., 2014). Indeed, in domestic matters, British public opinion tends to align 
generally with their leadership and party affiliation, vis-à-vis their political elites (Newton, 
1999; Reifler, et al., 2014, p. 50). Certainly, over the centuries, the relationship between 
 
169 Further, Tomz and Weeks (2013) indicate in their research that public opinion shows a special 
zone of peace amongst democracies. Their study found that democratic states were less likely to use 
military force against other democracies and regard such use as immoral (Tomz & Weeks, 2013). 
Conversely, a democratic state using force against an autocracy was more likely and perceived as just 
(Tomz & Weeks, 2013). Obviously, buttressing the democratic peace theoretic.  
170 Reverberation – how statements and actions of foreign actors (i.e., elites) reported by media 
sources can affect the domestic politics of another state, thereby, influencing the foreign policy decisions of 
that state (Putnam R. D., 1988; Strong, 2017) 
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British elites and publics has stood as distinctively different from other European 
countries.171 
Thus, the two-step flow may operate within Britain as it pertains to domestic issues; 
however, in the international affairs arena British publics appear to manifest an 
independence of mind separate from their elites (Best & Higley, 2018; Newton, 1999; 
Reifler, et al., 2014; Tomz & Weeks, 2013).172  This pattern of behavior displayed by their 
citizenry may manifest itself in the intrusive behavior of the would be British hacker. 
Indeed, their penchant for prudence and morality, particularly in their foreign interventions, 
may present itself in their intrusive activity (Reifler, et al., 2014; Tomz & Weeks, 2013). 
Further, as Tomz and Weeks (2013) discovered in their research, Brits find it morally 
wrong to attack another democracy. Particularly, a democracy whose relations with Britain 
is considered to be close, special, or unique such as their relationship with the U.S. (Bull, 
2012; Marsh, 2012; Oliver & Williams, 2016; Strong, 2017; Treharne, 2015). Since, as 
pointed out in the literature review, the media’s use of the term cyber-attack with all of its 
weaponized baggage may in this British case assist in deterring or dissuading the UK 
hacker population from intruding in U.S. networks (BBC, 2017; Kroft, 2015; Czosseck, 
Ottis, & Taliharm, 2013; FireEye, M-Trends, 2016; Gandhi, et al., 2011; Harris, 2017; 
Stavridis, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). Finally, as stated when one considers this 
evidence alongside the US–UK special relationship rubric, British hacker behavior could 
sharply break with that of the ordinary democratic intruder captured by the democracies 
 
171 Britain’s elites seem to possess an exceptionalism unique to others in Europe. Since the 
observations made by Alex de Tocqueville in the late-1700s, Britain’s nobles displayed uniquely different 
characteristics from their marriage practices to the ways in which elites treated their subjects (De 
Tocqueville, 1856). Britain was able to deftly weather the tumultuous era of the French Revolution, the 
deposing of the French monarchy, the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and an almost decade and half of 
constant war that followed (Best & Higley, 2018; Connolly, 1979; De Tocqueville, 1856). Further, the UK 
was able to soldier through the various exogenous shocks of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
managing internal social issues along the way through evolution not revolution. Indeed, British elites 
appear quite capable of skillfully making inclusive concessions (i.e., rights to citizenship) to previously 
disenfranchised elements of their population and by doing so avoiding the terribly destructive tendencies 
that personified the French Revolution  (Best & Higley, 2018; Connolly, 1979; De Tocqueville, 1856). 
Thereby, British elites have created a stronger bond of trust with their population, beyond that of most 
modern-day democracies. The most recent populist Brexit movement continues to highlight how British 
elites lack political trust in concept of the European Union, showing a continued trend of distrust in the 
continental elites and their methods (Best & Higley, 2018, p. 453). 
172 The most recent instantiation being the 2016 Brexit vote (Best & Higley, 2018). 
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model, where increases in NN material and verbal daily counts on a given day result in 
increasing intrusions on U.S. networks the next day. This British model may reflect an 
opposite reaction to these NN types.  
Further, reverberation may manifest itself as well. Meaning, increases in 
yesterday’s negative media polarization, resulting from differing views of U.S. elites’ 
opinions concerning British policies around some issue, could lead to increased intrusions 
today. As these British hackers’ resort to information seeking behavior to discern, for 
themselves, the reality of the issue at hand.  
Finally, over this period of analysis the UK drifted to a lower level of democracy 
from +10 to +8 (Freedom House, 2017; Freedom House, 2020). Due to the British 
government’s revision of their authority to surveil the population, because the previous 
laws governing these authorities were deemed illegal by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). These revisions coupled with the rise of anti-immigration sentiment, which 
ultimately led to the Brexit vote, to leave the European Union in 2016, taken together were 
viewed as a degradation of Britain’s position as a liberal democracy.173  As such, this 
provides another unique opportunity to observe how yesterday’s NN tone at varying levels 
of democracy leads to changes in today’s intrusions coming from Britain, in this case. Thus, 
similar to Turkey, one would expect at this discrete country-level of analysis that Britain’s 
response to increases in yesterday’s NN tone as their level of democracy decreases to result 
in increases in intrusions today. Further, as shown in Appendix J, British intruders tend to 
manifest a level of cyber sophistication similar to that of Turkey—intruding at the higher 
average risk level. Next, the research turns to reviewing the British version of the digital 
panopticon. 
The British appear to have avoided many of the negative aspects of employing the 
digital panopticon. Indeed, the main visual tell of the existence of the digital panopticon in 
Britain resides in the form of the ubiquitous closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras 
across the UK. The UK’s CCTV network is vast, numbering approximately 4.2 million 
 
173 Brexit was the British colloquialism used to describe the populist referendum to exit the EU 
(Freedom House, 2017). 
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devices (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). To place this in context, that is approximately one 
camera for every 14 UK citizens, which accounts for approximately 20% of the global 
CCTV installation (Morgan, 2013; Wu, Tao, & Chang, 2017). Impressive considering that 
Britain possesses roughly 0.86% of the earth’s population (CIA, 2019). 
Structurally, the UK has been able to avoid the incumbent suspicion of their 
ubiquitous use of public surveillance systems. Norris and Armstrong (1999) recorded that 
90% of Brits agreed with the use of CCTV systems. Further, many in Britain regard those 
who oppose CCTV’s use as heartless, perhaps due to the brutal murder of two children in 
Liverpool (1993), which may have been prevented, if this system had been in place (Wu, 
Tao, & Chang, 2017). Although, the British authorities have encountered some setbacks 
support for these types of automated system when used for police purposes, support 
remains solid amongst the general public in most locations.174 
Additionally, the British government’s common practice of conducting community 
audits that are intended to hear from and involve the local citizens in the planned use of 
public CCTV systems prior to its introduction certainly engenders public buy-in for 
deployment of these systems (Zurawski, 2004). Further, concerns that Britain will become 
an Orwellian surveillance state continually resonates across British media and their 
political spectrum with some periodicity (BBC, 2009; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Orwell, 
1949). Yet, Britain possesses a robust legal system resting on laws concerning surveillance 
that date back to 1990s and is strictly adhered to by government entities (Deibert & 
Rohozinski, 2010; Wu, Tao, & Chang, 2017; Zurawski, 2004). Perhaps their CCTV 
 
174 The troubles in the British province of Northern Ireland spanning from 1969 to 2007 provide the 
case in point. Centuries before, the British government established the province’s economic and 
governmental power structures, which strongly favored and benefitted the minority Protestants over the 
majority Catholics. In 1969, age old grievances borne out of existing systematic power structures boiled 
over leading to violent clashes between the two groups. The government immediately deployed military 
units to separate the two and keep the peace. As the troubles wore on, the Catholics and the Protestants 
created sophisticated surveillance networks to monitor each other and their intergroup members, while the 
British military attempted to surveil both to keep the peace using existing mechanisms of social control 
(Zurawski, 2004). Gradually, the military began emplacing CCTV towers, primarily surveilling the 
Catholic areas, revealing their government’s lack of neutrality in the troubles (Zurawski, 2004). Ultimately, 
as the 1998 peace initiatives began to gain traction and the military units began to withdraw, control of the 
state-of-the-art CCTV surveillance infrastructure devolved to the local police for crime prevention and 
security purposes. Nevertheless, due to the nearly thirty years of ubiquitous physical or virtual surveillance 
and control, the Catholic community in Northern Ireland still view the CCTV systems with disdain and 
suspicion (Zurawski, 2004). 
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deployment policies, their societal anxiety over becoming a surveillance state, and their 
robust structure of laws protecting individual rights and civil liberties produces a level of 
assurance that the British government will use these CCTV systems for crime prevention 
and security and not for societal control (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Freedom House, 
2020; Wu, Tao, & Chang, 2017).  
 
 
Figure 27.  United Kingdom – Case Study Hypotheses 
Finally, while there is evidence of the UK’s presence in cyberspace, overt action in 
what Valeriano and Maness (2015) would describe as cyber conflicts, disputes, or 
incidences remains non-existent. Although a Russian target of cyber incidences in 2011 
and 2014, any evidence of British retaliation remains muted (Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 
2018). Even though Britain’s cyber sophistication exists at a level on par with that of the 
other Five Eyes members, they apparently prefer to constrain their employment of it or 
clandestinely channel their cyber retaliations through the Five Eyes infrastructure, thereby, 
masking their capability and intent. Thus, just as Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness (2018) 
propose that the Five Eyes mechanisms and cooperative activities extend the US’s cyber 
capabilities, so to, the alliance may offer certain advantages to Britain as a silent partner in 
cyber conflicts, disputes, and incidence. Certainly, an unverifiable conjecture at the 
unclassified level of analysis, but entirely plausible. Accordingly, by considering all of the 
Hypothesis #22 (H22): Increasingly conflictual (i.e. negative) material and verbal 
interactions reported in British media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) or its 
interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from the UK, 
on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #23 (H23): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an 
increased level of media polarization, across media stories originating from the UK 
directed at the US and its interest—yesterday, results in increased in cyber intrusion 
activity on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #24 (H24): Increases in the accumulated conflictual or negative tone of 
interactions reported in media narratives from the UK directed towards the United States 
(U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. 
networks—today, with the effect becoming stronger as Britain’s level of democracy 
decreases. 
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information provided about Britain in this section, the hypotheses delineated in Figure 27 
below are provided for testing by the statistical model used throughout this research 
project. Now the research changes focus to the other democracy in this study—India. 
2. India in the Third Wave 
India stands as the world’s largest democracy with a population of 1.3 billion 
citizens, with 72% primarily Indian with 80% practicing the Hindu faith (CIA, 2019). 
India’s large predominantly homogenous population tend to be voracious consumers of 
media from diverse sources with 90% checking news sources at least once a day (Aneez, 
Neyazi, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2018; CIA, 2019). However, with a 32% internet 
penetration rate, television and broad sheet newspapers still dominate, but their rate of 
growth continues to decrease (Aneez, Neyazi, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2018). Further, 
Indian’s media consumers continue to use news from diverse sources numbering between 
11.2 to 5.7 outlets per media consumer—a rate higher than most peer countries (Aneez, 
Neyazi, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2018, p. 13; Freedom House, 2019). Thus, while 
Indians are voracious consumers of diverse news sources, the population still looks to the 
old-guard or more recently the nouveau—elites for their interpretation of policy and media 
stories to gauge their potential reactions on a given subject as drawn out in the V‒Dem and 
other research (Mechkova & Lindberg, 2016; Mohan, 2015; Natarajan, 2014; Oldenburg, 
2018). As such, India, most likely more properly aligns with the All-Regimes, autocracies, 
and anocracies models; thus, it should be expected that yesterday’s negative material 
narratives will correlate positively, while the verbal narratives clock a diminishing impact 
for intrusions on U.S. networks today. 
Along with this information, India manifests a labyrinth of elites spanning from 
National, to State, and to the local village level (Oldenburg, 2018). Consequently, India’s 
population, more so than other democracies, looks to either their time-honored elites or 
neo-elites involved in social movements to interpret contemporary events (Bjola & Manor, 
2018, Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Higley & Burton, 2006; Mechkova & Lindberg, 
2016; Mohan, 2015; Natarajan, 2014; Oldenburg, 2018; Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017; 
Trumbore, Boyer, Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000). Further, like most other 
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democracies, the Indian media exemplifies the cacophony of voices that make up the 
competing narratives as the country attempts to influence another nation in diplomatic 
negotiations (Bjola & Manor, 2018, Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Mechkova & 
Lindberg, 2016; Natarajan, 2014; Oldenburg, 2018; Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017; 
Trumbore, Boyer, Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000). So, after initial increases in NN 
tone leading to increases in Indian media polarization, the population increasingly looks to 
their elite structure in the two-step process, operating within level-two of domestic politics 
to make sense of international events. So, increases in yesterday’s NN tone in Indian 
narratives about the U.S. may cause an increase in today’s intrusions—initially. But, the 
much more dominant effects expected out of the India model will result from the two-step 
flows operation as manifested by negative material and verbal narratives and NN media 
polarization.  
Certainly their citizens’ attempts to tease out the truth as may be indicated by 
changes in NN tone, but at times, the Indian government and the courts have blocked 
information considered politically sensitive, which allows the government to control the 
narrative surrounding such issues (Aneez, Neyazi, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2018; 
Freedom House, 2019). All of these elements come together causing Indian citizens to look 
to their elites for their opinions on events, which subsequently, influences their actions. 
This became acutely apparent with the 2009 roll out of the technologically enabled unique 
identification project (UID), known as Aadhaar (in the Hindi language the word means 
foundation) (Goodman, 2015; Rao & Nair, 2019, p. 469; Shahin & Zheng, 2020, p. 25). 
Domestically, a few years earlier than China’s Social Credit System (SCS), and for 
different reasons, India embarked on development of the Aadhaar system in an attempt to 
take account of everyone in their population (Goodman, 2015; Rao & Nair, 2019, p. 469; 
Shahin & Zheng, 2020, p. 25). The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) began 
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and currently runs the Aadhaar program, which was originally envisioned to end the chain 
of corruption endemic to the Indian social welfare system (Shahin & Zheng, 2020).175   
Enter Aadhaar, which was envisioned to register every one of India’s 1.3 billion 
citizens, attempting to capture unique attributes of each individual’s identity, thereby 
allowing welfare payments to be made directly into the recipient’s bank account, thus 
cutting many elements in the bureaucracy out of the transfer chain (Rao & Nair, 2019). 
Ostensibly, this was indeed the intended purpose of this biometric system to ensure their 
unique identity.176  Indian media and elites used Foucault’s argument that without the 
ability to discretely identify each individual in society any government system would be 
rife with corruption, thereby hampering planned growth and development (Foucault & 
Ewald, 2003; Rao & Nair, 2019). As of 2019, the UIDAI had nearly completed registering 
the entire population and each citizen had knowingly exchanged their name, age, gender, 
address fingerprints, iris scan, and facial photograph for a twelve-digit unique identification 
code (Rao & Nair, 2019; Shahin & Zheng, 2020). Next, the Indian government made it 
mandatory for their citizens to possess this code to gain access to a variety of financial, 
governmental, and social services such as bank accounts, insurance policies, gas subsidies, 
tax payments, etc. (Rao & Nair, 2019, p. 476; Shahin & Zheng, 2020).  
Further, Indian media coverage and elite voices, at the beginning, tended to focus 
initially on the benefits of the program to the average citizen, while blithely vaulting over 
the fundamentally obvious privacy issues brought about by the collection of each citizen’s 
biometric and personal data (Shahin & Zheng, 2020). It was not until the 2013–2014 time 
frame, after the project was well underway that India’s news media began reporting and 
 
175 Previously, welfare payments or transfers made by the India government to poorer citizens flowed 
through the nation’s massive bureaucracy; however, as the money flowed through the system, bureaucrats 
or other nefarious characters along the way would take their cut of the payment ending up with the average 
beneficiary receiving very little of the dedicated subsidy (Rao & Nair, 2019; Shahin & Zheng, 2020). 
Policy Officials in India estimate that only about 15% of each rupee (i.e. India’s currency) spent makes it to 
the intended welfare beneficiary (Rao & Nair, 2019, p. 473). Blunting the intended effect of the social 
welfare systems, which was intended to assist the poor in India society, not facilitate corruption within the 
bureaucracy. 
176 Initially, the UIDAI used fingerprints alone as the biometric of choice to ensure individual 
identity; however, in India where most labor in done by hand, fingerprint quality can be of quite low 
quality (Rao & Nair, 2019, p. 475). Thus, UIDAI decided to add iris scan into the unique set of biometrics 
collected on each individual (Rao & Nair, 2019, p. 475).  
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Indian elites began voicing concerns about the privacy issues inherent to this type of 
mandatory data collection (Dixon, 2017; Goodman, 2015; Rao & Nair, 2019; Shahin & 
Zheng, 2020).  
Subsequently, as in all these cases technology moved faster than government 
policy. Elements of the government began to find uses for Aadhaar to ostensibly track 
criminals, illegal immigrants, and other people within the population who were not citizens 
of India. As recent as 2017, the Indian legislature had enacted very few laws to protect the 
data much less the citizens against the wrongful use of their data by rogue government 
employees or the technology companies that made Aadhaar a reality (Dixon, 2017; 
Goodman, 2015; Shahin & Zheng, 2020). All the while, the government continued to build 
out their version of the digital panopticon, even as evidence of Aadhaar’s abuses continued 
to mount (Dixon, 2017; Goodman, 2015; Shahin & Zheng, 2020).  
Indeed, India, unlike China’s SCS, had unwittingly created the means to achieve 
the digital panopticon via Aadhaar to fix the governmental problem of a citizen’s physical 
identity, while simultaneously and perhaps unintentionally creating a sophisticated system 
to surveil and track its own population. Now to adjust the focus, turn to India’s external 
cyber presence. 
The 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai shook the very foundations of the Indian 
government, pointing to their collective ineptitude in cyberspace (Deibert R. J., 2013, pp. 
92-94). As such, this singular event, coinciding with a spate of corrosive hacks originating 
from China, propelled India into the expansive use of second-generation content controls 
in the name of none other than national security concerns (Deibert R. J., 2013; Deibert R. 
, 2015). Indeed, the Indian administration followed the well-worn path of multiple other 
states across the regime spectrum by enacting vaguely written laws to compel commercial 
vendors such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Research in Motion (RIM), and Yahoo to 
establish a proactive prescreening system to ferret out any objectionable content and 
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remove it (Deibert R. J., 2013, pp. 92-94).177  Again, as in many other cases, this directive 
to remove internet content was accompanied by exceedingly broad and imprecise language 
of what constituted objectionable content, coupled with precisely targeted legal 
ramifications for non-compliance.178  As a case in point, executives would be subject to 
fines and up to seven years in jail for not complying (Deibert, 2013, pp. 92–94).  
To address India’s internal lack of cyber acumen, the government created the 
National Technical Research Organization (NTRO), their version of the NSA in the U.S., 
to reach out virtually to an interdisciplinary group specializing in cyber espionage at the 
University of Toronto known as Citizen Lab run by Dr. Ronald Deibert (Deibert, 2013). 
The Lab found their request simultaneously astonishing and illuminating. The requested 
revealed India’s lack of cyber prowess, their willingness to accept outside help, and their 
readiness to outsource cyber issues, if necessary, to handle the Chinese threat (Deibert, 
2013). While the author found the events surrounding these incidents as chronicled by 
Deibert (2013) profoundly riveting, a complete rendering here lies well beyond the scope 
of this research.  
Suffice it to say, that even though this research has discovered that the Chinese 
prefer mass over sophistication in their intrusion tactics, their penetration into India 
networks prior to 2010 was vast, thorough, and complete. Subsequently in 2013, India set 
upon an ambitious plan to quickly develop a cyber capability to include ethical hacking 
techniques and a half a million strong cyber army (Deibert, 2015; Ministry of Electronics 
and Information Technology, Government of India, 2020). This evidence supports what 
many scholars and world leaders have posited over the centuries: quantity does, indeed, 
 
177 The most infamous was India’s aggressive pursuit of RIM to comply with their “lawful access” 
demands. These demands required RIM to host their data on servers within India and assist the government 
in its surveillance requirements (Deibert R. J., 2013, p. 94 & 109; Deibert R. , 2015, p. 67). At times, even 
threated to expel RIM from India entirely if the company chose not to comply with their requirements 
(Deibert R. J., 2013, p. 109; Deibert R. , 2015, p. 67). Ultimately, this relentless pressure led RIM to 
acquiesce to India’s cyber mandates. Even agreeing to train Indian cyber experts in specialized surveillance 
techniques (Sharma, 2011). 
178 The mixture of laws resides in India’s Information and Technology Act of 2008, specifically 
Section 69, and the Information Technology (Intermediate Guidelines) of 2011 (Deibert R. J., 2013). 
Explicitly in Section 69 of the 2008 Act, the government is empowered to act in the sovereignty, integrity, 
defence, and security of India, which provides quite expansive legal authorities that the Indian regime 
appears intent on using extensively  (Deibert R. J., 2013).  
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have a quality all its own (Lipow, 2016). Next, to wrap up this section, the research will 
offer a few hypotheses about India. 
 
 
Figure 28.  India – Case Study Hypotheses 
Nevertheless, India swiftly built a largely defensive cyber infrastructure, restrained 
and regional in its use. Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness (2018) counted only 7 cyber 
incidents with India as the antagonist between 2000 and 2014. All of these incidents 
proceeded through a malicious vector seeking to achieve their primary objective of 
subversion (~86%) with the remainder focused on an information seeking intent (~14%) 
(Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018). India reached their objective in each case but may 
not have achieved their attempt to coerce their dyadic adversary; however, coercion may 
not have been their goal. Their goal appears more to push back against regional rivals and 
to defend their country’s public and private enterprises in cyberspace.  
First, as the empirical evidence indicated, India should exemplify the impact of 
yesterday’s negative media events on today’s intrusions on U.S. networks, tracking closely 
with the All-Regimes, autocracies, and anocracies model as posited in H25 and H26 above. 
Second, NN polarization in the Indian media should produce a dampening effect on today’s 
intrusions, as the population looks to the elites for answers, as conjectured in H27. Third, 
increases in yesterday’s NN tone in Indian media in reference to the U.S. is expected to 
Hypothesis #25 (H25): Increasingly conflictual (i.e. negative) material interactions reported in 
Indian media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) or its interests—yesterday, results in 
increased on cyber intrusion activity, emanating from the India, on US networks—today. 
Hypothesis #26 (H26): Increasingly conflictual (i.e. negative) verbal interactions reported in 
Indian media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) or its interests—yesterday, results in 
decreased on cyber intrusion activity, emanating from the India, on US networks—today.  
Hypothesis #27 (H27): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an 
increased level of media polarization, across media stories originating from India, directed at the 
US and its interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—
today. 
Hypothesis #28 (H28): Increases in the conflictual or negative tone of interactions reported in 
media narratives from India directed at the U.S. and its interests—yesterday, results in increased 
cyber intrusions on U.S. networks—today. 
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increase cyber intrusions on U.S. networks today as per H28 above. Again, running 
opposite to democracies in this aspect. Next, a short review of democracies and the model 
evidence previously discussed. 
C. EVIDENCE OF MEDIA EFFECTS IN CYBERSPACE 
A quick review of Chapter Three’s finding about democracies seems prudent at this 
point. First, as with the All-Regimes, autocracies and anocracies models, negative material 
narratives yesterday result in a rise in cyber intrusions on U.S. networks today. However, 
unlike the three previous models, yesterday’s negative verbal narratives do not produce a 
subsequent decrease in today’s intrusions on U.S. networks. The reader can find both 
results graphically depicted in Figure 10 in Chapter III. Second, NN polarization within 
democracies seems to track in sign direction consistent with All-Regimes and anocracies, 
but opposite of autocracies. This finding results from the fact that some democracies may 
lack confidence in the veracity of their country’s media outlets, as discussed in the India 
section above (Aneez, Neyazi, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2018; CIA, 2019). 
As previously posited, this could be the result of the sheer cacophony of partisan 
arguments, opinions, and voices emanating from manifold elite groups reported in 
democratic media environments (Bjola & Manor, 2018; Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; 
Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017; Trumbore, Boyer, Gibson, Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000). As 
such, the theoretical linkage between the two-step process and level-two, while it may exist 
for democracies, cannot be as clearly explained here as in the other models. While the 
democracies model allows for the acceptance of H1, H2, and H5—explanatory nuances 
beyond these remain as qualitative conjectures.179  
 
179 Hypothesis #1 (H1): Increases in the number of conflictual material interactions reported in the 
media narratives of other sovereign states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, 
regardless of regime type, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
 Hypothesis #2 (H2): Increases in the number of conflictual verbal interactions reported in the 
media narratives of democratic states directed at the United States (U.S.) and its interests—yesterday, 
results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
 Hypothesis #5 (H5): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased 
level of media polarization, across media stories originating from democratic and anocratic states directed 
at the U.S. and its interest—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—
today. 
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Third, the first-order interactive variable depicts the relationship between NN tone 
yesterday and, in this case, the democratic countries at varying levels of democracy as 
shown in Figure 9 of Chapter III. In the evidence sections below, the research will ascribe 
each country to their given polity score broken out on the z-axis, representing each level of 
democracy. For example, India represents those democracies scoring 9 on the scale and is 
but one of the eighteen countries with that score   Appendix G contains a complete listing 
of the eighty-eight democracies considered in this study.  
Nevertheless, the graphic provides evidence for rejection of H7, because even 
though all of the lines for democracies at polity levels of 7, 8, and 9 record decreasing 
intrusions today as yesterday’s NN tone increases, the line depicting the higher democracy 
countries does not decrease as rapidly with a higher mean value above that of lower-level 
democracies. Thus, Figure 9 shows how those +7 countries represented by the red line 
record a drastic decrease in today’s intrusions, dropping ‒40 per day across the x-axis from 
right to left. Today’s intrusions for those +9 countries captured by the green line score a 
drop of only ‒3 per day at that democracy scale, which appears almost flat. The analysis 
will return to this interesting aspect in the country case studies below. 
1. British Evidence 
Interestingly, like Iran and Russia both the negative material and verbal narratives 
record a negative coefficient value. Both are depicted in comparison to the All-democracies 
model in Figure 30 and Table 8. Very interesting findings indeed, which deserve some 
exploration and explanation. Rarely, if ever, has a material negotiation within this dyad not 
resulted in a win-set suitable to both these long-standing allies (Buckley, 2004; Marsh, 
2012; Nicholson, 2019; Oliver & Williams, 2016; Reifler, et al., 2014; Stoddart, 2016; 
Strong, 2017; Tomz & Weeks, 2013; Treharne, 2015). Further, it appears by the negativity 
of the coefficient and its statistical significance indicates that any negative verbal rhetoric 
used by the UK toward the U.S. is viewed by its hacker population as posturing by their 
leadership to achieve some marginal gain in the win-set. Thus, taken together this provides 
further evidence that these long-standing allies rarely get cross and that the United 
Kingdom’s intrusion community is not mobilized by negative verbal rhetoric unlike other 
 192
Democracies as shown in Figure 30. This explanation, coupled with the Third Wave 
discussion above, the negative coefficients and, the statistical significance, allows for the 
acceptance of H21 and the rejection of the null.180 
Next, observe that NN polarization coefficient positively correlates with 
subsequent intrusions. A finding similar in sign direction to both Turkey and China. Yet, 
the explanation for this finding tracks closer to Turkey than China, which will be drawn 
out later. 
Now, observe the negative tone interaction coefficient, which is recorded in this 
analysis manifesting the UK’s drop in level of democracy in 2016 from +10 to +8. As 
discussed earlier, this was precipitated by the UK government’s revision of surveillance 
policy, rising anti-immigrant sentiment resulting in the Brexit referendum, all of which 
were viewed as symptoms of the deterioration of their liberal democracy. Like Turkey, this 
provides yet another unique opportunity to analyze this variable at the country-level and 
the results as hypothesized run similar to Turkey’s. Notice in Figure 29, how Britain’s 
polity score of +10, depicted by the dark green dashed line, records a ‒496 drop in today’s 
intrusions across the x-axis range as a result of the increases in yesterday’s NN tone, while 
the dark red dotted line indicating Britain’s decrease in score to +8 clocks an increase of 
+332 in today’s intrusions across the x-axis as a result of yesterday’s increase in NN tone. 
This finding is consistent with the UK discussion above and the conjectured hypothesis, 





180 Hypothesis #21 (H21): Increasingly conflictual (i.e., negative) material and verbal interactions 
reported in British media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) or its interests—yesterday, results 
in decreased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from the UK, on U.S. networks—today. 
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Table 8.   Results of Negatives Narratives Models for the United Kingdom 
and India 
CYBER INTRUSION ATTEMPTS (Democracy Comparison) 
 Dependent Variable 
 TotalIntrusions ‒ Today 
 Poisson Model 
Yesterday’s Independent Variables 
/ Model All Regimes All Democracies 
United 
Kingdom India 
Negative Material Narratives 0.03*** 0.03*** ‒0.27*** 0.22*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) 
Negative Verbal Narrative ‒0.24*** 0.08*** ‒0.19*** ‒0.18*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) 
NN Gold_Mean (Tone) ‒0.003*** 0.23*** ‒0.63*** ‒0.01** 
 (0.001) (0.01) (0.06) (0.003) 
NN Gold_SD ‒0.01*** ‒0.03*** 0.06*** ‒0.20*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
Polity ‒0.01*** 0.77*** ‒0.02  
 (0.0001) (0.02) (0.02)  
Internet Not Free 0.12*** 0.08***   
 (0.003) (0.005)   
Media Not Free ‒0.21*** ‒0.12***   
 (0.003) (0.003)   
Media Self-Censorship 0.08*** 0.04***   
 (0.003) (0.003)   
Friday 0.22*** 0.29*** 0.53*** ‒0.91*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) 
Saturday 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.07*** ‒0.25*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sunday ‒0.32*** ‒0.27*** ‒0.31*** ‒0.15*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) 
NN Gold_Mean x Polity 0.002*** ‒0.03*** 0.07***  
 (0.0001) (0.001) (0.01)  
Constant ‒4.49*** ‒5.99*** ‒0.67 ‒11,174.95*** 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.65) (337.85) 
Observations 40,608 24,126 288 288 
MAE 36.9 22.2 140.2 399.0 
RMSE 581.0 202.8 432.0 1,176.5 
AIC 2,512,547.6 767,059.7 35,507.4 108,732.1 
Log Likelihood ‒1,256,240.8 ‒383,496.8 ‒17,728.7 ‒54,342.1 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Further, Britain possesses a sophisticated cyber population with a 95% internet 
penetration rate, and their hacktivists chose to salve their curiosity to find out what they 
are missing, due to this manifest reduction in freedoms, as the NN tone increases. As their 
level of cyber sophistication indicates in Appendix J, intruding at the highest level of 
intrusion risk 68% of the time. As such, this supports the acceptance of H24, showing that 
increases in NN tone of yesterday’s UK narratives about the U.S. results in an increase in 
today’s intrusions, as their polity score decreases.181  
 
Figure 29.  Negative Narrative Tone Results: United Kingdom. 
Finally, notice the line depictions of the material and verbal negative daily narrative 
counts and average marginal effects table in Figure 30. Observe how both lines trends 
negative as discussed and posited. Both predicted values swing to the negative direction 
with material scoring a marginal decrease across the x-axis range 125 times below and 
verbal recording a marginal drop twenty-one times faster than the predicted values for 
democracies. Perhaps, a real indicator of Briton’s belief in their close relationship with the 
 
181 Hypothesis #24 (H24): Increases in the accumulated conflictual or negative tone of interactions 
reported in media narratives from the UK directed towards the United States (U.S.) and its interests—
yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today, with the effect becoming 
stronger as Britain’s level of democracy decreases. 
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Figure 30.  Media Results Comparison: United Kingdom.  
Media Variable Prediction Comparison Table: United Kingdom 
Model or Regime Type /            
Calculated Variable Democracies United Kingdom 
Difference from 
Democracies 
















Average Marginal Effect (AME) 
Negative Material Narrative (NmN) 
Negative Verbal Narrative (NvN) 
Negative Narrative Polarization (NNp) 
Standard Error (SE) 
 
Statistical Significance – p-Level: 
 *p < 0.01; **p < 0.001; ***p < 0.0001 
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Next, notice how the magenta line, characterizing the effect of yesterday’s NN 
polarization in the UK media, pitches up scoring a dramatic increase in today’s intrusions, 
seventeen times greater than the predicted marginal effect for democracies, as quantified 
in the table at the bottom of Figure 30.182  Further, consider the UK’s tolerance for NN 
media polarization tracking in variation range at 3% less than democracies as a group.183  
Perhaps, as discussed in the UK section above this could be an indication of the impact of 
media reverberation. As, yesterday’s media stories become more negatively polarized, 
increases in intrusions occur the following day because the polarization creates cognitive 
dissonance causing the astute UK hacktivist community to salve their curiosity online. 
Thus, as each of these coefficients are statistically significance in Table 8 and align with 
the evidence provided in Figure 30, when viewed together, this provides evidence in 
support of H21 and H22, allowing for their combined acceptance and rejection of the 
null.184  Now to analyze India in the same manner. 
2. Indian Evidence 
First, notice the negative material and verbal coefficients for India in Table 8. The 
negative material narratives coefficient tracks in sign value clocking a marginal increase 
in forecasted intrusions nearly twenty-seven times higher than democracies across the x-
axis range, as shown in the table at the bottom of Figure 32. Secondly, the negative verbal 
narratives coefficient in the table tracks opposite in direction scoring a marginal drop in 
today’s forecasted intrusions over the range, six times less than the aggregated democracies 
model. Interestingly, India tracks in negative sign for verbal narrative effects with all the 
other countries in the study, except China.  
 
182 Change in average marginal effect on intrusions today resulting from yesterday’s NN polarization 
scores a ‒1.82 for democracies and a +29.33 for Britain clocking a difference of +31.15 as shown in Figure 
30. Consequently, the magnitude of the change between the two is 31.15 / 1.82] = 17.1 ~ 17.  
183 Drawn from the middle frame of Figure 32 [(9.8 – 9.5) / 9.8 = .03 ~ 3%. 
184 Hypothesis #21 (H21): Increasingly conflictual (i.e., negative) material and verbal interactions 
reported in British media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) or its interests—yesterday, results 
in decreased cyber intrusion activity, emanating from the UK, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #22 (H22): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an increased 
level of media polarization, across media stories originating from the UK directed at the U.S. and its 
interest—yesterday, results in increased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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Next, notice how yesterday’s NN tone variable scores a negative coefficient (‒
0.01), which equates to an amplifying effect over the NN tone range and comes in at a 
lower (p < 0.05) level of statistical significance. Further, observe how the green dashed 
line, in Figure 31, for India stands atop the other green lines for the countries captured by 
the democracies interactive coefficient combining NN tone and level of democracy, rising 
at a rate four times higher than the other democracies with a polity score of +9. One can 
easily discern how India, as compared to the twenty other countries depicted in the solid 
dark green line, scores an increase in intrusions today as yesterday’s NN tone about the 
U.S. increases. This differs in impact and sign value from media sources residing in those 
countries scoring a +9 level of democracy. Thus, even when considering the lower level of 
statistical significance for this coefficient, in view of this statistical and graphical evidence, 
presented in Table 8 and Figure 31 respectively, H27 can be accepted and the null 
rejected.185  These findings seem to validate the conclusion made in the Reuters Institute 
report on India indicating that 90% of those surveyed accessed news media reports at least 
once a day, which implies, based on the below depicted result, that Indians are quite 
sensitive to media tone (Aneez, Neyazi, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2018). Also, this may 
provide evidence of the operation of the two-step process within level-two of domestic 
politics within India. 
 
 
185 Hypothesis #27 (H27): Increases in the conflictual or negative tone of interactions reported in 
media narratives from India directed at the U.S. and its interested—yesterday, results in increased cyber 
intrusions on U.S. networks—today. 
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Figure 31.  Negative Narrative Tone Results: India. 
Now, returning to yesterday’s negative material and verbal narrative coefficients as 
show in Figure 32. Notice, how they are both graphically correlated with intrusion’s today. 
Further, by observing their values in Table 8 with NN material and verbal scoring +0.22 
and ‒0.18, respectively, one can see that India tracks precisely in sign with democracies, 
but at an incremental rate 137 times higher for material narratives. India’s negative verbal 
marginal effect drops nearly 193 times faster over the predicted intrusion range, as depicted 
in the table at the bottom of Figure 32. 
Indeed, India, like Turkey for anocracies, seems to epitomize what has been posited 
in this research that for certain regime types and countries the two-step flow process seems 
operate within level-two of domestic politics as depicted in the logic map in Appendix C. 
Thus, while India’s leadership is engaged negotiations with the U.S. in level-one of 
international politics, the labyrinth of India elites signal to the population to give their 
leadership room to negotiate, which is indicated in the drop of intrusions today based on 
yesterday’s negative verbal narratives. 
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Figure 32.  Media Results Comparison: India. 
Media Variable Prediction Comparison Table: India 
Model or Regime Type /            
Calculated Variable Democracies India 
Difference from 
Democracies 
















Average Marginal Effect (AME) 
Negative Material Narrative (NmN) 
Negative Verbal Narrative (NvN) 
Negative Narrative Polarization (NNp) 
Standard Error (SE) 
 
Statistical Significance – p-Level: 
 *p < 0.01; **p < 0.001; ***p < 0.0001 
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Subsequently, when a tangible result is realized, the elites, either themselves or 
possibly through social movement affiliations, signal to resume or increase intrusion 
activity, as indicated by the rise of intrusions resulting from yesterday’s negative material 
narratives. Again, this is not to indicate directionality of these effects. Certainly, material 
can precede verbal or vice versa. Nevertheless, increases in the number of yesterday’s 
negative material and verbal narratives expressed by India about the U.S. results in an 
increased or decrease in the level of intrusions, respectively, on U.S. networks today. Thus, 
this finding provides the requisite support for the acceptance of H25 and H26, rejecting the 
null in each case.186  
Next, observe the NN media variance or polarization coefficient notching the 
highest negative value (‒0.20) which tracks in sign direction with the democracies model, 
dropping at an average marginal rate 193 times faster than democracies, as depicted in the 
table at the bottom of Figure 32. Further, note how India’s NN polarization variation range 
scores only 3% less than democracies as a group.187  As for India, this appears to showcase 
their population’s tendency to absorb media content from a diversity of sources; yet, 
tending not to react to the NN polarization of yesterday’s narrative. To some this may stand 
in stark contrast to the effects of NN tone above; however, each variable measures different 
things. NN tone measures tenor of media stories, while NN polarization gauges the 
divergence of media narratives, which buttresses the acceptance of H27.188 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter began with an overview of democracies and how they view the use of 
cyberspace—free and open. Surveillance of actions on the internet is governed by legal 
 
186 Hypothesis #25 (H25): Increasingly conflictual (i.e., negative) material interactions reported in 
Indian media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) or its interests—yesterday, results in increased 
on cyber intrusion activity, emanating from the India, on U.S. networks—today. 
Hypothesis #26 (H26): Increasingly conflictual (i.e., negative) verbal interactions reported in Indian 
media narratives directed at the United States (U.S.) or its interests—yesterday, results in decreased on 
cyber intrusion activity, emanating from the India, on U.S. networks—today.  
187 Drawn from the middle frame of Figure 32 [(9.8 – 9.2) / 9.8 = .06 ~ 6%.  
188 Hypothesis #27 (H27): Increases in the variation of negative narrative tone, indicating an 
increased level of media polarization, across media stories originating from India, directed at the U.S. and 
its interests—yesterday, results in decreased cyber intrusion activity on U.S. networks—today. 
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frameworks mainly focused on terrorism, the protection of children from exploitation, and 
the theft of intellectual property or copyrights (Deibert, 2015; Goodman, 2015; 
MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011). Certainly, some democracies employ first-generation 
internet content controls but rarely resort to second-generation controls, mostly in those 
cases outlined above (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert R. J., 2013). Yet, some 
democratic policy makers have fallen into the seductive policy heuristic (i.e., thought trap) 
of outsourcing policing of internet content to third party providers, who, driven by the 
profit motive may quickly censor the issue du jour, which could lead to censoring of 
democratic voices on a larger scale (MacKinnon, 2012; Morozov, 2011). 
Yet, in this research, Britain stands out as applying the rule of law to their citizens’ 
cyber interactions over outsourcing their responsibilities to police content to private sector 
ISPs, regardless of their colossal use of CCTV across the country. Their citizens remain 
confident in the government’s just use of their CCTV surveillance methods. Further, the 
average British citizen appears to exercise an independence of mind different from most 
other countries on the planet, usually sharply breaking with the aristocratic elites on foreign 
affairs issues. Most Britons find it immoral to attack other democratic countries, 
particularly the U.S., with which Britain has enjoyed a manifestly special relationship for 
over a century. 
These findings play out quite nicely in the research conducted here. NN material 
and verbal stories in yesterday’s UK press, about the U.S., both result in negative 
correlation by this set of coefficients on today’s intrusions. This set of results are uniquely 
different from democracies. Further, yesterday’s NN tone negatively correlates with 
today’s intrusions when Britain’s scored a +10 in level of democracy, but then shifted to 
positive correlation when they incurred a drop in polity score to +8. This parallels the 
findings for Turkey showing how shifts in level of democracy can impact intrusions as the 
effect of NN tone becomes progressively more negative. Finally, the intrusion risk factor 
counts, shown in Appendix J, reveal that the British do possess a high level of cyber 
sophistication, when they choose to exercise it. Thus, providing evidence that high 
penetration rate democracies possess high end cyber capabilities. Yet, on the international 
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stage Britain remains silent, perhaps relying on their Five Eyes partners to respond on their 
behalf. 
At the other end of the democratic spectrum lies India, which stands out as 
discretely different, in most respects, from the UK but seems to closely align with 
democracies in negative material narrative and NN polarization impact on intrusions. Each 
recording a magnifying or dampening effect, respectively. 
Thus, India, whose population dwarfs the UK by comparison, catalogues many of 
the issues incumbent with having so many citizens. First, creating a unique identification 
system (i.e., Aadhaar) to account for its vast inhabitants attempting to fix existing welfare 
corruption issues. Creating an IT system (Aadhaar) that seems to address the main issue, 
but simultaneously results in the creation of a digital panopticon. This fact in conjunction 
with their V‒Dem (2019) scoring internet and media as not free, and Freedom House 
(2020) scoring as partially free highlights India’s differences and challenges. 
Yet, India tracks precisely in direction aligning with democracies for yesterday’s 
negative material narratives and NN polarizations influence on today’s intrusions on U.S. 
networks. Further, India’s NN tone yesterday trends negative producing a positive impact 
on today’s intrusions. These findings provide evidence of how India’s population manifests 
diverse media consumption habits; yet, their elaborate elite structure, based in the caste 
system, still holds sway over their reactions to media narratives. This research provides 
evidence of the operation of the two-step process within level-two of domestic politics 
within India, as yesterday’s negative verbal media narratives and NN polarization show 
dampening effects on today’s intrusions. The Indian elites signal their population to reduce 
intrusion activity to provide their leadership with room to negotiate at level-one of 
international politics or attempt to make sense of the diverse media space rife with NN 
polarization. However, once the result of the level-one negotiations becomes known, elites 
signal a return to normal or even a heightened level of intrusions as indicated by the effects 
of negative material narratives and increases in NN tone. 
Finally, India appears to lack cyber proficiency, seeking to use low risk intrusion 
techniques. The values shown in Appendix J indicate this lack of cyber proficiency as India 
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apparently prefers low risk intrusions, choosing quantity over quality. This finding is 
similar to that of China, where evidence from this research showed that Chinese hackers 
follow the same methods. This finding sets nicely with India’s minimal involvement in the 
international aspect of cyberspace, seeking only to push back against its regional rivals. 
Therefore, this case study winds to an end with similar discoveries to those made 
in the previous case study chapters. First, when comparing the individual country to their 
regime type countries, culture, political context, and their evolutionary setting matter. 
Second, unlike the other countries surveyed across this research, democracies appear to 
manage the domain while simultaneously realizing they cannot control it, which allows 
their civil societies to use it as their populations deem necessary, using generational 
controls sparingly and only when necessary. Nevertheless, as differences abound, so do 
parallels and similarities, which were drawn out in this research. Yet, each country, with 
its own culture and context, arrives at those similarities following, decidedly, very different 
paths. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. MEDIA EFFECT IN CYBERSPACE 
In this exploration of media effects in cyberspace, the research used discrete 
country-day counts of the sources of cyber intrusions drawn from a single server on a U.S. 
network as the dependent variable, with the independent variable drawn primarily from the 
Phoenix data set, recording the rate of negative media narratives directed by countries 
toward the United States. The research drew out some interesting differences and 
similarities between regime types and countries across the breadth and period of analysis.  
This chapter will begin by reviewing the conclusions drawn from the variations and 
parallels across the negative narrative model results. First, this section will analyze the 
major findings of this research comprising the material and verbal narrative effects on 
subsequent intrusions on U.S. networks. Second, it will summarize how negative media 
polarization impacts intrusions on U.S. networks. Third will be the analysis of the 
multiplicative interaction effects of negative media tone and each country’s level of 
democracy, to include country-level differences and similarities. Finally, the chapter will 
conclude with recommendations for future research in the media effects and cyberspace 
arena. 
B. CONCLUSIONS: MEDIA EFFECTS IN CYBERSPACE 
1. Material and Verbal Negative Narratives 
The analysis of the regime-type models for democracies, anocracies, and 
autocracies drew out some interesting differences and parallels. The first difference 
surfaced when comparing the types of narratives (i.e., material or verbal) across the regime-
type models. Autocracies showed a drop in today’s intrusions when compared to an 
increased number in yesterday’s verbal negative narratives. The democracies recorded the 
opposite impact, while anocracies generated no impact. This reveals three separate 
conclusions.  
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First, autocracies, in general, seem to be able to dampen intrusion activity on U.S. 
networks, while their leadership is engaged in verbal discourse in level-one negotiations 
with the U.S. The supposition was that as their country’s leadership engaged with the U.S. 
in level-one dialog, their elites would cue the citizenry at level-two, encouraging them to 
reduce their intrusions or through the use of generational content controls constrain 
intrusions on U.S. networks on the following day (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Putnam, 
1988). This would indicate that two-step process flow, where elites digest the regime’s 
current narrative and relay its content to the general population, was operating within level-
two of domestic politics in autocracies (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944). 
Second, due to this multiplicity of verbal negative narratives in a democracy, the 
opposite effect occurs. This finding indicates that either two-step flow does not operate in 
democracies within the level-two discussions or there is simply too much media noise 
generated by the manifold partisan elites within democracies, to produce a discernable 
signal of the flow’s effect within level-two deliberations (Bjola & Manor, 2018; 
Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Putnam, 1988; Strong, 2017; Trumbore, Boyer, Gibson, 
Harvey, & Wilkenfeld, 2000). In contrast, autocracies and anocracies, normally with a 
single party or group in charge, can and do rheostat the internet and control media 
messages, thereby cuing their publics to act accordingly. 
Thirdly, anocracies score a neutral impact resulting from verbal negative narratives. 
Coupled with the minimal negative impact of narrative polarization and the moderate 
growth across the material narrative range, this indicates the strict control anocracies place 
on their sovereign internet space and media narratives. As pointed out in the model design 
chapter, anocracies generate a robust coefficient value for media self-censorship with a 
slope value ten times greater than All-Regimes and thirteen times greater than democracies, 
the only other models that estimated a value for this coefficient. These taken together 
indicate extensive use of generational content controls by anocracies, within their unique 
digital panopticon structures. 
Moreover, yesterday’s material negative narratives produce consistently positive 
effects on succeeding cyber intrusions across the All-Regimes and regime-type models, 
except for Turkey which produces a positive effect with no statistical significance. Since, 
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Turkey was embroiled in a period of political upheaval and locked in a state of emergency 
during the period of analysis, this may explain the lack of statistical significance. Yet, the 
preponderance of these findings supports the conclusions made above. 
Anocracies and autocracies each rheostat today’s intrusions, either neutralizing or 
decreasing them as yesterday’s level-one verbal negative narratives increase. By allowing 
subsequent intrusions to increase following the increasing number of yesterday’s material 
negative narratives, this would signify an end to the negotiation and the realization of a 
negative tangible result. Thus, this negative outcome for the country, as indicated by the 
negative material narratives, cues the elites to prompt the population to resume or increase 
today’s intrusions on U.S. networks. Secondarily, the regime may ease generational content 
controls, making it easier for intruders affiliated with either the government or some social 
movement to ply their tradecraft. Again, this directionality of explanation with verbal 
proceeding to material is provided here for ease of understanding; certainly, events could 
happen in the opposite manner. 
To further buttress the theoretical evidence of the finding discussed above, 
democracies track slightly higher and in consistent sign direction with the other two 
models’ material negative narratives. Due to the sheer cacophony of differing media 
narratives, democratic partisan elites and their audiences cannot discern any unanimity of 
message. Consequently, democratic hackers manifest very little change in their intrusive 
practices based on type of narrative (i.e., material vs. verbal). 
As the research delved into the country-level case studies, certain differences within 
regime types and similarities across regime-type boundaries began to surface. Yesterday’s 
material negative narratives effect China and India by tracking quite closely in direction 
with their corresponding regime-type models. On the other hand, Turkey scores a positive; 
yet, statistically insignificant impact on today’s intrusions resulting from yesterday’s 
material negative narratives. This Turkish finding could be a result of the political turmoil 
discussed above, the fact that Turkey remains an ally of the U.S., the sheer paucity of 
material observations scoring a maximum of 8 on any given day, or any combination of 
these explanation could apply. 
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In contrast, Iran, Russia, and Britain tack opposite in direction to each of their 
corresponding regime-types. The explanation for Iran and Russia resides in their well-
known use of first through third generation content controls coupled with their extensive, 
manifest use of internet throttling and filtering techniques. To improve the argument, their 
use of generational controls further demonstrates that the internet residing within their 
borders is a sovereign domain similar to air, land, sea, and space. Thus, any intrusive 
actions beyond their sovereign borders in cyberspace could be viewed as state sponsored. 
As for Britain, this negative coefficient value could be explained by the fact that the U.S. 
and the UK share a well-documented special relationship and their population’s distain for 
any aggression towards other democracies. 
This diversity in trends continues in the effects of verbal negative narratives. 
Patterns reveal China’s ability to subtly rachet down intrusive behavior during verbal 
jostling with the U.S. at level-one of international politics. Further, the PRC leverages their 
intergovernmental elite structure coupled with their extensive use of generational content 
controls. Once the verbal jousting has ended and a tangible result is realized, the PRC uses 
the same methods to rheostat up their patently intrusive cyber behavior. This finding 
provides evidence of the operation of the two-step flow within level-two of China’s 
domestic political narrative. Iran and Russia swing consistent with their respective regimes 
types for the same reasons described above.  
Regarding India, Turkey, and the UK, the explanation for the negative coefficient 
value remains similar because they are all allies of the U.S., even though each has its own 
discrete culture. As for Britain, the reasoning is similar to the material negative narrative 
explanation above. India appears to starkly manifest the two-step process operating within 
level-two of domestic politics as shown by the wide swing from verbal negative narratives 
resulting in fewer subsequent intrusions, to material negative narratives clocking an 
increase in ensuing intrusions. These findings point directly to operation of the two-step 
flow reinforcing the level-two domestic politics narrative for India. 
As for Turkey, the explanation is tied to a shift in foreign policy. During this period 
of analysis, Erdoğan and the AKP steered away from their age-old policy of viewing 
Turkey as the bridge between the cultures of the east and west to a two-tiered policy. First, 
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regionally Turkey adopted the zero problems with their neighbors policy and secondly, 
they began to execute a policy of rhythmic diplomacy to maintain their presence 
internationally (Dedeoglu, 2016; Hussain & Hussain, 2017; Tabansky, 2016). This meant 
that their NATO allies could no longer rely on Turkey to be a hedge for the west against 
Chinese or Russian aggression. Further, this positioned Turkey as a more neutral player / 
partner in the region and internationally. Turkey’s shift to a more restrained posture seems 
to manifest itself in cyberspace with anocracies recording a statistically insignificant 
coefficient close to zero for verbal negative narratives with a marginal effect on today’s 
intrusions fourteen times less than the same value of anocracies. Thus, the shift in policy, 
the rampant political upheaval, the lustration of AKP’s ex-domestic allies—the 
technologically savvy Gülenists—from governmental positions, and the state of emergency 
all came together positioning the AKP as the reigning elites. AKP elites used this newfound 
position to buttress their new policy of non-aggression regionally and consistent 
engagement internationally at level-one by controlling the domestic political narrative at 
level-two using their now exclusive instrument—the two-step flow. 
Finally, to close out the review of negative narrative types, note that Britain stands 
out as decidedly different from democracies in the effects of both material and verbal 
negative narratives. The marginal effects of yesterday’s material and verbal negative 
narratives were estimated at 125 times and twenty-one times less than other democracies, 
respectively. Here the explanation is twofold: the average Briton appears to have a moral 
aversion to attacking another democracy and the U.S. enjoys a special relationship with 
Britain both historically and through a multitude of treaties. As such, UK hackers appear 
disinclined to be mobilized by negative narratives about the U.S., at least in the intrusion 
realm. Thus, it appears that the special relationship between the U.S. and Britain crosses 
into the intersection between media events and cyberspace. 
2. Negative Narrative Media Polarization 
Next the analysis turns to the negative narrative polarization results. As proffered 
in the hypotheses, democracies and anocracies see a decrease in subsequent intrusions as a 
result of increases in negative media polarization yesterday. These findings align with the 
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arguments made above for both negative narrative types. Anocracies’ tighter control of 
media messaging and use of generational content controls appears to produce a slight 
marginal dampening effect, recording a 37% drop below the result seen in the All-Regimes 
model. Democracies seem to be either reviled or confused by the negative media 
polarization, resulting in an 87% drop in marginal effects compared to all other regimes. 
However, autocracies swing in the opposite direction in response to negative media 
polarization leading to a thirty-fold increase in succeeding intrusions over the predictions 
of the All-Regimes model. Apparently, autocracies manifest control of the internet and 
media spaces leaves their technologically savvy hacktivists with little choice other than to 
indulge in information seeking behavior beyond their borders. Also, this could be the result 
of a coordinated effort by the regime to rachet up the rhetoric to essentially mobilize their 
hacktivist population. Either is plausible. 
China seems to reflect the latter, leveraging its colossal elite PRC structure to 
mobilize or demobilize their hacktivists, following similar theoretical mechanisms aligning 
with the material and verbal explanations above. Iran and Russia oscillate in the opposite 
direction with the former clocking a ten-fold drop and the later scoring fourteen-fold drop 
in marginal effect on today’s intrusions resulting from yesterday’s media polarization 
below their respective regime types. Russia follows anocracies in direction; yet, Iran tracks 
opposite of autocracies with both showing a higher dampening impact on subsequent 
intrusions. When considering each and the explanations made above concerning material 
and verbal narratives, this finding appears to further buttress the argument that both 
countries retain solid control of their internet and media space. 
The results for Turkey move in the opposite direction to its regime type, as do the 
results for Iran and Russia, but for different reasons. Turkey records a seven-fold increase 
in the average marginal impact on intrusions over anocracies resulting from yesterday’s 
NN polarization. Further, Erdoğan and the AKP seems to exercise greater control over their 
negative media variation, recording a maximum variance 22% less than all anocracies. 
Nevertheless, this increase in intrusions resulting from increases in media polarization may 
be emanating from the recently purged, technologically astute Gülenists, or spurned 
secularists, who are seeking to understand the narrative beyond Turkey’s AKP controlled 
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media space. The fact that 93% of the intrusions originating from Turkey come in at the 
highest intrusion risk level serves to support this argument, as seen in Appendix J. 
India aligns with democracies, while Britain runs in the opposite direction. As 
stated, India’s media space is quite diverse with 90% of the population accessing news 
media reports at least once a day. Thus, their population is firmly engaged in the media 
space, with manifold diversity, so they simply are not triggered by it and become 
increasingly disinterested as that polarization increases, showing marginal effects for 
polarization far smaller than those observed in other democracies. 
Britain comes in opposite to both India and democracies, recording an average 
marginal increase in today’s intrusions seventeen times higher than that predicted across 
all democracies. Perhaps this could be a manifestation of the independent-minded Brits 
who seek to salve the cognitive dissonance created by increasing negative media 
polarization and indulging in information-seeking behavior. This increase in negative 
media variability led to a degradation in the UK’s liberal democracy due to changes in their 
surveillance laws, a rise in anti-immigration sentiment, and Brexit, their break with the 
European Union. These events, occurring over this period of analysis, could have fused 
together in the minds of independent Brits, leading to a spike in information seeking 
behavior. Further, evidence of this phenomenon, in regards to Britain, will be provided 
during the analysis of the first-order interaction between negative narrative tone and level 
of democracy. 
3. Negative Narrative Media Tone and Level of Democracy 
The interaction term combining negative narrative tone and level of democracy 
(i.e., polity score) also records some interesting findings. First, autocracies and 
democracies saw an increase in the level of intrusions as the level of democracy increased 
within their discrete regime-types, a finding which ran opposite the conjectured hypothesis. 
However, the analysis of anocracies bore out where the posited phenomenon occurred, 
recording findings in-line with hypothetical expectations where decreases in today’s 
intrusions resulted from increases in negative narrative tone as the level of democracy (i.e., 
polity score) increased. These findings can be reviewed graphically in Appendix H.  
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Second, Britain and Turkey each provided a unique opportunity to extend this 
hypothesis and test it at the country-level, because each country experienced a degradation 
in level of democracy over this period of analysis. The study of each drew out results 
substantively similar to those predicted for anocracies. Thus, for each country, intrusions 
on U.S. networks today increased as yesterday’s narrative tone became increasingly 
negative, in combination with the coincidental drop in their level of democracy. All of the 
other countries showcased in this analysis remained in their distinct level of democracy 
throughout. 
Next, Figures 17 and 19 in the autocracies’ case study chapter graphically depict 
China’s and Iran’s negative narrative tone effects across the x-axis as compared to the first-
order interaction between the two variables for the regime-type. Within these figures, 
China and Iran are both incorporated in the line scoring ‒7.189  As the figures depict, both 
countries track closely with other autocracies at their level of democracy. Interestingly with 
this set, it seems that the countries that are more democratic intrude more, while those 
autocrats scoring less than ‒7 intrude less. Perhaps this is a result of these countries having 
a more rivalrous relationship with U.S. than the more autocratic countries, which includes 
Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia at the extreme ‒10 polity score.  
Whereas India, which is similarly depicted in Figure 31, scores an increase as NN 
tone becomes increasingly negative at a lower level of statistical significance (p < 0.05). 
Yet, this level of significance rises to a point allowing one to posit that Indians appear to 
be moderately triggered by increases in NN tone, opposite in direction to NN polarization 
with a smaller impact. Russia scores a statistically insignificant value for this coefficient.  
Thus, for autocracies and democracies, regime intrusions may diminish as negative 
narrative tone increases, but the level of intrusions increases as these countries within each 
regime-type bin (i.e., ‒10 to ‒6 for autocracies) become more democratic. However, for 
anocracies, the opposite is generally true—more intrusions result today from yesterday’s 
 
189 The other seven include: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Kuwait, Laos, and Vietnam (see 
Appendix G). 
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negative narrative tone as countries within this bin become less democratic. Certainly, this 
provides an opportunity for further study. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH OF MEDIA EFFECTS ON CYBER INTRUSIONS 
One place to look for evidence of democratic peace in cyberspace might be by 
applying this model and analysis to other close relationships between democracies. For 
example, one could analyze Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, as members of the Five 
Eyes, to discern if they manifest the same type of hacker behavior toward the U.S. This 
could possibly place a finer point on the broad nature of the theory, which still largely rests 
mainly on qualitative arguments. 
Second, one could proceed by focusing this intrusion research on those states with 
shifting levels of democracy over a period of analysis to discern if the above findings 
presented for Turkey and the United Kingdom still hold. Third, by exposing these models 
to different intrusion data sets, either captured by a different IDS or by an IDS in the private 
sector, would enhance the reliability and validity of this statistical correlation model in 
assessing media effects in cyberspace. 
Certainly, this dissertation has encountered many twists and turns in the exploration 
of this phenomenon, unearthing manifold differences and similarities between countries, 
both across and within regime-types. Ultimately, the outcome of media effects on 
cyberspace intrusions depends on the given country’s unique culture, political context, and 
evolutionary setting. Indeed, each country’s behavior, operation, and presence in 
cyberspace depends on each of these components simultaneously. 
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APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
The definitions used and created in this research are composed of language that is 
combined, synthesized, and frequently taken verbatim from the cited source(s). This 
glossary precisely establishes the terms of reference or terminology in an effort to create 
general understanding and to standardize the explanations of the amorphous, diverse, ever-
changing environment where cyberspace and media events comingle. In doing so, the 
definitions necessarily draw from established language of expert sources, as cited, to 
propose recognizable yet directed terminology for the field. When language has been 
copied verbatim from a source, the page or section number is provided in the citation. 
 
A. 
Active measures ‒ describes the employment of an array of operationally covert 
and overt psychological methods intent on polluting and subverting the opinion-
making process of an adversary (Inkster, 2016, pp. 28-29; Metzl, 1974; 
Snegovaya, 2015, pp. 14-15; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 2018, pp. 114-115) 
Activism ‒ a doctrine or practice that emphasizes direct vigorous action 
especially in support of or opposition to one side of a controversial issue 
(examples: political activism or environmental activism) (Webster, 2017, sec. 
“activism”); to normal, non-disruptive use of the Internet in support of an agenda 
or cause (Denning, 2001, p. 1). 
Activist – a person involved in activism; engaged in activities to include 
browsing the Web for information, constructing websites and posting materials 
on them, transmitting electronic publications and letters through e-mail, and 
using the internet to form coalitions, or to plan and coordinate specific activities 
(Denning, 2001, p. 1). 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) is a statistical test approximating the 
predictive accuracy through the use of out of sample prediction error or deviance 
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(McElreath, 2016, p. 189). AIC penalizes models that try to overfit the dataset by 
using too many parameters or explanatory variables. 
Anocracy ‒ a form of government that is neither a full democracy nor an 
autocracy; often times referred to as a mixed democracy or hybrid regime 
(Marshall & Cole, 2014, p. 21). 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) ‒ the theory and development of computer systems 
able to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence, such as visual 
perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translation between 
languages (Oxford Dictionary, 2015, sec. “artificial intelligence”). 
Autocracy – a form of government where citizen participation is severely 
curtailed, restricted, or suppressed; chief executives are selected according to 
clearly defined (usually hereditary) rules of succession from within the 
established political elites; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power 
over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, most of 
civil society (Marshall & Cole, 2014, pp. 20-21).  
Average Marginal Effect ‒ predicts the marginal change (effect) in a dependent 
variable, as depicted on a graph’s y-axis, for each per unit change of a given 
independent variables across the x-axis. 
B. 
Benign Hacking – hacking motivated by the desire for knowledge (Himma, 2008, 
p. 200).  
Biometric – the measure or analysis of unique physical or behavioral 
characteristics (i.e., fingerprints, eye scans, voice patterns, keystroke rhythm, etc.) 
used specifically as a means of verifying personal identity (Webster, 2017, sec. 
“Biometric”).  
Botnet(s) – host of networked computers forced or clandestinely compromised and 
controlled by a remote user or hacker to perform an array of functions. Botnets 
constitute free (stolen) computational or network resources leveraged to conduct 
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malicious activity on the internet, such as denial of service, defraud internet 
advertisers, etc., while masking the identity of the remote operator (Singer & 
Friedman, 2013, p. 44). Hackers use tailored malware to clandestinely take over 
and exploit a computer or networks resources for their own purposes (Singer & 
Friedman, 2013). Hackers use various methods to propagate their customized 
malware via automated or non-automated means (Shin, Lin, & Guofei, 2011). 
Broadband Services ‒ a mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides 
the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all 
Internet endpoints, including any capabilities that are incidental to and enable the 
operation of the communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access 
service (Federal Communications Commission, 2020, p. 19741; Jordan S. , 2017, 
pp. 405-507). 
C. 
Civil Society ‒ the self-generating and self-supporting communities of people who 
share a normative order and volunteer to organize political, economic, or cultural 
activities that are independent from the state or state functions (Diamond, 1994, 
p.5; Hussain, 2016, p. 7). 
Competitive Advantage – is the unique ability of a state to utilize its resources 
effectively, managing to improve its value and position itself ahead of its economic 
or military rival (Choucri, 2012; Diehl & Goertz, 2001; Porter, 1991; Valeriano, 
Jensen, & Maness, 2018; Vasquez & Leskiw, 2001) 
Computer Worm ‒ stand-alone software, known as Malware that requires no host 
program to replicate within the information system or execute its intended purpose 
(Goodman, 2015). 
Conflict ‒ is a disagreement on preferred outcomes (Valeriano & Maness, 2015, 
p. 32). 
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Cyber ‒ interactions through the use of computers or digital information systems 
or networks (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 40; Valeriano & 
Manness, 2015, p. 22) 
Cyber-attack ‒ a cyber-operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is 
reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction 
to objects (Schmitt, 2013, pp. 91-92). 
Cyber conflict ‒ the use of computational technologies in cyberspace for 
malevolent [or] destructive purposes in order to impact, change, modify 
diplomatic, economic, [or] military interactions between entities [state or non-
state] short of war and non-contiguous to a battlefield  (Valeriano & Maness, 2014, 
pp. 348-351; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, p. 5). Cyber Attacks occur within cyber 
conflicts. 
Cyber dispute ‒ specific campaigns between two states using cyber tactics during 
a particular time-period and contains one to several incidents, often including an 
initial engagement and responses (Valeriano & Maness, 2014, p. 349). Cyber 
Attacks may occur within cyber disputes. 
Cyber domain ‒ see Internet ~ synonymous usage with internet throughout this 
paper. 
Cyber Exploitation – refers to the use of cyber offensive actions-perhaps over an 
extended period of time-to support the goals and missions of the party conducting 
the exploitation, usually for the purpose of obtaining information resident on or 
transiting through an adversary’s computer systems or networks (Valeriano & 
Maness, 2015, pp. 49-50).  
Cyber Intrusion – an event or combination of multiple events, that constitutes a 
cyber-incident in which a hacker or an intruder gains, or attempts to gain, access 
to information residing on an information system (IT) or networks, without having 
authorization, in violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable 
use policies (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 61; Maness & 
Valeriano, 2016, p. 310; Valeriano & Maness, 2014; Vatis, 2001. pp. 11-12). For 
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example, methods used to remotely accessing a network for the purposes of 
stealing, gathering, or exfiltrating information. 
Cyber Incident ‒ a. an occurrence or set of occurrences that result in an actual or 
potentially adverse effect on an information system, network, and/or the 
information residing therein (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 
40). b. an individual action or cyber operation launched against a state, by another 
state or non-state actor as part of an ongoing cyber dispute or conflict (Valeriano 
& Maness, 2014, p. 349; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). 
Cyberspace – see Internet ~ synonymous usage throughout this paper with internet. 
Cyberzone ‒ a sanction electronic space (i.e., state sponsored – intranet), which 
only can access authorized state provided information (Deibert & Rohozinski, 
2010).  
D. 
Dataveillance – a. surveilling individual behavior through the intensive data trails 
their digital behavior generates. b. surveilling individuals through computational 
means and digital information, which has become easier for government entities 
to trace, an individual or groups behavior, than was possible in the past because 
of the historical reliance on heavier forms of architectural or institutional 
surveillance means (Clarke, 1988; Galič, Timan, & Koops, 2017, p. 29). 
Dictator’s Dilemma – pits the dictator or autocrats desire for control and slow 
implementation of the internet and associated technologies against the fact that 
any country or state not connected to the internet will fall behind economically 
and technologically – both of which pose threats to the longevity of an 
authoritarian regime (Al Jazeera, 2018; Shirky, 2011; Morozov, 2011). 
Digital Bonapartism ‒ essentially a populist demagogue, who uses democratic 
oratory and symbolism to legitimize their rule and political leadership through the 
manipulation of public opinion by controlling digital media, networks, or 
platforms (MacKinnon, 2012, pp. 66‒67). 
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Digital Panopticon ‒ an internet enabled, digital version of a structural design and 
theoretical concept that allows a single individual to monitor an entire institution 
without the observed subject’s awareness of their observation. This presumes that 
if individuals ‒ such as prisoners, students, workers, or citizens ‒ understand that 
they may be under observation at any time; these individuals will act as though 
they are under examination; thus, they will self-police (Foucault, 1977, p.216; 
Loadenthal, 2018 pp.1-3; Manokha, 2018, pp.219-237; Pinkaew, 2016, pp. 195-
214). 
Direct action ‒ any action that achieves its desired goal (i.e., civil disorder, civil 
strife, civil disorder, civil violence, or any state sponsor variations thereof) and 
spans from cyber to kinetic measures (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Deibert, 2015; 
King M. L., 1963; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; MacKinnon, 2012; McAdams, 
McCarthy, & Zald, 1999) 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) ‒ an attack in which multiple compromised 
computer systems attack a target, such as a server, website or other network 
resource, and cause a denial of service for users of the targeted resource. The flood 
of incoming messages, connection requests or malformed packets to the target 
system forces it to slow down or even crash and shut down, thereby denying 
service to legitimate users or systems (Beaver, 2018, sec.”DDOS”). 
Doxing ‒ revealing personal documents publicly, as part of a protest, prank, or 
vigilante action. Often doxing requires minimal network penetration, relying more 
on careful research to link hidden personal or embarrassing data to the victim 
(Singer & Friedman, 2013, p. 46). 
Dyad – an interaction between two elements or parts, in this case two states or 
countries (Oxford Dictionary, 2015, sec. “dyad”). 
E. 
Elite – individuals and small, cohesive groups who wield a disproportionate level 
of power or influence affecting national and supranational political outcomes in a 
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substantial way on a continuing basis (Best & Higley, 2018, p. 3; Higley & Burton, 
2006, p. 14). Throughout this text, elite is synonymous with opinion or proximate 
leader. 
Emergence – a classic systems principle indicating the effectiveness of a Systems 
of Systems; patterns and properties in a complex system come about (emerge) as 
the system operates; these patterns and properties cannot be anticipated beforehand 
or derived from an understanding of system elements or their individual properties 
(Johnson IV, Tolk, & Sousa-Poza, 2013, p. 284; Keating, 2009, p. 209). 
Explain – see Explanatory inference below. 
Explanatory inference ‒ to derive and compare hypotheses about the hidden 
frameworks that may be responsible for the data (i.e., cyber-intrusions), then use 
an epistemic branch of science, in this case statistical correlation, to test the 
strength of the hypothesized relationships between the dependent variable and 
independent or explanatory variables (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, pp. 190-201). 
F. 
Fourth Estate – the idealized role of journalism is that it serves as a “watchdog,” keeping 
government honest and watching out for the interests of people (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 
2001, pp. 50-53). 
Framing – a. in the media narrative (effects) context is defined as deliberate efforts 
by groups of media professionals (i.e., reporters, journalists, editors, etc.) to 
mediate a shared understanding of world events by creating a narrative that 
resonates, and possibly influences, the audience’s schemata of an event either 
experienced or re-counted by a given actor (i.e., politicians, lobbyists, advocates, 
experts, moral entrepreneurs, intellectuals, elites, witnesses) (Ball-RoKeach & 
DeFleur, 1976; Benford & Snow, 2000; Carroll & Hackett, 2006; Habermas, 2006; 
McAdams, McCarthy, & Zald, 1999; Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011; Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2007; Werder, 2009). 
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Freeware ‒ (a.k.a. Public Domain Software) software not protected by copyright 
laws of any nation that may be freely used without permission of or payment to 
the creator, and that carries no warranties from or liabilities to the creator 





Hack ‒ a. to gain unauthorized access to computers or to computerized, 
information systems or networks, (Floridi, 2008, p. 8; Himma, 2008, pp. 191-192; 
Webster, 2017, sec. “hack”); b. related form ‒ Hacker, noun; c. related form ‒ 
Hacking, transitive verb. 
Hacker ‒ an expert at programming and solving problems with a computer; a 
person who gains unauthorized access to and sometimes tampers with 
information in computers, information systems or networks (Committee on 
National Security Systems, 2015, p. 56; Floridi, 2008, pp. 3-24; Himma, 2008, 
pp. 191-192; Webster, 2017, sec. “hacker”). 
Hacking ‒ refers to acts in which a person or groups of people gain unauthorized 
access to computers, information systems or networks (Floridi, 2008, p. 8; 
Himma, 2008, pp. 191-192; Webster, 2017, sec. “hacking”). 
Hacktions – actions conducted within an information system (i.e., computer, 
server, computer network, or through the internet) by a hacker (Samuel, 2004b, 
pp. 129–130).  
Hacktivism – a. refers to the marriage of hacking and activism. It covers operations 
that use hacking techniques against a targets Internet site with the intent of 
disrupting normal operations but not causing serious damage. Examples are Web 
sit-ins and virtual blockades, automated e-mail bombs, Web hacks, computer 
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break-ins, and computer viruses and worms (Denning, 2001a, pp. 70-75); b. the 
commission of an unauthorized digital intrusion for the purpose of expressing a 
political or moral position (Himma, 2008, pp. 200-201); c. the (sometimes) 
clandestine use of computer hacking to help advance political causes (Manion & 
Goodrum, 2000; pp. 14-19); d. the nonviolent use of illegal or legally ambiguous 
digital tools in pursuit of political ends, combining the transgressive civil 
disobedience with the technology and techniques of computer hackers (Samuel, 
2004a, p. 2); e. related form Hacktivist, noun or adjective. 
Halal – in Arabic means lawful, referring to any object or act considered as 
permissible under Islamic law (MacKinnon, 2012, p. 55). 
I. 
Indexing ‒ the way in which journalists write their narratives (i.e., stories) by 
reporting the voices or viewpoints of prominent officials who because of their 
position of influence may affect the outcome of the situation (Bennett, 1990; 
Strong, 2017). Journalist perform the function of indexing to ensure they adhere 
to professional standards of balanced, fair, and objective reporting, which is 
reinforced by normative editorial standards (Bennett, 1990; Strong, 2017). 
Information Seeking Intent ‒ the active and intentional actions in cyberspace, set 
upon executing acts of cyber espionage (i.e., intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance) to exfiltrate or gather information specifically from or out of a 
target’s IT networks (Case & Given, 2016; Clarke & Knake, 2010; Denning, 2011; 
Gandhi et al., 2011; Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015; Kello, 2013; Samuel, 2004a). 
Information System (IS) ‒ a discrete set of information resources organized for the 
collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of 
information (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 65). 
Information Technology (IT) ‒ includes all categories of ubiquitous technology 
used for the gathering, storing, transmitting, retrieving, or processing of 
information (e.g., microelectronics, printed circuit boards, computing systems, 
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software, signal processors, mobile telephony, satellite communications, and 
networks). Synonymous with Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
(Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 67). 
Instruments of National Power ‒ Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic 
(DIME) (Farlin, 2014, pp. 9-38; Mattis, 2018, p. 4) 
Internet Protocol (IP) ‒ standard protocol for transmission of data from source to 
destinations in packet-switched communications networks and interconnected 
systems of such networks (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 70). 
Internet ‒ the single, interconnected, worldwide system of commercial, 
governmental, educational, and other computer or digital information systems or 
networks that share (a) the protocol suite specified by the Internet Architecture 
Board (IAB) and (b) the name and address spaces managed by the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (Committee on National 
Security Systems, 2015, p. 70; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, pp. 9-17). Used 
throughout this paper as synonymous with the World Wide Web (WWW), 
cyberspace, or cyber domain. 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) ‒ an organization that provides access to the 
Internet, as well as other services such as web hosting or e-mail. It is a primary 
control point, since all traffic from an individual or organization flows through its 
ISP (Singer & Friedman, 2013, p. 47). Synonymous with Internet Provider in this 
paper. 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS): Software that automates the process of 
monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing 
them for signs of possible incidents and attempting to stop detected possible 





Liberalism ‒ an analytical approach to international relations where states are part 
of a global society that modulates their interactions based on norms and rules 
established through interaction, initially through transnational and more recently 
international trade (Nye, 2007, p. 288). National borders signify moral importance 
because states represent the collective ideals and rights of the peoples inhabiting 
them; thus, it follows that respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a 
given state shows respect for the rights of its citizens (Nye, 2007, pp. 23–24; 
Walzer, 1977; Walzer, 1980).  
M. 
Malicious Vector ‒ an intrusion, infiltration, or exploitation of IT systems to steal 
intellectual property, a person’s identity, or execute a cybercrime comprise the 
lattice of cyber actions and goals form its’ the boundaries (Choo, 2011; Goodman, 
2015; Sharp, 2017; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). These observable actions seem 
intent on causing financial, psychological, or reputational harm to the target (i.e., 
individual or government). 
Malware –software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process that 
will have adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an 
information system. A virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that 
infects a host. Spyware and some forms of adware are also examples of malicious 
code, hardware, firmware, or software that is intentionally included or inserted in 
a system for a harmful purpose (Cichonski, Millar, Grance, & Scarfone, 2012, p. 
60; Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 79).  Also see computer 
worm. 
Material Conflictual (Negative) – physical acts of a conflictual nature, including 
armed attacks, destruction of property, assassination, embargos, naval blockades, 
etc. (Schrodt, 2017, p.20). 
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Material Cooperative (Positive) – physical acts of collaboration or assistance, 
including receiving or sending aid, reduce bans, reduce sanctions, etc. (Schrodt, 
2017p. 20). 
Mean Absolute Error (MAE) – is the measure of the average absolute difference 
between the actual and model calculated residuals over a given time series (Levine, 
Berenson, & Stephan, 1998, pp. 690-693).  
Media-Effects Theory – a. the deliberate and non-deliberate short and long-term 
within-person changes in cognitions (including beliefs), emotions, attitudes, and 
behavior that result from media use (Valkenburg, Peter, & Walther, 2016, p. 316). 
b. Elements of media effects include timing (immediate vs. long-term), duration 
(temporary vs. permanent), valence (negative or positive), change (difference vs. 
no difference), intention (or non-intentional), level of effect (macro vs. micro), 
direct (or indirect), and manifestation (observable vs. latent) (Potter, 2012, pp. 35-
36). 
N. 
Narrative Theory – the institutionalized use of semiotic structures or codes to 
allow narrators (i.e., authors) and readers to communicate through texts; thereby, 
allowing the reader to understand and make sense of a given situation described in 
the story (Barbatsis, 2004; Kearns, 2005). b. information that actively engages the 
senses using language to create structure that draws in the reader or listener, 
intentionally, leaving out pieces of information, or the other side of the story, in 
an effort to engage the reader or listener by inviting them to us their imagination 
to fill in the missing information and discern what really happened (Wake, 2009, 
p. 674). 
Neo-Liberalism ‒ similar to liberalism except that state actions are constrained by 
economic interdependence and international institutions (Nye, 2007, p. 288). 
Netizen ‒ citizen of the internet (Diamond, 2010; Lindsay, 2014).  
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Network(s) ‒ Information system(s) implemented with a collection of 
interconnected components. Such components may include routers, hubs, cabling, 
telecommunications controllers, key distribution centers, and technical control 
devices (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 86). 
O. 
Opinion Leader – see Elite. 
P. 
Performative Hacktivist – refers to the use of cyber offensive actions—perhaps 
over an extended period of time (Samuel, 2004a, pp.129–130). 
Polity ‒ the design or constitution of a politically formed state or country; in this 
context it means to describe the form of governing institutions spanning from 
Democracies, to mixed governments such as Anocracies, through to totalitarian 
regimes or Autocracies (Polity IV, 2018; Webster, 2017, sec. “polity”) 
Polyvocality ‒ means there is no objective truth, no single official version of a 
story, no preferred interpretation or reading of the events, rather, the story is 
derived from many voices and multiple differing points of view from which the 
single narrative is created (Wake, 2009, pp. 673-677). 
Q. 
R. 
Reflexive Control ‒ explains the use of tailored information (i.e., media narratives) 
that would influence an opponent or rival to voluntarily make the pre-determined 
decision created, framed, and preferred by the preparer or originator (a.k.a., 
opposing state in a conflictual dyad) (Thomas, 2004, pp. 237-238; Valeriano, 
Jensen, & Maness, 2018, pp. 113-114).. While similar to perception management, 
reflexive control focuses on control of the subject ‒ in this case public opinion of 
a state or the civil society within a target country (Thomas, 2004, p. 237). 
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Reverberation – how statements and actions of foreign actors (i.e., elites) reported 
by media sources can affect the domestic politics of another state, thereby, 
influencing the foreign policy decisions of that state (Putnam,1988, pp. 454–456; 
Strong, 2017, pp. 293–294). 
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) ‒ is the square root of the model’s variance 
residuals or the difference between the observed values of the data collected and 
the model’s predicted values. It provides an indication of how well the model 
predicts the response. The lower the RMSE the better the explanatory variables 
predict the response variable (Ludecke, 2019, p. 19). 
Router ‒ a device that mediates the transmission routes of data packets over an 
electronic communications network (i.e., the Internet) (Webster, 2017, sec. 
“router”). 
Rivalry ‒ is a relationship between two states whereby through a series of 
connected disputes both sides use, with some regularity, their instruments of 
national power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, or economic (DIME)) to 
telegraph threats, to employ coercion or intimidation tactics in order to gain some 
competitive advantage over the other (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016; 
Diehl & Goertz, 2001; Farlin, 2014; Porter, 1991; Valeriano, Jensen, & Maness, 
2018; Vasquez & Leskiw, 2001). Rivalries take on psychological manifestations 
of their enmity towards each other, which include suspicion, mistrust, hatred, and 
demonization (Maoz & Mor, 2002). This psychosis seems to permeate all level of 
civil societies (i.e., masses to elites) engaged in a rivalrous behavior (Maoz & Mor, 
2002). Further, opponents view accommodations, made by the other, in actions, 
deeds, or statements with bias suspicion, whereas, hostility consistently defines 
the true essence of a rival’s intentions or attitudes (Jervis, 1976; Heradstveit, 1979; 
Maoz, 1990; Maoz & Mor, 2002). 
S. 
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Server ‒ a computer in a network that provides services (such as access to files or 
shared peripherals or the routing of e-mail) to other computers in the network 
(Webster, 2017, sec. “server”). 
Social Control ‒ the rules and standards of society that circumscribe individual 
action through the inculcation of conventional sanctions and the imposition of 
formalized mechanisms (Webster, 2017, sec. “social control”). Used in and 
throughout this text as synonymous with Societal Control. 
Social Media ‒ forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social 
networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to 
share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos) 
(Webster, 2017, sec. “social media”). 
Semantic substrate – a substratum of the synthetic layer that contains the 
information and knowledge created, manipulated, and utilized by humans in our 
day-to-day life. Access to this substrate comes through the physical through the 
syntactic. Information that is exfiltrated, manipulated, or stolen resides in the 
semantic substrate (Libicki, 2007, pp.8-10; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, pp. 22-24). 
Subversive Intent ‒ the desire to undermine the constitution, the integrity, or the 
authority embodied in a rival’s ability to exercise control over their established 
institutions or entities defines subversive intent (Rid, 2012, p. 22; Valeriano & 
Maness, 2015, pp. 33-37). 
Surveillance – a. to watch from above; to keep a close watch over someone, b. 
‘sur’ to watch from above, ‘veillance’ from above (Galič, Timan, & Koops, 2017; 
Webster, 2017, sec. “surveillance”). 
Syntactic substrate – a substratum of the synthetic layer that contains the computer 
language, instructions, and syntax, which enables the internet to function. The 
physical layer, of cyberspace, enables access to the semantic substrate, through 
the syntactic substrate where the hacking occurs to gain access to the information 
in the semantic (Libicki, 2007, pp. 8-10; Valeriano & Maness, 2015, pp. 22-24). 
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System of Systems (SOS) ‒ a super system or meta system comprised of elements 
which themselves are independent systems, and interact among themselves to 
achieve, either wittingly or unwittingly, a common goal (Johnson IV, Tolk, & 
Sousa-Poza, 2013, p. 284). Emergence of patterns/properties in a complex system 
will come about (emerge) through operation of the system (Keating, 2009, p. 170). 
T. 
The First Wave ‒ Agrarian Age; the age of the three estates, 1st Estate or the 
Clergy, 2d Estate or the Nobility, 3d Estate or the Serfs, Peasants, or Commoner. 
Society revolved around the cultivation of arable land and the security of it. 
Information circulated by word of mouth orally from person to person. Hence, 
conflict generally revolved around the protection or acquisition of land or territory 
(Connolly, 1979; De Tocqueville, 1955; Toffler, 1980; Toffler & Toffler, 1993). 
Agrarian Age spanned from 8000 – 9000 BC or BCE (Saharan Africans begin to 
farm and raise cattle for subsistence) to 1770s (Toffler, 1980). 
The Second Wave ‒ Industrial Age (i.e., Revolution), the age of mechanization of 
textiles, transportation, communications, warfare, etc., which created the requisite 
mass production, mass merchandising, and mass distribution of goods and services 
(Toffler, 1980; Toffler & Toffler, 1993). Society became dependent on industrial 
production and the security of materials and means of production. Information 
passed via word of mouth, written word via print media, or use of telegraph, 
telephone, and/or radio to transmit information. Agriculture still necessary to 
sustain the population became increasingly industrialized and more efficient (i.e., 
Eli Whitney’s Cotton Gin). Conflict between the industrial and agrarian age 
societies culminated in the U.S. Civil War (1861‒1864), with the industrial society 
firmly supplanting the agrarian (Toffler, 1980). The Industrial Age spanned from 
approximately 1800 to 1960.  
The Third Wave – Third Wave – Information Revolution (current age), the age of 
digitization and computerization of information through use of interconnected 
networks spanning the globe (i.e., the internet, World Wide Web, Cyberspace), 
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enabling the nearly instantaneous transfer of information and knowledge, leading 
to the demassification of society (Nye, 2014; Toffler, 1980; Toffler & Toffler, 
1993). Social and political power resides with those creating, innovating, 
controlling, managing, harnessing information to improve or innovate the use of 
existing legacy or newly developed systems (Nye, 2014; Toffler, 1980; Toffler & 
Toffler, 1993). By using information, agriculture and industrial products have 
become commodities (Toffler, 1980; Toffler & Toffler, 1993). The Information 
Revolution began in the 1960s and continues in the present era. 
Tone ‒ a construct meant to apply a objective scale (i.e., +10 to ‒10) to media 
narratives from cooperative (i.e., positive, +10) to conflictual (i.e., negative, ‒10) 
(Bi, 2015; Brandt, Colaresi, & Freeman, 2008; Colaresi, 2004; Goldstein, 1992; 
Goldstein & Pevehouse, 1997; Schrodt & Gerner, 1997; Shellman, Clare Hatfield, 
& Mills, 2010; Yonamine, 2001). 
Throttling ‒ adjusting the amount of bandwidth to or from a server. The term is 
often associated with Internet Service Providers (ISP)s that limit the speed to users 
based on the volume or type of traffic being transmitted (PC Mag Digital Group, 
2020, sec. “throttling”).  
U. 
V. 
Verbal Conflictual (Negative) – a spoken criticism, threat, or accusation, innately 
rhetorical and often related to past or future potential acts of conflict (Schrodt, 
2017, p. 20). 
Verbal Cooperative (Positive) – narratives describing dialog-based meeting, such 
as negotiations or peace talks or statements that express a desire to cooperate or 
appeal for assistance (other than material aid) for other states (Schrodt, 2017, p. 
20).  
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Virtual Private Network (VPN) ‒ protected information system link utilizing 
tunneling, security controls, and endpoint address translation giving the 
impression of a dedicated line (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 
131). 
W. 
World Wide Web (WWW) – see internet ~ synonymous usage throughout this 




APPENDIX B. SOURCES OF NEWS MEDIA EVENTS  






# Name of News Source Website address News Type Language
1 alakhbar http://feeds.feedburner.com/AlAkhbarEnglish?format=xml international english
2 alarabia http://english.alarabiya.net/.mrss/en.xml international english
3 aljazeera http://america.aljazeera.com/content/ajam/articles.rss international english
4 allafrica http://allafrica.com/tools/headlines/rdf/latest/headlines.rdf international english
5 allafrica_somalia http://allafrica.com/tools/headlines/rdf/somalia/headlines.rdf international english
6 almonitor http://www.al‐monitor.com/rss international english
7 afghanistan_analysts http://www.afghanistan‐analysts.org/feed/ local english
8 africa_newstime http://feeds.feedburner.com/NewstimeAfrica?format=xml international english
9 ap http://hosted2.ap.org/atom/APDEFAULT/cae69a7523db45408eeb2b3a98c0c9c5 wire english
10 asharq_al_awsat http://www.aawsat.net/feed international english
11 asianage_delhi http://www.asianage.com/rss/40 local english
12 asianage_india http://www.asianage.com/rss/38 local english
13 asianage_int http://www.asianage.com/rss/37 international english
14 asianage_mumbai http://www.asianage.com/rss/42 local english
15 asiancorrespondent http://asiancorrespondent.com/feed/ international english
16 australia_smh_politics http://www.smh.com.au/rssheadlines/federal‐politics/article/rss.xml international english
17 australia_smh_world http://feeds.smh.com.au/rssheadlines/world.xml international english
18 australia_smh_national http://feeds.smh.com.au/rssheadlines/national.xml international english
19 austria_voice http://voiceofvienna.org/?feed=rss2 international english
20 balkanins http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/rss/all‐balkans‐news‐latest international english
21 baltic_times http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheBalticTimes?format=xml local english
22 bangkokpost_breaking http://www.bangkokpost.com/rss/data/breakingnews.xml local english
23 bangkokpost_top http://www.bangkokpost.com/rss/data/topstories.xml local english
24 bbc http://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml wire english
25 buenosairesherald http://www.buenosairesherald.com/articles/rss.aspx local english
26 bulatlat http://feeds.feedburner.com/bulatlat?format=xml local english
27 canada_globalnews http://globalnews.ca/feed/ local english
28 cbs_world http://www.cbsnews.com/latest/rss/world international english
29 china_scmp_asia http://www.scmp.com/rss/3/feed international english
30 china_scmp_china http://www.scmp.com/rss/4/feed international english
31 china_scmp_hk http://www.scmp.com/rss/2/feed international english
32 china_scmp_world http://www.scmp.com/rss/5/feed international english
33 chinapost_asia http://www.chinapost.com.tw/rss/asia.xml international english
34 chinapost_china http://www.chinapost.com.tw/rss/china.xml international english
35 chinapost_international http://www.chinapost.com.tw/rss/international.xml international english
36 chinapost_taiwan http://www.chinapost.com.tw/rss/taiwan.xml international english
37 chosun http://english.chosun.com/site/data/rss/rss.xml international english
38 croatia_dalje http://feeds.feedburner.com/daljeenglish international english
39 csm_politics http://rss.csmonitor.com/feeds/politics?format=xml international english
40 csm_usa http://rss.csmonitor.com/feeds/usa?format=xml international english
41 csm_world http://rss.csmonitor.com/feeds/world?format=xml international english
42 cyprus_mail http://cyprus‐mail.com/feed/ international english
43 czech_praguemon http://praguemonitor.com/rss/1+11+12+13+14+19+143/feed local english
44 daily_monitor_uganda http://www.monitor.co.ug/‐/691150/691150/‐/view/asFeed/‐/11emxavz/‐/index.xml local english
45 daily_star_lebanon http://www.dailystar.com.lb/RSS.aspx?id=1 international english
46 daily_star_middle_east http://www.dailystar.com.lb/RSS.aspx?id=102 international english
47 daily_start_int http://www.dailystar.com.lb/RSS.aspx?id=113 international english
48 dawn_pk http://feeds.feedburner.com/dawn‐news international english
49 defenseone http://www.defenseone.com/rss/all/ international english
50 denverpost_top http://feeds.denverpost.com/dp‐news‐topstories?format=xml international english
51 denverpost_politics http://feeds.denverpost.com/dp‐politics‐national_politics?format=xml international english
52 dw http://rss.dw.de/rdf/rss‐en‐all international english
53 east_african http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/‐/2456/2456/‐/view/asFeed/‐/13blr5d/‐/index.xml local english
54 egypt_dailynews http://feeds.feedburner.com/DailyNewsEgypt local english
55 egypt_independent http://www.egyptindependent.com//rss‐feed‐term/114/rss.xml international english
56 euronews http://feeds.feedburner.com/euronews/en/home?format=xml international english
57 euroobs http://feeds.euobserver.com/rss/9 international english
58 france24_africa http://www.france24.com/en/africa/rss international english
59 france24_americas http://www.france24.com/en/americas/rss/ international english
60 france24_asiap http://www.france24.com/en/asia‐pacific/rss/ international english
61 france24_me http://www.france24.com/en/middle‐east/rss international english
62 ft http://www.ft.com/rss/world international english
63 google https://news.google.com/?output=rss international english
64 granma http://www.granma.cu/idiomas/ingles/granmai_ingl.xml local english
65 greece_kathimerini http://ws.kathimerini.gr/xml_files/latestnews.xml local english
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66 guardian_africa http://www.theguardian.com/world/africa/roundup/rss international english
67 guardian_americas http://www.theguardian.com/world/americas/roundup/rss international english
68 guardian_china http://feeds.theguardian.com/theguardian/world/china/rss international english
69 guardian_europe http://www.theguardian.com/world/europe/roundup/rss international english
70 guardian_scasia http://www.theguardian.com/world/southandcentralasia/roundup/rss international english
71 haaretz_dd http://feeds.feedburner.com/DefenseAndDiplomacy?format=xml international english
72 haaretz_international http://feeds.feedburner.com/InternationalRss?format=xml international english
73 hindu_cities http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/?service=rss local english
74 hindu_int http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/?service=rss international english
75 hindu_nat http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/?service=rss local english
76 hindustan_bhopal http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Bhopal?format=xml local english
77 hindustan_chandigarh http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Punjab?format=xml local english
78 hindustan_dehradun http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Dehradun?format=xml local english
79 hindustan_delhi http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Delhi?format=xml local english
80 hindustan_gurgaon http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Gurgaon?format=xml local english
81 hindustan_india http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐India?format=xml local english
82 hindustan_indore http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Indore?format=xml local english
83 hindustan_jaipur http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Jaipur?format=xml local english
84 hindustan_kolkata http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Kolkata?format=xml local english
85 hindustan_lucknow http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Lucknow?format=xml local english
86 hindustan_mumbai http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Mumbai‐News?format=xml local english
87 hindustan_noida http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Noida?format=xml local english
88 hindustan_patna http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Patna?format=xml local english
89 hindustan_ranchi http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐Ranchi?format=xml local english
90 hindustan_world http://feeds.hindustantimes.com/HT‐World?format=xml local english
91 houstoncron_news http://www.chron.com/rss/feed/News‐270.php local english
92 hungary_budbusjourn http://www.bbj.hu/assets/rss/rss.php local english
93 hurriyet http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/rss.aspx international english
94 india_deccanher_elec http://www.deccanherald.com/rss/election‐news.rss local english
95 india_deccanher_int http://www.deccanherald.com/rss‐internal/top‐stories.rss local english
96 india_deccanher_news http://www.deccanherald.com/rss/news.rss local english
97 india_mint_companies http://www.livemint.com/rss/companies local english
98 india_mint_econpol http://www.livemint.com/rss/economy_politics local english
99 india_mint_homepage http://www.livemint.com/rss/homepage local english
100 india_mint_industry http://www.livemint.com/rss/industry local english
101 india_statesman_bengal http://www.thestatesman.net/feed.aspx?cat_id=10 local english
102 india_statesman_india http://www.thestatesman.net/feed.aspx?cat_id=1 local english
103 india_statesman_odisha http://www.thestatesman.net/feed.aspx?cat_id=429 local english
104 india_statesman_world http://www.thestatesman.net/feed.aspx?cat_id=2 local english
105 india_telegraph_bengal http://www.telegraphindia.com/feeds/rss.jsp?id=8 local english
106 india_telegraph_bihar http://www.telegraphindia.com/feeds/rss.jsp?id=22 local english
107 india_telegraph_calcutta http://www.telegraphindia.com/feeds/rss.jsp?id=5 local english
108 india_telegraph_int http://www.telegraphindia.com/feeds/rss.jsp?id=13 local english
109 india_telegraph_jharkhand http://www.telegraphindia.com/feeds/rss.jsp?id=23 local english
110 india_telegraph_nation http://www.telegraphindia.com/feeds/rss.jsp?id=4 local english
111 india_telegraph_nbengal http://www.telegraphindia.com/feeds/rss.jsp?id=14 local english
112 india_telegraph_northeast http://www.telegraphindia.com/feeds/rss.jsp?id=24 local english
113 india_telegraph_odisha http://www.telegraphindia.com/feeds/rss.jsp?id=25 local english
114 india_zee_national http://zeenews.india.com/rss/india‐national‐news.xml local english
115 india_zee_states http://zeenews.india.com/rss/india‐news.xml local english
116 india_zee_world http://zeenews.india.com/rss/world‐news.xml international english
117 india_zee_seasia http://zeenews.india.com/rss/south‐asia‐news.xml international english
118 insight http://www.insightcrime.org/news/feed international english
119 int_the_news_islamabad http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheNewsInternational‐Islamabad?format=xml local english
120 int_the_news_karachi http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheNewsInternational‐Karachi?format=xml local english
121 int_the_news_lahore http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheNewsInternational‐Lahore?format=xml local english
122 int_the_news_latest http://feeds.feedburner.com/com/YEor?format=xml local english
123 int_the_news_national http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheNewsInternational‐National?format=xml local english
124 int_the_news_peshawar http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheNewsInternational‐Peshawar?format=xml local english
125 int_the_news_top http://feeds.feedburner.com/com/cwEr?format=xml local english
126 int_the_news_world http://feeds.feedburner.com/World‐TheNewsInternational?format=xml international english
127 ips_africa http://www.ipsnews.net/news/regional‐categories/africa/ international english
128 ips_aid http://www.ipsnews.net/news/development‐aid/feed/ international english
129 ips_asiapac http://www.ipsnews.net/news/regional‐categories/asia‐pacific/ international english
130 ips_civsoc http://www.ipsnews.net/news/civil‐society/feed/ international english
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131 ips_econ http://www.ipsnews.net/news/economy‐trade/feed/ international english
132 ips_env http://www.ipsnews.net/news/environment/feed/ international english
133 ips_europe http://www.ipsnews.net/news/regional‐categories/europe/ international english
134 ips_gender http://www.ipsnews.net/news/gender/feed/ international english
135 ips_gg http://www.ipsnews.net/news/global‐governance/feed/ international english
136 ips_headlines http://www.ipsnews.net/news/headlines/feed/ international english
137 ips_hr http://www.ipsnews.net/news/human‐rights/feed/ international english
138 ips_latinam http://www.ipsnews.net/news/regional‐categories/latin‐america‐and‐caribbean/ international english
139 ips_me http://www.ipsnews.net/news/regional‐categories/middle‐east/ international english
140 ips_namerica http://www.ipsnews.net/news/regional‐categories/north‐america/ international english
141 ips_ss http://www.ipsnews.net/news/south‐south/ international english
142 ips_world http://www.ipsnews.net/news/regional‐categories/world/ international english
143 ireland_herald http://www.herald.ie/rss local english
144 ireland_rte http://www.rte.ie/news/rss/news‐headlines.xml international english
145 irin http://www.irinnews.org/irin.xml international english
146 japan_times http://www.japantimes.co.jp/feed/topstories/ local english
147 jordan_times http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheJordanTimes‐LatestNews?format=xml international english
148 jpost_defense http://www.jpost.com/Rss/RssFeedsDefense.aspx international english
149 jpost_front http://www.jpost.com/Rss/RssFeedsFrontPage.aspx international english
150 jpost_int http://www.jpost.com/Rss/RssFeedsInternationalNews.aspx international english
151 jpost_iran http://www.jpost.com/Rss/RssFeedsIT.aspx international english
152 jpost_me http://www.jpost.com/Rss/RssFeedsMiddleEastNews.aspx international english
153 kenya_nation http://www.nation.co.ke/‐/1148/1148/‐/view/asFeed/‐/vtvnjq/‐/index.xml local english
154 kenya_news24 http://feeds.news24.com/articles/kenya/National/rss local english
155 kenya_star http://www.the‐star.co.ke/rss.xml local english
156 kosovapress http://www.kosovapress.com/en/rss/news/?xml=1 local english
157 kyodo http://english.kyodonews.jp/rss/news.xml international english
158 lithuania_tribune http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/feed/ local english
159 maan_news http://maannews.net/ENG/Rss.aspx?CID=NEW international english
160 maan_regional http://maannews.net/ENG/Rss.aspx?CID=RGN international english
161 maan_politics http://maannews.net/ENG/Rss.aspx?CID=POL international english
162 mail_and_guardian http://mg.co.za/rss/ local english
163 malstar_nat http://www.thestar.com.my/RSS/News/Nation/ local english
164 malstar_regional http://www.thestar.com.my/RSS/News/Regional/ international english
165 malstar_world http://www.thestar.com.my/RSS/News/World/ international english
166 malta_independent http://www.independent.com.mt/rss/news‐51118080/ local english
167 malta_today http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/rss/ local english
168 mb http://www.mb.com.ph/feed/ local english
169 mcclatchy_econ http://www.mcclatchydc.com/economy/v‐rss/index.rss international english
170 mcclatchy_iraq http://www.mcclatchydc.com/iraq/v‐rss/index.rss international english
171 mcclatchy_mideast http://www.mcclatchydc.com/middle‐east/v‐rss/index.rss international english
172 mcclatchy_mexico http://www.mcclatchydc.com/mexico/v‐rss/index.rss international english
173 mcclatchy_guantanamo http://www.mcclatchydc.com/guantanamo/v‐rss/index.rss international english
174 mcclatchy_europe http://www.mcclatchydc.com/europe/v‐rss/index.rss international english
175 mcclatchy_asia http://www.mcclatchydc.com/asia/v‐rss/index.rss international english
176 mcclatchy_afpak http://www.mcclatchydc.com/afghanistan‐pakistan/v‐rss/index.rss international english
177 mcclatchy_whitehouse http://www.mcclatchydc.com/white‐house/v‐rss/index.rss international english
178 mcclatchy_congress http://www.mcclatchydc.com/congress/v‐rss/index.rss international english
179 mcclatchy_state http://www.mcclatchydc.com/state/v‐rss/index.rss international english
180 mcclatchy_election http://www.mcclatchydc.com/election‐news/v‐rss/index.rss international english
181 mcclatchy_politics http://www.mcclatchydc.com/political‐news/v‐rss/index.rss international english
182 mcclatchy_natsec http://www.mcclatchydc.com/national‐security/v‐rss/index.rss international english
183 mcclatchy_courtscrime http://www.mcclatchydc.com/courts‐crime/v‐rss/index.rss local english
184 mcclatchy_nation http://www.mcclatchydc.com/nation‐news/v‐rss/index.rss international english
185 mcclatchy_syria http://www.mcclatchydc.com/syria/v‐rss/index.rss international english
186 mcclatchy_egypt http://www.mcclatchydc.com/egypt/v‐rss/index.rss international english
187 menafn_algeria http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Algeria.xml international english
188 menafn_bahrain http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Bahrain.xml international english
189 menafn_egypt http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Egypt.xml international english
190 menafn_iraq http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Iraq.xml international english
191 menafn_jordan http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Jordan.xml international english
192 menafn_kuwait http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Kuwait.xml international english
193 menafn_lebanon http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Lebanon.xml international english
194 menafn_morocco http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Morocco.xml international english
195 menafn_oman http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Oman.xml international english
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196 menafn_palestine http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Palestine.xml international english
197 menafn_qatar http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Qatar.xml international english
198 menafn_saudi http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Saudi_Arabia.xml international english
199 menafn_syria http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Syria.xml international english
200 menafn_tunisia http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Tunisia.xml international english
201 menafn_turkey http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Turkey.xml international english
202 menafn_uae http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_UAE.xml international english
203 menafn_yemen http://www.menafn.com/rss/menafn_Yemen.xml international english
204 mercopress http://en.mercopress.com/rss/ international english
205 miami_americas http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/index.xml local english
206 miami_cuba http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/cuba/index.xml local english
207 miami_haiti http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/haiti/index.xml local english
208 miami_nation http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation/index.xml local english
209 miami_politics http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics/index.xml local english
210 miami_world http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/index.xml international english
211 middleeasteye http://www.middleeasteye.net/rss international english
212 miltimes_army http://projects.militarytimes.com/rss‐feed/?sitename=Army international english
213 miltimes_navy http://projects.militarytimes.com/rss‐feed/?sitename=Navy international english
214 minnstartrib_national http://www.startribune.com/nation/index.rss2 local english
215 minnstartrib_world http://www.startribune.com/world/index.rss2 international english
216 moldova_infotag http://www.infotag.md/eng/ local english
217 moscow_times http://www.themoscowtimes.com/rss/news/ international english
218 nation_news http://feeds.feedburner.com/pakistan‐news‐newspaper‐daily‐english‐online/24hours‐news?format=xml international english
219 nigeria_abusidiqu http://abusidiqu.com/feed/ local english
220 nigeria_advocate http://theadvocatengr.com/new/?feed=rss2 local english
221 nigeria_blanknews http://blanknewsonline.wordpress.com/feed/ local english
222 nigeria_blueprint http://www.blueprint.ng/feed/ local english
223 nigeria_businessday http://businessdayonline.com/feed/ local english
224 nigeria_businessnews http://businessnews.com.ng/feed/ local english
225 nigeria_businessworld http://businessworldng.com/new/?feed=rss2 local english
226 nigeria_dailyindependent http://dailyindependentnig.com/feed/ local english
227 nigeria_dailypost http://dailypost.ng/feed/ local english
228 nigeria_desertherald http://desertherald.com/feed/ local english
229 nigeria_hallmark http://www.hallmarknews.com/feed/ local english
230 nigeria_herald http://www.theheraldnews.info/feed local english
231 nigeria_leadership http://leadership.ng/feed/ local english
232 nigeria_nationalmirror http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/feed/ local english
233 nigeria_newsday http://newsdayngonline.com/feed/ local english
234 nigeria_newschronicle http://thenews‐chronicle.com/feed/ local english
235 nigeria_newswatch http://www.mydailynewswatchng.com/feed/ local english
236 nigeria_osundefender http://www.osundefender.org/?feed=rss2 local english
237 nigeria_peoplesdaily http://www.peoplesdaily‐online.com/feed/ local english
238 nigeria_pilot http://nigerianpilot.com/feed/ local english
239 nigeria_pmnews http://feeds.feedburner.com/PmNewsNigeriaFeed?format=xml local english
240 nigeria_premiumtimes http://www.premiumtimesng.com/feed local english
241 nigeria_promptnews http://www.promptnewsonline.com/feed/ local english
242 nigeria_quicknews http://www.quicknews‐africa.net/feed/ local english
243 nigeria_saharareporters http://saharareporters.com/feeds/latest/feed local english
244 nigeria_standard http://www.thenigeriastandard.com/index.php?format=feed&type=rss local english
245 nigeria_sunnews http://sunnewsonline.com/new/?feed=rss2 local english
246 nigeria_thepunch http://www.punchng.com/feed/ local english
247 nigeria_tidenews http://www.thetidenewsonline.com/feed/ local english
248 nigeria_tribune_conf http://www.tribune.com.ng/confab?format=feed local english
249 nigeria_tribune_headlines http://www.tribune.com.ng/news/news‐headlines?format=feed local english
250 nigeria_tribune_politics http://www.tribune.com.ng/quicklinkss/politics?format=feed local english
251 nigeria_vangard http://www.vanguardngr.com/feed/ local english
252 nyt http://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml wire english
253 nytafrica http://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/Africa.xml wire english
254 nytamericas http://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/Americas.xml wire english
255 nytasiapacific http://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/AsiaPacific.xml wire english
256 nytatwar http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/feed/ wire english
257 nyteurope http://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/Europe.xml wire english
258 nytindia http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/feed/ wire english
259 nytmiddleeast http://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/MiddleEast.xml wire english
260 nxherald_national http://rss.nzherald.co.nz/rss/xml/nzhrsscid_000000001.xml local english
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261 nzherald_world http://rss.nzherald.co.nz/rss/xml/nzhrsscid_000000002.xml international english
262 ocregister_ap http://hosted2.ap.org/atom/CAANR/0260ea4c3e85456b80715585ba3c7b5b international english
263 pahjwok_english http://www.pajhwok.com/en/nodequeue/1/feed international english
264 pakistan_balohhal http://thebalochhal.com/feed/ local english
265 pakistan_busrecorder_pak http://www.brecorder.com/rss/?feed_id=2&format=raw local english
266 pakistan_busrecorder_world http://www.brecorder.com/rss/?feed_id=3&format=raw international english
267 pakistan_explorer_regional http://dailyexplorer.net/category/regional‐news/feed/ local english
268 pakistan_explorer_national http://dailyexplorer.net/category/national‐news/feed/ local english
269 pakistan_dailymessanger http://dailymessenger.com.pk/feed/ local english
270 pakistan_frontierpost http://thefrontierpost.com/rss/ local english
271 pakistan_fridaytimes http://thefridaytimes.com/tft/feed/ local english
272 pakistan_lahoredispatch http://lahoredispatch.com/feed local english
273 pakistan_kooza http://www.thekooza.com/feed local english
274 pakistan_thenews http://feeds.feedburner.com/Newspakistanpk?format=xml international english
275 pakistan_pakasiatimes http://www.pakasiatimes.com/feed/ international english
276 pakistan_thepioneer http://thepioneer.com.pk/feed/ international english
277 pakistan_tribune http://www.pakistantribune.com.pk/feed local english
278 pakistan_telegraph http://www.pakistantelegraph.com/index.php/rss/8c3d7d78943a99c7 local english
279 pakistan_worldtribune http://worldtribunepakistan.com/feed/ international english
280 panamanews http://thepanamanews.com/wp/?feed=rss2 local english
281 payvand http://www.payvand.com/news/rssfeed.xml local english
282 phil_inquirer http://www.inquirer.net/fullfeed local english
283 phil_manilatimes http://www.manilatimes.net/feed/ local english
284 phil_manilabulletin http://www.mb.com.ph/feed/ local english
285 phil_manilastandard http://manilastandardtoday.com/feed/news/ local english
286 phil_sunstar_breaking http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/breaking‐news local english
287 phil_sunstar_bacolod http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/bacolod local english
288 phil_sunstar_cagayan http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/cagayan‐de‐oro local english
289 phil_sunstar_cebu http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/cebu local english
290 phil_sunstar_davao http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/davao local english
291 phil_sunstar_dumaguete http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/dumaguete local english
292 phil_sunstar_iloilo http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/iloilo local english
293 phil_sunstar_manila http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/manila local english
294 phil_sunstar_pangasinan http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/pangasinan local english
295 phil_sunstar_tacloban http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/tacloban local english
296 phil_sunstar_zamboanga http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/zamboanga local english
297 phil_sunstar_pampanga http://www.sunstar.com.ph/feeds/pampanga local english
298 philstar_headlines http://www.philstar.com/rss/headlines local english
299 philstar_nation http://www.philstar.com/rss/nation local english
300 philstar_world http://www.philstar.com/rss/world local english
301 philstar_region http://www.philstar.com/rss/region local english
302 phil_bicolmail http://www.bicolmail.com/2012/?feed=rss2 local english
303 phil_manilachannel http://www.manilachannel.com/feed/ local english
304 reuters http://feeds.reuters.com/Reuters/worldNews wire english
305 rfa http://www.rfa.org/english/RSS wire english
306 rfe http://www.rferl.org/api/epiqq wire english
307 rfi http://www.english.rfi.fr/last_24h/rss wire english
308 romania_nineoclock http://www.nineoclock.ro/feed/ local english
309 russia_interpreter http://www.interpretermag.com/feed/ local english
310 russia_stpetersburgtimes http://feeds.feedburner.com/sptimes?format=xml local english
311 sacbee_natworld http://www.sacbee.com/830/index.rss international english
312 sacbee_state http://www.sacbee.com/state/index.rss local english
313 seurtimes http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/rss/en_GB/setimes.rss international english
314 sfgate_bayarea http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/feed/Bay‐Area‐News‐429.php local english
315 sfgate_national http://www.sfgate.com/rss/feed/National‐News‐RSS‐Feed‐435.php international english
316 sfgate_world http://www.sfgate.com/rss/feed/World‐News‐From‐SFGate‐432.php international english
317 shanghai_national http://rss.shanghaidaily.com/Portal/mainSite/Handler.ashx?i=3 international english
318 shanghai_world http://rss.shanghaidaily.com/Portal/mainSite/Handler.ashx?i=7 international english
319 skorea_chosun http://english.chosun.com/site/data/rss/rss.xml local english
320 skorea_hankung_econ http://rss.hankyung.com/english/latest.xml local english
321 skorea_yonhap_nk http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/RSS/northkorea.xml local english
322 skorea_yonhap_sk http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/RSS/headline.xml local english
323 somalia_horseed http://feeds.feedburner.com/horseed?format=xml local english
324 somalia_sabahi http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/rss local english
325 southaf_busdaily_nat http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/?service=rss local english
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326 southaf_busdaily_world http://www.bdlive.co.za/world/?service=rss international english
327 southaf_capetownt http://www.iol.co.za/cmlink/1.1046095 local english
328 southaf_citypress http://www.citypress.co.za/feature‐type/top‐stories/feed/ local english
329 southaf_iol_pretoria http://www.iol.co.za/cmlink/1.1118954 local english
330 southaf_iol_thestar http://www.iol.co.za/cmlink/1.1073915 local english
331 southaf_iol http://iol.co.za/cmlink/1.640 local english
332 southaf_mailg http://mg.co.za/rss/ local english
333 spiegel http://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss international english
334 straits_times_asia http://straitstimes.com.feedsportal.com/c/32792/f/640960/index.rss international english
335 straits_times_singapore http://straitstimes.com.feedsportal.com/c/32792/f/640958/index.rss international english
336 straits_times_world http://straitstimes.com.feedsportal.com/c/32792/f/640961/index.rss international english
337 taipeitimes_taiwan http://www.taipeitimes.com/xml/taiwan.rss international english
338 taipeitimes_world http://www.taipeitimes.com/xml/world.rss international english
339 thailand_bankokpost http://www.bangkokpost.com/rss/data/news.xml international english
340 thailand_nation_national http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/rss/national.rss international english
341 thailand_national_politics http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/rss/politics.rss local english
342 thailand_phuket http://www.phuketgazette.net/rss/get_rss_news_by_type/5/15 local english
343 thenational_uae http://www.thenational.ae/section/rss local english
344 thenews_pk_islamabad http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheNewsInternational‐Islamabad local english
345 thenews_pk_karachi http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheNewsInternational‐Karachi local english
346 thenews_pk_lahore http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheNewsInternational‐Lahore local english
347 thenews_pk_national http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheNewsInternational‐National local english
348 thenews_pk_peshawar http://feeds.feedburner.com/TheNewsInternational‐Peshawar local english
349 times_of_india_india http://timesofindia.feedsportal.com/c/33039/f/533965/index.rss local english
350 times_of_india_world http://timesofindia.feedsportal.com/c/33039/f/533917/index.rss international english
351 tolo http://www.tolonews.com/en/component/ninjarsssyndicator/?feed_id=1&format=raw local english
352 toronto_star_top http://www.thestar.com/feeds.topstories.rss international english
353 toronto_star_world http://www.thestar.com/feeds.articles.news.world.rss international english
354 toronto_star_canada http://www.thestar.com/feeds.articles.news.canada.rss international english
355 uganda_monitor http://www.monitor.co.ug/‐/691150/691150/‐/view/asFeed/‐/11emxavz/‐/index.xml local english
356 uganda_newvision_national http://www.newvision.co.ug/feed.aspx?cat_id=1 local english
357 uganda_newvision_world http://www.newvision.co.ug/feed.aspx?cat_id=2 local english
358 uk_telegraph_world http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/rss international english
359 uk_telegraph_national http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/rss international english
360 uk_telegraph_politics http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/rss international english
361 un_africa http://www.un.org/apps/news/rss/rss_africa.asp international english
362 upi http://rss.upi.com/news/emerging_threats.rss international english
363 voa_africa http://www.voanews.com/api/z‐$otevtiq international english
364 voa_all http://www.voanews.com/api/epiqq international english
365 voa_am http://www.voanews.com/api/zoripegtim international english
366 voa_asia http://www.voanews.com/api/zo$o_egviy international english
367 voa_euro http://www.voanews.com/api/zj$oveytit international english
368 voa_me http://www.voanews.com/api/zr$opeuvim international english
369 voa_news http://www.voanews.com/api/zji‐veyj‐v international english
370 wn_africa http://rss.wn.com/English/keyword/africa international english
371 wn_americas http://rss.wn.com/English/keyword/america international english
372 wn_asia http://rss.wn.com/English/keyword/asia international english
373 wn_europe http://rss.wn.com/English/keyword/europe international english
374 wn_mideast http://rss.wn.com/English/keyword/mideast international english
375 wn_politics http://rss.wn.com/English/keyword/politics international english
376 wn_world http://rss.wn.com/English/keyword/world international english
377 wpr_africa http://www.worldpress.org/feeds/africa.xml international english
378 wpr_americas http://www.worldpress.org/feeds/americas.xml international english
379 wpr_asia http://www.worldpress.org/feeds/asia.xml international english
380 wpr_europe http://www.worldpress.org/feeds/europe.xml international english
381 wpr_mideast http://www.worldpress.org/feeds/Mideast.xml international english
382 xinhua http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/rss/worldrss.xml wire english
383 yahoo_india http://in.news.yahoo.com/rss/asia local english
384 yemen_times http://www.yementimes.com/?tpl=1341 local english
385 zaman http://www.todayszaman.com/104.rss international english
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APPENDIX D. MACRO-MODEL COMPARISON RESULTS 
CYBER INTRUSION ATTEMPTS (Macro-Model: All-Media Narratives)                                                                  29 Oct 2020 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Intrusions_Lead (Today) 

















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Neg Mat Narratives 85.840*** 0.006*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.623*** 0.189*** 0.193*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 
 (12.347) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.040) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) 
Neg Ver Narratives 59.524*** ‒0.168*** ‒0.161*** ‒0.161*** ‒0.161*** ‒0.161*** 0.348*** 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 
 (8.737) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) 
Avg NN Tone  7.948*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.111*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
 (2.008) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
NN Tone StdDev ‒6.646** ‒0.031*** ‒0.032*** ‒0.032*** ‒0.032*** ‒0.032*** ‒0.008 ‒0.009 ‒0.008 ‒0.006 ‒0.006 
 (3.183) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Polity ‒5.340*** ‒0.009*** ‒0.012*** ‒0.012*** ‒0.012*** ‒0.012*** 0.007*** ‒0.006*** ‒0.006*** ‒0.006** ‒0.006** 
 (0.559) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Polity squared 0.559*** 0.001*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0003 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.098) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Internet PenRate ‒1.334*** ‒0.004*** ‒0.004*** ‒0.004*** ‒0.004*** ‒0.004*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.190) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Internet Not Free 20.635*** 0.199*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** ‒0.052* 0.063** 0.063** 0.095*** 0.095*** 
 (6.741) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) 
Media Not Free 0.198 ‒0.186*** ‒0.250*** ‒0.250*** ‒0.251*** ‒0.251*** ‒0.004 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 
 (7.622) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
Media Self-Censor 8.156 0.078*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.010 0.045* 0.046* 0.055* 0.055* 
 (7.590) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) 
Log: Population ‒11.752*** 0.131*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.420*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 
 (2.080) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log: GDP ‒23.486*** 0.257*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.380*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 
 (4.442) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
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Log: Tot Narratives 5.197 0.151*** 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.048** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 (5.747) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
Log: Tot Intrusions 120.781*** 0.790*** 0.764*** 0.764*** 0.764*** 0.764*** 0.781*** 0.759*** 0.759*** 0.771*** 0.771*** 
 (1.924) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Tuesday ‒0.765 ‒0.0004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 ‒0.028 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
 (8.402) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) 
Wednesday 15.280* 0.198*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.052 ‒0.024 ‒0.015 ‒0.016 ‒0.016 
 (8.360) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) 
Thursday 3.325 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** ‒0.052 ‒0.020 ‒0.026 ‒0.028 ‒0.028 
 (8.433) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) 
Friday 13.491 0.172*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.241*** 0.324*** 0.317*** 0.351*** 0.351*** 
 (8.358) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) 
Saturday 11.341 0.176*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.153*** 0.201*** 0.197*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 
 (8.423) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) 
Sunday ‒21.571** ‒0.268*** ‒0.267*** ‒0.267*** ‒0.267*** ‒0.267*** ‒0.165*** ‒0.218*** ‒0.220*** ‒0.215*** ‒0.215*** 
 (8.553) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) 
Feb 2015 10.297 0.203*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.083* 0.554*** 0.553*** 0.548*** 0.548*** 
 (10.428) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.047) (0.063) (0.063) (0.067) (0.067) 
Mar 2015 13.065 ‒0.088*** ‒0.025*** ‒0.025*** ‒0.025*** ‒0.025*** ‒0.370*** ‒0.017 ‒0.017 ‒0.019 ‒0.019 
 (10.101) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.047) (0.062) (0.062) (0.065) (0.065) 
April 2015 2.189 ‒0.058*** ‒0.035*** ‒0.035*** ‒0.036*** ‒0.036*** ‒0.009 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 
 (10.190) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.046) (0.059) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) 
May 2015 35.796** 1.953*** 1.995*** 1.995*** 1.995*** 1.995*** 2.146*** 2.821*** 2.812*** 2.819*** 2.819*** 
 (15.746) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.057) (0.085) (0.085) (0.090) (0.090) 
Sep 2016 30.780** 0.568*** 0.490*** 0.490*** 0.490*** 0.490*** 0.594*** ‒0.183*** ‒0.182*** ‒0.243*** ‒0.243*** 
 (13.104) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.053) (0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.060) 
Oct 2016 ‒34.995*** 0.414*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.875*** ‒0.008 ‒0.009 ‒0.068 ‒0.068 
 (10.246) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) 
Nov 2016 ‒98.488*** 0.610*** 0.474*** 0.474*** 0.474*** 0.474*** 1.395*** 0.503*** 0.501*** 0.472*** 0.472*** 
 (10.440) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) 
Dec 2016 ‒86.385*** 0.639*** 0.515*** 0.515*** 0.515*** 0.515*** 1.401*** 0.344*** 0.343*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 
 (10.754) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.043) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) 
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Jan 2017 ‒141.828*** 0.404
*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 1.101*** 0.068 0.067 0.014 0.014 
 (10.497) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) 
Feb 2017 ‒167.618*** 0.486
*** 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.318*** 1.302*** 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.123** 0.123** 
 (11.489) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) 
Mar 2017 ‒164.415*** 0.436
*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 1.268*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.064 0.064 
 (12.795) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.054) (0.054) 
NN Gold_Mean x 
Polity ‒0.139 ‒0.001
*** ‒0.001*** ‒0.001*** ‒0.001*** ‒0.001*** ‒0.013*** ‒0.011*** ‒0.011*** ‒0.011*** ‒0.011*** 
 (0.204) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 386.601*** ‒4.065*** ‒1.976*** ‒1.976*** ‒1.976*** ‒1.976*** ‒11.966*** ‒5.213*** ‒5.212*** ‒5.271*** ‒5.271*** 
 (51.498) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.216) (0.222) (0.222) (0.238) (0.238) 
Observations 34,881 34,881 34,881 34,881 34,881 34,881 34,881 34,881 34,881 34,881 34,881 
Observations (test sample) 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 9,664 
MAE 123.350 31.439 31.340 31.340 31.350 31.349 111.913 44.049 44.048 45.523 45.520 
MAE (test sample) 130.924 38.634 38.837 38.838 38.842 38.842 111.246 48.766 48.720 49.796 49.794 
RMSE 418.867 351.229 342.724 342.726 342.729 342.730 2,072.289 543.335 543.759 585.268 585.268 
RMSE (test sample) 1,005.313 928.845 931.251 931.251 931.249 931.249 1,293.566 946.218 945.726 947.278 947.278 
AIC 520,247.768 1,775,769.093 1,682,839.334 1,682,829.772 1,682,814.926 1,682,805.882 162,105.122 153,432.191 153,429.251 153,034.533 153,025.488 
Log Likelihood ‒260,089.884 ‒887,851.546 ‒841,353.667 ‒841,358.886 ‒841,341.463 ‒841,346.941 ‒81,018.561 ‒76,649.095 ‒76,657.625 ‒76,450.266 ‒76,455.744 
Note: In Models 4, 6, 9, and 11 the statistically insignificant coefficients for the zero-inflated or hurdle 
portions of the models were removed to improve model fit (Zeileis, Kleiber, and Jackman, 2015). 






APPENDIX E. RESEARCH MODEL COMPARISON RESULTS 
CYBER INTRUSION ATTEMPTS – Today                                                                                                                                                                13 Nov 2020 
 TotalIntrusions ‒ Today (Regime and Country Comparison) 
 Poisson Model 
Independent Variables / Model 
All-Negative 
Narrative All-Autocracies China Iran All-Anocracies Russia Turkey All-Democracies United  Kingdom India 
NegMaterialNarratives 0.03*** 0.14*** 0.42*** ‒0.12*** 0.10*** ‒0.11*** 0.03 0.03*** ‒0.27*** 0.22*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.03) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) 
NegVerbalNarratives ‒0.24*** ‒0.23*** 0.09*** ‒0.22*** 0.0000 ‒0.12*** ‒0.41*** 0.08*** ‒0.19*** ‒0.18*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.02) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) 
Avg NN Tone (GoldMean) ‒0.003*** ‒0.21*** 0.12*** 0.02*** ‒0.001 0.001 0.01 0.23*** ‒0.63*** ‒0.01** 
 (0.001) (0.02) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.003) 
NN Tone StdDev ‒0.01*** 0.04*** 0.15*** ‒0.07*** ‒0.02*** ‒0.03*** 0.02** ‒0.03*** 0.06*** ‒0.20*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.01) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
Polity ‒0.01*** ‒2.75***   ‒0.01***  ‒0.08*** 0.77*** ‒0.02  
 (0.0001) (0.05)   (0.001)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  
Polity squared ‒0.001*** ‒0.21***   ‒0.01***   ‒0.04***   
 (0.0000) (0.003)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
Internet Not Free 0.12***    ‒0.29***   0.08***   
 (0.003)    (0.01)   (0.005)   
Media Not Free ‒0.21***       ‒0.12***   
 (0.003)       (0.003)   
Media Self-Censorship 0.08***    3.50***   0.04***   
 (0.003)    (0.45)   (0.003)   
Friday 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.58*** 0.56*** 0.42*** 0.48*** 0.29*** 0.53*** ‒0.91*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) 
Saturday 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.66*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.07*** 0.07*** ‒0.25*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sunday ‒0.32*** ‒0.31*** ‒0.17*** ‒0.27*** ‒0.29*** ‒0.25*** 0.02 ‒0.27*** ‒0.31*** ‒0.15*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) 
NN Gold_Mean x Polity 0.002*** ‒0.03***   0.01***  0.01** ‒0.03*** 0.07***  
 (0.0001) (0.003)   (0.0004)  (0.004) (0.001) (0.01)  
Constant ‒4.49*** ‒13.75*** 3,209.80*** ‒13,296.73*** ‒11.69*** ‒47,474.37*** 1.86*** ‒5.99*** ‒0.67 ‒11,174.95*** 
 (0.03) (0.20) (77.65) (104.99) (0.47) (976.82) (0.20) (0.10) (0.65) (337.85) 
Observations 40,608 5,184 288 288 10,071 288 288 24,126 288 288 
MAE 36.9 137.1 1,245.2 841.9 15.7 146.5 96.7 22.2 140.2 399.0 
RMSE 581.0 1,309.9 4,466.3 1,905.6 118.9 250.5 323.0 202.8 432.0 1,176.5 
AIC 2,512,547.6 1,174,295.0 414,419.0 364,709.0 192,375.2 33,555.2 37,022.5 767,059.7 35,507.4 108,732.1 
Log Likelihood ‒1,256,240.8 ‒587,117.5 ‒207,185.5 ‒182,330.5 ‒96,155.6 ‒16,753.6 ‒18,486.3 ‒383,496.8 ‒17,728.7 ‒54,342.1 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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APPENDIX F. ADDITIONAL CHARTS USED IN ANALYSIS 
Figure 33.  Coefficient Intrusion Prediction (Plot 1 & 2 [w/out China]) 
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Figure 34.  Coefficient Intrusion Prediction (Plot 3 & 4 [w/out China]) 
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Figure 35.  Coefficient Intrusion Prediction (Plot 5 & 6 [w/out China]) 
4 of 4 
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Figure 36.  Self-Censorship Model Comparison 
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Score PenRate # Country 
Polity 
Score PenRate 
1 Azerbaijan ‒7 0.790 11 Laos ‒7 0.255 
2 Bahrain ‒10 0.980 12 Oman ‒8 0.801 
3 Belarus ‒7 0.744 13 Qatar ‒10 0.974 
4 China ‒7 0.543 14 Saudi Arabia ‒10 0.942 
5 Cuba ‒7 0.571 15 Swaziland ‒9 0.303 
6 Eritrea  ‒7 0.013 16 Syria ‒9 0.343 
7 Iran (Persia) ‒7 0.640 17 United Arab Emirates ‒8 0.948 
8 Kazakhstan  ‒6 0.764 18 Uzbekistan ‒9 0.487 
9 PRC, Korea ‒10 0.010 19 Vietnam ‒7 0.581 




Score Penrate # Country 
Polity 
Score Penrate 
1 Afghanistan ‒1 0.114 23 Mauritania ‒2 0.208 
2 Algeria 2 0.477 24 Morocco ‒4 0.618 
3 Angola ‒2 0.143 25 Myanmar (Burma) ‒3 0.217 
4 Armenia 5 0.647 26 Niger 5 0.102 
5 Bangladesh 1 0.180 27 Nigeria 4 0.360 
6 Bhutan 5 0.418 28 Papua New Guinea 5 0.112 
7 Burundi ‒1 0.052 29 Russia (Soviet Union) 4 0.760 
8 Cambodia (Kampuchea) 2 0.329 30 Rwanda ‒3 0.218 
9 Cameroon ‒5 0.232 31 Singapore ‒4 0.845 
10 Chad ‒1 0.065 32 Somalia 5 0.020 
11 Congo, Rep of ‒4 0.087 33 Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 4 0.121 
12 DRC, Congo, (Zaire)  5 0.086 34 Sudan ‒4 0.309 
13 Cote D’Ivoire 4 0.438 35 Surinam 5 0.489 
14 Djibouti 3 0.557 36 Tajikistan ‒3 0.220 
15 Ecuador 5 0.541 37 Tanzania/Tanganyika 3 0.200 
16 Egypt ‒4 0.450 38 Thailand ‒3 0.529 
17 Ethiopia ‒3 0.186 39 Turkey(Ottoman Empire) 3 0.647 
18 Gambia 4 0.198 40 Uganda ‒1 0.237 
19 Haiti 5 0.123 41 Ukraine 4 0.589 
20 Jordan ‒3 0.668 42 Venezuela 4 0.643 
21 Malaysia 5 0.801 43 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 4 0.271 
22 Mali 5 0.127     
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1 Albania 9 0.72 31 Guatemala 8 0.41 60 Nicaragua 9 0.28 
2 Argentina 9 0.74 32 Guyana 7 0.37 61 Niger 6 0.02 
3 Australia 10 0.87 33 Honduras 7 0.32 62 Nigeria 7 0.26 
4 Austria 10 0.88 34 Hungary 10 0.79 63 Norway 10 0.97 
5 Belgium 8 0.88 35 India 9 0.32 64 Pakistan 7 0.17 
6 Benin 7 0.14 36 Indonesia 9 0.32 65 Panama 9 0.60 
7 Bolivia 7 0.44 37 Iraq 6 0.58 66 Paraguay 9 0.61 
8 Botswana 8 0.41 38 Ireland 10 0.84 67 Peru 9 0.50 
9 Brazil 8 0.67 39 Israel 6 0.82 68 Philippines 8 0.60 
10 Bulgaria 9 0.63 40 Italy (Sardinia) 10 0.63 69 Poland 10 0.76 
11 
Burkina 
Faso 6 0.16 41 Jamaica 9 0.55 70 Portugal 10 0.74 
12 Burundi 6 0.05 42 Japan 10 0.93 71 Rumania 9 0.64 





6 0.04 44 Korea, Republic of 8 0.95 73 Serbia 8 0.70 
15 Chile 10 0.84 45 Kyrgyz Republic 7 0.38 74 Sierra Leone 7 0.13 
16 Colombia 7 0.62 46 Latvia 8 0.80 75 Slovakia 10 0.82 
17 Costa Rica 10 0.72 47 Lebanon 6 0.78 76 Slovenia 10 0.79 
18 Croatia 9 0.73 48 Liberia 6 0.33 77 Solomon Islands 8 0.12 
19 Cyprus 10 0.81 49 Lithuania 10 0.78 78 South Africa 9 0.56 
20 
Czech 
Republic 9 0.79 50 
Macedonia 
(Yugoslavia) 9 0.75 79 Spain 10 0.85 
21 Denmark 10 0.97 51 Mauritius 10 0.55 80 Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 6 0.34 
22 
Dominican 
Republic 8 0.68 52 Mexico 8 0.64 81 Sweden 10 0.93 
23 El Salvador 8 0.34 53 Moldova 9 0.76 82 Switzerland 10 0.90 
24 Estonia 9 0.88 54 Mongolia 10 0.24 83 Taiwan 10 0.88 
25 Finland 10 0.88 55 Montenegro 9 0.71 84 Trinidad and Tobago 9 0.77 
26 France 10 0.81 56 Namibia 6 0.37 85 Tunisia 7 0.56 
27 Georgia 7 0.60 57 Nepal 6 0.21 86 United Kingdom 8 0.95 
28 Germany 10 0.88 58 Netherlands 10 0.93 87 Uruguay 10 0.70 
29 Ghana 8 0.38 59 New Zealand 10 0.91 88 Zambia 7 0.28 
30 Greece 10 0.70         
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APPENDIX H. FIGURES COMPARING REGIME TYPE NEGATIVE 
NARRATIVE TONE TO LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY 
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